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This thesis, presented in six thematic chapters, investigates an approach for promoting the growth 
of small businesses in South Africa. Chapter 1 motivates the thesis by discussing the contested 
role of small businesses in reducing unemployment and fostering social equity. Chapter 2 reviews 
the small business development policy in South Africa and explicates the socioeconomic 
conditions underpinning the policy. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are empirical analyses using data from the 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys of 2003 and 2007, and the World Bank Financial Crisis Survey of 
2010 to determine key impediments to the growth of small businesses and characteristics of firms 
creating and retaining most jobs in South Africa.  
Chapter 3 uses two methods to investigate the key impediments. The first method is based on a 
count of obstacles that entrepreneurs rate as seriously affecting enterprise operations. The second 
estimates the effects of the obstacles on growth through sequential multivariate regressions and 
identifies binding constraints for different categories of firms. It emerges that medium-sized firms 
are mildly affected by most obstacles but micro and small firms are significantly affected by crime, 
electricity and transportation problems. The chapter provides important insight on the sequencing 
of interventions to address the impediments to growth. 
Chapter 4 studies the finance constraint. It evaluates the importance of the constraint firstly by 
assessing whether firms rating finance as a serious problem underperform firms rating the problem 
as less important. Thereafter, the chapter studies the experiences of firms when seeking external 
finance and identifies four levels of the finance constraint. Using an ordered logit model and a 
binary logit model, the chapter explores the profile of financially constrained firms. Results show 
that firms owned by ethnic groups disadvantaged in the apartheid era are more likely to be credit-
constrained. The results also suggest that the likelihood of being credit-constrained decreases with 
higher levels of formal education. The results inform policy on the types of firms that financial 
interventions must target. 
Chapter 5 builds on a growing body of evidence which shows that a small proportion of firms in an 
economy account for over 50 percent of net new jobs. The evidence from the literature suggests 
that such high-growth enterprises have distinct characteristics that could make it possible for 
interventions to nurture or for other firms to emulate. The chapter employs two methods to 
investigate the characteristics of high-growth firms. The first is logit regression, which the 
investigation uses to determine characteristics of firms that create more jobs than the average firm. 
The characteristics are also interacted to identify interaction terms most associated with growth. 




The second method is quantile regression, which makes it possible to assess the importance of 
each characteristic for firms in different levels of growth rates. The results show that the typical 
high-growth firm is more likely to be black-owned. The results of the chapter however highlight the 
need for further research into characteristics that may perhaps explain high-growth firms more 
robustly than variables in the survey instrument. The research ends with a summary, a discussion 
of areas of further research, and policy recommendations in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In countries with high levels of unemployment and social inequalities, government policies often 
emphasise the potential contribution of small businesses in addressing such socioeconomic 
challenges. But since governments have limited resources to attend to all possible issues impeding 
the growth of small businesses, there are some important empirical questions evoked by such 
policies. One such question is on the growth impediments that small businesses encounter in a 
given context, particularly what the most critical ones are and the extent to which they constrain 
growth. If this question is addressed, the limited resources can be used to attend to the most 
critical impediments. Given the high failure rate of small businesses, another important question 
concerns the characteristics of firms that survive, create and retain jobs. Specifically, what are the 
characteristics of firms that take on more employees than the generality of others? An 
understanding of such characteristics informs the design of interventions and whom such 
interventions must target for the socioeconomic challenges to be addressed. These empirical 
issues motivate the research for this thesis.  
The thesis explores how support to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) could be 
designed to improve the socioeconomic circumstances of many in South Africa, especially by 
creating jobs. South Africa has had decades of high levels of unemployment that has averaged 
23.5 percent since 1995 (South African Reserve Bank (SARB), 2014). The country also has high 
levels of social and income inequality, attributed mainly to the colonial and apartheid era policies 
that limited the majority of South Africans’ participation in commercial activities and matters relating 
to national policy formulation. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the government promotes 
MSMEs as the foremost strategy to integrate the society and to address the socioeconomic 
challenges evidenced by high levels of unemployment (National Planning Commission (NPC), 
2011). A study on the South African MSME sector is therefore an invaluable contribution to the 
socioeconomic policy debates in South Africa and the empirical literature on enterprise 
development in emerging economies.  
Although many studies, as reviewed by Rogerson (2008), have been conducted to inform 
government policy on how support to MSMEs could be improved in South Africa, lack of reliable 
firm-level data capturing enterprise performance over consecutive periods has meant that the 
impact that obstacles such as access to finance have on job creation and overall enterprise 
performance is speculative. Specifically, it is not clear which obstacles ought to be prioritised for 
policy interventions. It is also not clear which characteristics in firms and business owners the 
interventions must nurture for more jobs to be created. This thesis uses the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys (WBES) of 2003 and 2007 and the World Bank Financial Crisis Survey (WBFCS) of 2010 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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to investigate the key obstacles to the growth of MSMEs and determine the characteristics of firms 
creating most jobs in South Africa.  
The WBES provide comprehensive firm-level data that include obstacles firms encounter, jobs 
each firm created or lost, financial information about the firms as well as specific characteristics of 
the firms, managers and business owners. Most of the studies using the WBES are cross-country 
(for example Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Singer, 2013; Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier and Pages, 
2011;Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2010; and Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008). 
Cross-country studies include many countries in the analyses such that the resultant policy 
recommendations may not relate to specific circumstances prevailing in a country of interest such 
as South Africa.  
Indeed, most cross-country studies recognise the limited relevance of their policy 
recommendations to individual countries analysed. For example, Ayyagari et al. (2008: 486) note 
that although controlling for country-fixed effects provides some useful country-level information on 
issues affecting enterprise growth, such information is ‘not definitive’ because start-ups and firm 
size distribution is influenced by business conditions in a particular country and is thus unique to a 
country. In-depth single country studies are thus essential for more appropriate policy 
recommendations since an in-depth single country study considers comprehensively the peculiar 
business conditions of the country and the unique firm size distribution such conditions have 
fostered. 
1.2 MICRO, SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES AND JOB CREATION 
The policy question on how public incentives for job creation can be designed to target recipients 
who would create most jobs such that public funds are most effectively utilised is well-studied 
(Anderson, 1982; Birch, 1981; Winter, 1995; Rogerson, 2001; Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Nichter and 
Goldmark, 2009; Shane, 2009). The study by Birch (1981) however is important in that it highlights 
the challenges research and policy on small businesses must contend with. Birch (1981) observed 
that the main problem encountered by policymakers in designing effective policies was that it was 
not clear which enterprise types created most jobs. So Birch (1981) investigated the problem using 
data covering 80 percent of firms in the United States of America and concluded that two-thirds of 
new jobs between 1969 and 1976 “were created by firms with twenty or fewer employees, and 
about 80 percent were created by firms with 100 or fewer employees” (Birch 1981: 7). The findings 
by Birch (1981) prompted a debate on the importance of small businesses in job creation. This 
thesis is attentive to the resultant debate and how empirically and theoretically fragile the argument 
that small businesses deliver jobs is.  
Methodological concerns, some of which Birch (1981) was upfront with in his report, were perhaps 
the first to emerge as basis to contest the findings. One concern is that the investigation did not 
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adequately deal with the high failure rate of small businesses, and another is the fact that some 
small businesses are subsidiaries of large firms, an issue not considered in the study (Davis, 
Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1994). A further concern is that the ‘regression to the mean’ problem was 
not dealt with in the study such that a small firm initially classified as a job-creator in the earlier 
years of the study period could be classified as a ‘fast-shrinking large firm’ in the later years of the 
study period if it reverted to its original size (Nightingale and Coad, 2013: 122). In spite of these 
concerns, however, Landström (2010) and Acs and Mueller (2008) among many others note that in 
Birch (1981), the ‘conventional claims’ (Davis et al., 1994: 13) that small businesses create most 
jobs found empirical justification beyond the urge to appease the sheer numbers of small business 
owners to gain political votes (Thurik and Wennekers, 2004).  
Studies subsequent to Birch (1981) provide mixed evidence on the importance of small businesses 
in reducing unemployment, with some researchers arguing strongly against public policy 
interventions for small businesses (Cowling and Siepel, 2013; Shane, 2009; Holtz-Eakin, 2000). 
One reason Shane (2009: 144-145) gives to demonstrate the wastefulness of broad-based 
programmes to support small business owners on the finding that “43 people have to try to start 
companies so that we can have 9 jobs a decade from now”.  
Indeed, Stel, Carree and Thurik (2005) used the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data and 
found that the effects of entrepreneurial activity on economic growth are positively associated with 
higher levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of a country such that countries with low 
per capita incomes may not grow or improve the lives of their citizens by promoting small 
businesses. But instead of concluding that entrepreneurship1 must not be encouraged in 
developing countries, Stel et al. (2005: 318-319) argue that developing countries have few large 
firms from which knowledge can spill over to small-scale entrepreneurial activities. Without such 
knowledge and skills, the performance of entrepreneurial ventures is set to be mediocre resulting 
in limited socioeconomic development (Stel et al., 2005; Wennekers, Stel, Thurik and Reynolds, 
2005; Amorόs, 2009).  
On the other end of the debate is a strong commitment to support small businesses by public 
authorities globally. The commitment is expressed in reports such as the World Development 
Report (WDR, 2013) which identifies job creation through MSMEs as underpinning improvements 
in living standards, productivity and social cohesion and the G20 (Group of 20) report by the SMEs 
                                               
1
 There is a debate in the literature on the appropriateness of the noun ‘entrepreneur’ being used in 
reference to owners of MSMEs (e.g. Amorόs, 2009; Davidsson, 2004; Shane and Venkatarama, 2000; 
Baumol, 1990). In this thesis, ‘business owner’ rather than ‘entrepreneur’ is used except when the literature 
on entrepreneurship, especially that influenced by the GEM datasets, is being discussed. 
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Finance Group which surveyed programmes supporting Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)2 in 
developing countries so as to determine the most effective programmes for scaling-up with the 
financial support of the G20 (G20, 2010). For policymakers the question is how to improve support 
to small and emerging firms and not whether small and emerging firms can create jobs, promote 
growth or improve living standards (Hallberg, 2000; Biggs, 2002). 
There are further rationalisations that affirm the commitment of policymakers to supporting 
MSMEs. The rationalisations can be summarised from the more detailed discussions by 
Snodgrass and Biggs (1996), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2005) and Green, Kirkpatrick and 
Murinde (2005) as follows. MSMEs enhance competition and boost innovation, which results in 
economy-wide efficiencies that are necessary for economic growth. MSMEs are in some cases 
more efficient and more productive than large firms, for example in serving niche markets that 
could be too small for large firms. However, MSMEs encounter more obstacles such as accessing 
finance to enable them to acquire better technologies to remain competitive. As a result, MSMEs 
are labour-intensive, affirming their importance in economies that have high levels of less skilled 
labour (Snodgrass and Biggs, 1996; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2005). It is further argued 
that because of their labour intensity, MSMEs are “more equitable in distributing the income that 
they generate” suggesting that MSMEs could be vital tools for engendering economic growth and 
social equity (Snodgrass and Biggs, 1996: 11).  
In essence, the debate on whether or not small businesses must be supported on the basis of their 
job-creating capacity (where job creation represents a better livelihood as suggested by WDR 
(2013)) is unlikely to be settled. In fact, after reviewing the debate Hallberg (2000) concluded that 
the importance of small businesses is based on them being dominant private sector entities and 
accounting for most of the jobs in developing countries. Findings such as in Stel et al. (2005) and 
Amorόs (2009) on preconditions necessary for small businesses to lead to economic growth are 
therefore quite important in buttressing the research agenda in developing countries. The 
challenge for policy and research in developing countries is in determining ways of improving 
conditions in which small businesses operate cognisant of the evidence that most of the MSMEs 
fold even when some of the obstacles to growth are addressed (Naudé, 2010; Amorόs, 2009). 
Thus, over and above exploring the most serious obstacles as most of the research in developing 
countries does, it is important to understand the characteristics of firms that are consistent in 
creating jobs, hence this thesis discussion on the profile of such firms.  
                                               
2
 In the thesis, the acronyms MSMEs and SMEs are not used interchangeably. The acronym SMEs excludes 
microenterprises and refers to small and medium enterprises, while MSMEs refers to micro, small and 
medium enterprises. 
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The debate in the empirical literature on small enterprise development triggered by Birch (1981) is 
on whether small businesses are to be supported on the rationalisation that they could improve 
living standards. But what is the theoretical basis for this empirical rationalisation? This is an 
important question because in a perfectly functioning market economy of profit or income 
maximising individuals (including the MSMEs), a firm whose products are well-received by the 
market should be able to expand if it continually innovates. Such a firm is able to retain its 
competitive advantage and market share (Shane and Venkatarama, 2000; Kirzner, 1999; 1997). A 
discussion on firm size is therefore difficult to envisage in a perfectly functioning market economy. 
However, the discussion on firm size arises when the market failure hypothesis is evoked. That 
markets have failed becomes the basis for justifying interventions to mitigate the failure 
(Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda, 2013; Hall, Daneke and Lenox, 2010; Stiglitz, 1991; Anderson, 
1982). By definition, market failure refers to a situation where allocation of resources by a well-
functioning market mechanism is such that there are possible outcomes which yield better 
allocation of the available resources (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Bator, 1958). The challenge for 
policymakers is to identify the market failures and determine how they can be addressed (Stiglitz, 
1991; Winston, 2006). 
In small enterprise development literature, markets are presumed to have failed when small 
businesses have limited access to finance. Interventions such as credit guarantee schemes are 
implemented to operate within the normal well-functioning financial market to incentivise the 
market to lend to the small businesses that would otherwise not be considered without a guarantee 
from a third party. Similarly, microfinance institutions extend the reach of financial services without 
directly altering the operations of the financial market. Likewise, the market is presumed to have 
failed when executives of small businesses seem to consistently have poor business management 
skills. To mitigate the market failure, business development interventions are implemented to 
supplement the executives’ limited formal education in accounting, management, marketing etc. 
Thus, interventions seek to complement existing formal market arrangements to improve the 
capacity of MSMEs to access production inputs and markets and ultimately create jobs (Audretsch 
and Thurik, 2000). The motivation of a significant body of empirical literature is to determine market 
failures present in a given context. 
1.3  AN OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
The literature can be categorised based on whether the focus is on one country, referred to as 
country-specific studies, or many countries, referred to as cross-country studies. Country-specific 
studies on MSMEs are often based on small surveys that raise concerns about the 
representativeness of the samples, authenticity of data, and dependability of resultant 
recommendations (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2007). Such surveys also lack data from 
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consecutive periods, which makes it difficult for researchers to assess the real impact of problems 
that business owners report as impeding growth. Most studies on MSMEs in South Africa are 
based on small samples, are descriptive of challenges encountered by MSMEs, and review 
changes in the public institutional system for supporting small businesses (Rogerson, 2004; Lotz 
and Marais, 2007; Ladzani and van Vuuren, 2002; Rwigema and Karungu, 1999). A few studies 
however use larger samples drawn from national surveys (e.g. Naudé, Gries, Wood and Meintjies, 
2008; Gumede, 2004; Visser, Coning and Smit, 2005). While small samples from a locality are 
useful in identifying key obstacles faced by MSMEs, it is perhaps necessary that such studies are 
complemented by more nationwide studies for the empirical literature to make a comprehensive 
contribution to policy formulation. 
Two datasets have played an important role in mitigating the problem of lack of reliable data and 
unrepresentative samples on small business research in developing countries: GEM, which started 
in 2000, and the WBES, which started in 2002. Studies stemming from the two datasets have 
however been mainly cross-country in approach, leveraging on the large aggregated samples to 
employ cross-country regression in order to determine common characteristics of smaller 
businesses in the developing world. One of the key results from studies based on the two datasets, 
especially the WBES, is that access to finance is the most serious obstacle to the growth of 
MSMEs (Beck et al., 2013; Dihn, Mavridis and Nguyen, 2010; Ayyagari et al., 2008, Ayyagari et al. 
2007).  
Inasmuch as there seems to be consensus in the empirical literature that access to finance is the 
main obstacle to the growth of MSMEs, comprehensive studies of other obstacles at country level 
are necessary to ensure that interventions are directed at the most serious obstacles given the 
limited resources at the disposal of governments to address all obstacles at once (Rodrik, 2010; 
Ayyagari et al., 2008). The GEM and WBES data facilitate country-specific studies but such studies 
remain sporadic in Africa such that the degree to which business environment obstacles constrain 
job creation by MSMEs is speculative. Some studies have used the GEM in South Africa. Naudé et 
al. (2008) used GEM data on South Africa and found that access to finance is a significant 
determinant of start-up rates. Gumede (2004) used the National Enterprise Survey of 1998 and 
found that access to finance significantly explains the propensity of small and medium enterprises 
to export. There are many studies using smaller samples in localities that show finance to be a key 
problem for MSMEs in South Africa (e.g. Netswera, 2010; Fatoki and Garwe 2010; Ladzani and 
Netswera, 2009; Naidoo and Hilton, 2006) but the relative importance or ordering of business 
obstacles based on the obstacles’ effects on growth remains underexplored. 
MSMEs are estimated to account for 57 percent of private sector jobs and 30 percent of GDP in 
South Africa (SEDA, 2012; DTI, 2005; Nieman, Hough and Nieuwenhuizen, 2003). But such 
statistics mask the lack of stability in jobs created by small businesses. Kerr, Wittenburg and Arrow 
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(2014) showed the lack of stability of jobs in the SME sector using quarterly employment data from 
Statistics South Africa. Kerr et al. (2014) found that on average in each quarter between 2005 and 
2011, small businesses created 75 000 jobs but lost 110 000. The finding by Kerr et al. (2014) 
suggests that perhaps it does not suffice to merely identify obstacles to the growth of small 
business without demonstrating the possible existence of a segment of MSMEs that could be net 
job creators. If the goal of interventions for small businesses is job creation, it is necessary that 
there is some understanding of the profile of firms that are consistent job creators.  
Public policy in South Africa underscores the important role of small businesses in social and 
economic development. MSMEs are seen as ‘critical to broadening economic participation and job 
creation’ (SEDA, 2013: 9). MSMEs are envisaged to contribute significantly to reducing the 
unemployment rate from 24 percent in 2013 to the target of 6 percent in 2030 (NPC, 2011). 
Empirical literature as in, for example, the findings by Kerr el al. (2014) suggests that a generic 
approach to supporting MSMEs may not be an effective use of resources because MSMEs as a 
sector may not be a net job creator. There is therefore a need to identify and understand the profile 
of firms that are net job creators. 
1.4 OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS 
Since 1994, South African government policy has emphasised the importance of MSMEs as a 
means of fostering social cohesion. It has done so by promoting enterprises owned by ethnic 
groups previously disadvantaged by apartheid. Government policy also underscores the role of 
MSMEs in creating jobs and contributing to economic growth. Empirical evidence globally suggests 
that access to finance is the most serious obstacle to the growth of MSMEs. Studies on MSMEs in 
South Africa also point to the same conclusion, albeit with limited assessment of the effects of 
access to finance and other obstacles on enterprise performance. There is thus a gap in the 
literature on the impact of obstacles on enterprise performance and on which obstacles impede 
growth the most. 
There is a growing body of empirical evidence, particularly in developed economies, showing that a 
small proportion of enterprises account for most new jobs in an economy (Nightingale and Coad, 
2013; Henrekson and Johansson, 2010). The subject of high-growth firms is underexplored in 
South Africa and in developing countries as a whole. The evidence that a small proportion of firms 
accounts for most net new jobs suggests that it may be beneficial to understand the profile of such 
firms as they could expedite job creation, thus improving living standards, productivity and social 
cohesion.  
The thesis therefore seeks to: 
i. determine the key impediments to the growth of MSMEs in South Africa, 
ii. determine the characteristics of financially constrained MSMEs in South Africa,  
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iii. determine the characteristics of enterprises that generate jobs more than the generality of 
firms in South Africa, and 
iv. based on the findings, propose targeted interventions in the MSME sector that could improve 
the socioeconomic circumstances of many South Africans through access to formal 
employment. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
Inasmuch as cross-country studies are useful in showing a global view of MSMEs, they are less so 
in informing national policies. National studies that attempt to bridge this gap are constrained by 
unrepresentative samples which make their contribution to policy limited. In this regard, this thesis 
provides an important contribution to the empirical literature in South Africa by using a survey 
designed to be representative of the diversity of MSMEs. 
MSME studies in South Africa describe obstacles faced by business owners and the extent to 
which business owners rate the severity of the obstacles on enterprise operations. The thesis 
contributes to this literature by linking such ratings of the severity of obstacles to actual 
performance of the firm and is thus able to determine the most critical obstacles. Furthermore, the 
effects of obstacles on enterprises are not determined only on firms grouped by size (i.e. micro, 
small, medium or large) but the obstacles’ effects on interacted firm characteristics, such as level 
of education of the business owner and sector of the firm, are also determined. The effects of the 
interaction terms provide a more vivid depiction of what interventions must seek to address and the 
enterprises that must be targeted for improved impact.  
There is limited discussion on high-growth firms in developing countries with emphasis being on 
the MSME sector as a whole (Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2010; Bradford, 2007). The thesis 
builds on the limited research on high-growth firms to encourage discussion of this important 
subset of the MSME sector that could facilitate more effective use of intervention resources than 
when support is generic. Although the use of WBES limits the thesis to variables in the database, 
the detailed analysis on South Africa is useful in encouraging debates on firms accounting for most 
of the net new jobs. 
1.6  OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 2 discusses the MSME sector in South Africa by reviewing small enterprise development 
policy. Three empirical chapters follow. Chapter 3 investigates the main barriers to the growth of 
MSMEs and estimates the effects of such barriers on growth. Growth is proxied by the number of 
jobs created. The relative importance of barriers is determined so as to inform policy on the 
sequence or order in which interventions can be implemented. 
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Chapter 4 studies the finance constraint. The analysis tracks the importance of the problem 
between 2003 and 2010 and assesses its impact on growth. The chapter also determines the 
profile of firms encountering problems in accessing finance. The focus on access to finance is 
motivated by the extensive empirical evidence showing access to finance as the main constraint to 
growth, especially in developing countries. The chapter informs policy on the type of firms 
interventions should target.  
While Chapters 3 and 4 examine obstacles to growth, Chapter 5 seeks to explain why some firms 
perform better than the generality of other firms. The chapter investigates whether such high-
growth firms have distinct characteristics. The analysis of high-growth firms is important in that it 
informs policy on what interventions should nurture if more jobs are to be created at a faster rate. 
The final chapter, Chapter 6, summarises the research and concludes with some policy and 
research recommendations.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 10 
 
CHAPTER 2: SMALL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the socioeconomic environment motivating the emphasis of government 
policies on micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in South Africa. The chapter also gives 
an overview of the MSME sector by reviewing the small enterprise development policy and 
institutions through which the policy is implemented. The final section of the chapter describes the 
WBES data used in the empirical analyses of the next three chapters and presents some 
descriptive statistics. 
2.2  THE SOCIOECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT MOTIVATING MSME PROMOTION 
The main criticism of cross-country studies as raised in the preceding chapter is that peculiarities 
of a country are smoothed-off, resulting in policy recommendations that may not suit a country of 
interest. Table 2.1 presents some socioeconomic statistics of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) as well as Nigeria and Ghana to demonstrate the peculiarity of 
South Africa among its peer states. The middle-income status of the selected countries and their 
shared development strategy, particularly among the BRICS (as illustrated by the launch of the 
jointly owned New Development Bank in 2014), makes this selection of peer states reasonable. 
The column headed ‘Middle Income’ in Table 2.1 indicates the composite statistics for all middle-
income countries globally. 
For South Africa, the unemployment rate was 22.3 percent while the average for all middle-income 
countries was 5.5 percent. The youth unemployment rate in South Africa was close to three times 
that of middle-income countries and the highest in the countries shown in Table 2.1. The proportion 
of working-age population with jobs at 41.8 percent compared unfavourably to the middle-income 
countries’ average of 60 percent and it is the worst for all the countries in the table. Poverty 
headcount was the highest in the middle-income economies; also, the Gini index for South Africa, 
which is an estimate of income inequality, was the highest in the world. The unemployment rate of 
the tertiary-educated is low in South Africa such that the less educated and the youth are more 
likely to be unemployed. 
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GDP per person employed (constant 
1990 PPP $) 
10 424 12 877 17 978 7 170 9 975 13 197 5 354 3 877 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, 
total (%)  
60.26 63.90 59.20 56.30 69.40 41.80 51.00 66.10 
Ratio of female to male labour force 
participation rate (%)  
64.55 71.92 81.57 40.58 82.95 74.96 76.32 94.20 
Unemployment with secondary 
education (% of total unemployment) 
.. 35.70 54.20 .. .. 56.30 .. .. 
Unemployment with tertiary education 
(% of total unemployment) 
.. 4.10 32.10 .. .. 4.50 .. .. 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour 
force) 
5.51 8.10 6.00 3.90 3.80 22.30 7.60 3.60 
Unemployment, youth total (% of total 
labour force ages 15-24)  
12.70 16.70 14.40 9.20 8.00 46.60 13.80 6.40 
Gini index .. 54.69 40.11 33.9 58.88 63.14 48.83 42.06 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day 
(PPP) (% of population) 
41.17 11.32 0.08 .. 29.79 31.33 .. .. 
Self-employed, female (% of females 
employed) 
.. 26.30 6.70   18.90   
Self-employed, male (% of males 
employed) 
.. 34.00 8.00   16.20   
Self-employed, total (% of total 
employed) 
.. 30.80 7.30   17.40   
Cost of starting a business (% of 
income per capita) 
 4.6 1.3 47.3 2.0 0.3 58.3 15.7 
Number of procedures to start a 
business 
 13 7 12 13 5 8 8 
Sources: World Development Indicators; World Bank poverty and inequality database; Doing business for 
SMEs database 
The socioeconomic statistics in Table 2.1 are conducive of high-levels of small business start-ups. 
Besides the high unemployment rates which would typically generate a large number of necessity-
driven firms, the cost and number of procedures to starting a business in South Africa are quite 
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favourable to start-ups as shown by the last two rows of Table 2.1. However, the GEM data 
summarised in Figure 2.1 reveals that South Africans score poorly on two key indicators of 
entrepreneurship: the perception of entrepreneurial opportunities, and the intention to exploit such 
opportunities as entrepreneurs.  
Two reasons are plausible for why South Africa scores poorly on entrepreneurship indicators. The 
first is the social welfare grants programme, which Marais (2011: 238) suggests had 14 million 
beneficiaries in 2013, which is approximately a quarter of the total population. A study by Bhorat, 
Tseng and Stanwix (2014) using the national household Income and Expenditure Surveys and the 
Consumer Price Index found that although aggregate poverty levels declined in the period 1995 to 
2005, levels of inequality increased. Bhorat et al. (2014) attributed the fall in aggregate poverty to 
social grants that arguably minimised the momentum to necessity-driven entrepreneurship despite 
the consistently high levels of unemployment as shown in Figure 2.2. The second reason is the 
legacy of apartheid.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Indicator of entrepreneurship: South Africa and selected countries 
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Figure 2.2: Unemployment in South Africa  
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2014) 
Laws such as the Group Areas Act from 1950 restricted the extent to which most South Africans 
could venture into business. Black entrepreneurs often incurred losses because of intermittent 
raids by authorities (Simon and Birch, 1992; Beavon and Rogerson, 1986). Rogerson (2004) 
shows in a review of small enterprise development policy, support programmes and empirical 
literature from 1994 to 2003 that white-owned firms accounted for a higher proportion of 
beneficiaries from intervention such as the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Programme 
(SMEDP) than black entrepreneurs in the first decade of a democratic South Africa. Rogerson 
(2004) argued that the low level of uptake by black entrepreneurs of such interventions was 
because black-owned firms were predominantly informal and thus less able to access supports 
targeting formal SMEs, an argument that perhaps demonstrates the lingering effects of the 
apartheid era.  
2.3  MSME DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
On the back of high unemployment and inequality, the small enterprise development policy seeks 
to promote enterprise competitiveness in the global market, citizens’ welfare by reducing poverty, 
and social equity by supporting the previously disadvantaged South African (Rogerson, 2004). The 
White Paper on the National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Small Business in 
South Africa of 1995 (henceforth White Paper, 1995) set the policy framework for promoting small 
businesses. The White Paper (1995) was informed by international evidence on the obstacles that 
must be addressed by policy for small businesses to grow. For instance, it observes that “in 
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most urgently felt needs”. Management and skills training are mentioned as add-ons to the finance 
interventions.  
But the implementation of the White Paper (1995) encountered challenges especially because the 
country at that point lacked institutionalised support structures and a regulatory environment for 
emerging firms. Some of the support institutions had to be set up before the necessary regulatory 
systems were in place. For example, Khula Finance Limited, the financing agency set up in 1996 to 
address issues in access to finance, had large write-offs and low take-up of its credit guarantee 
products in the period 1997 to 2002 (Makina and Malobola, 2004; Rogerson, 2004; Nigrini and 
Schoombee, 2002). A key reason for the write-offs was that the microfinance industry to which 
Khula Finance Limited extended wholesale finance was largely unregulated, leading to most 
microfinance institutions folding (Bauman, 2004; Christen and Pearce, 2004). A case study of four 
microfinance institutions by Bauman (2004) found that microfinance institutions had high staff costs 
and that employees lacked appropriate skills for their responsibilities. On non-financial support, the 
advisory agency Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency, set up by the government in 1996, was 
undercapitalised such that its national outreach programme, particularly the Local Business 
Service Centres initiative, was not as effective as was envisioned by the White Paper of 1995 
(Rogerson, 2004).  
Thus, in its first decade in office, the African National Congress government put in place an 
institutional system to support MSMEs. However, studies that have sought to evaluate the impact 
of the interventions of that period (for example the credit guarantee scheme by Khula Finance 
Limited) show that there was minor positive impact on MSMEs. The studies have attributed this to  
limited nationwide presence of the institutions that were set up to support MSMEs and that there 
was limited awareness by MSME owners of the intervention programmes such institutions were 
providing (Rogerson, 2004; Ladzani and Netswera, 2009; Netswera, 2001). A survey of 534 
MSMEs in Limpopo province by Ladzani and Netswera (2009) for instance, showed that potential 
beneficiaries were not aware of support programmes available. An earlier study by Netswera 
(2001) on 60 MSMEs who were members of Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce also found 
limited awareness of public support initiatives among small business owners.  
The Integrated Strategy on the Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Small Enterprises of 2005 
sought to address the poor performance of the first decade in enterprise promotion (DTI, 2005). 
The strategy had three action plans: to promote enterprise development, to increase the supply of 
financial and non-financial support, and to create demand for output from smaller enterprises (DTI, 
2005: 4). The integrated strategy of 2005 restructured the institutions set up to support MSMEs. 
The Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA) succeeded the Ntsika Enterprise Promotion 
Agency, while the South African Microfinance Apex Fund (SAMAF) was formed to regulate the 
microfinance industry and provide wholesale finance along with Khula Finance Limited to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 15 
 
microfinance institutions and Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs). The Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) legislation of 2004 sought to create demand for the output of 
MSMEs and to ensure that enterprise support and development would thereafter be a joint initiative 
of large businesses and government.  
The BBBEE legislation since 2004 has been an important strategy to implement MSME 
development policy. The BBBEE legislation has a scorecard system with a total of 105 points. 
Established organisations earn the points by spending at least three percent of their annual net 
profit after tax on the five elements in the BBBEE scorecard. Of the five, two are closely associated 
with MSMEs: enterprise and supplier development with 40 points and socioeconomic development 
with 5 points. In essence, the BBBEE legislation compels all established entities to facilitate growth 
of MSMEs. In most economies, such expenditures would be voluntary corporate social investment. 
Under the BBBEE legislation, the procurement procedures also require that public departments 
and other established organisations procure some of their inputs from MSMEs.  
There is limited research on approximate resources and impact on enterprise development of 
support attributable to BBBEE requirements, with existing studies focusing on transactions 
involving changes of shareholdings in big companies (Patel and Graham, 2012; Jackson, 
Alessandria and Black, 2005). Inasmuch as the Impact Amplifier (2013) report finds limited 
contribution of BBBEE to socioeconomic development, the hypothetical volume of resources 
available from large firms in South Africa suggests that support attributable to BBBEE 
requirements is larger. It perhaps has potential for a wider reach and impact on enterprise 
development than the dedicated public agencies that have limited budgets and branch network. 
Furthermore, the public-private partnership implicit in the BBBEE framework makes imminent the 
emergence of hybrid organisations such as social businesses envisaged by Yunus (2007) that 
raise and manage resources from multiple stakeholders to deliver financial returns and social 
good.  
Since the Integrated Strategy on the Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Small Enterprises of 
2005, the country development policies, especially the New Growth Path of 2010 (NPC, 2010) and 
National Development Plan of 2011 (NPC, 2011), continue to emphasise the role of the small 
business sector in creating jobs and diversifying the industrial sector. In 2014, a dedicated Ministry 
of Small Business Development was created, signalling the increasing importance of the sector. 
The new Ministry has a mandate to improve the performance of the MSME sector and ensure that 
an enabling business environment is in place so that the much-needed jobs are created. 
Previously, enterprise development policy had been under the Department of Trade and Industry 
with SEDA as the principal agency to implement and coordinate the policy while offering non-
financial support to MSMEs. At the end of 2013, SEDA had 9 provincial offices and 43 branches 
nationally (SEDA, 2013: 8). The other key public institution is SEFA (Small Enterprise Finance 
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Agency) which was set up in 2012. SEFA, which incorporates the former Khula Finance Limited 
and SAMAF, finances MSMEs directly and wholesale through financial services providers such as 
microfinance institutions and SACCOs. SEFA has 9 offices nationally (SEFA, 2013). 
In summary, government has since 1994 created dedicated institutions to implement the small 
enterprise development policy. Through the BBBEE requirements, policy has extended the 
challenge of promoting MSMEs to well-established organisations in the private sector.  
2.4  MSMES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The National Small Business Amendment Act of 2003 lists four categories of MSMEs: a 
microenterprise has less than 5 employees, a very small firm has 5 to 20, a small firm 21 to 49, 
and a medium firm between 50 and 200. MSMEs are estimated to account for up to 57 percent of 
employment (SEDA, 2012). A survey by Finscope (2010) which defined a small business as 
employing up to 200 workers estimated that there were about 6 million small businesses in South 
Africa, and found that 84 percent of small business owners were black. The finding of the survey 
that 67 percent of the owners were solely dependent on income from the business shows the 
importance of small businesses to people’s livelihood and the economy. Furthermore, a third of 
small business owners started their business because they could not find jobs or had been 
retrenched, which suggests that their enterprises would be significantly undercapitalised to exploit 
identified opportunities. Without support, it is difficult to envisage such MSMEs contributing 
significantly to job creation and playing an important role in reducing social and economic 
inequalities.  
With regard to social and economic inequalities, Figure 2.3 shows that income inequality has 
persisted since 1995 with the share of income increasing for the highest 20 percent but declining in 
all the lower categories such that income held by the lowest ten percent is one percent. The 
scenario depicted in Figure 2.3 is of possible social tensions that “have the potential to undermine 
the post-apartheid transition, threatening the nation’s economic, political and social stability” 
(Struwig et al., 2013: 399). In a country with a population of about 52 million, the 6 million MSMEs 
may indeed be indispensable to policies that seek to achieve inclusive growth. It is therefore 
imperative that the entrepreneurial efforts of citizens to improve their socioeconomic circumstances 
are carefully studied so that policymakers can design and implement appropriate support 
interventions. 




Figure 2.3: Inequality in South Africa 1995 to 2009 
Note:  The percentage of income held in 1995 and in 2009 is above the respective bars. The Gini 
index for 1995 and for 2009 is also above the respective bars. 
Source: World Development Indicators 
This chapter next describes the WBES data used in the next three chapters to study MSMEs in 
South Africa. The section discusses the sampling approach used by the WBES and presents some 
descriptive statistics on the types of firms making up the data. 
2.5 DESCRIPTION OF WORLD BANK ENTERPRISE SURVEY DATA  
The WBES started in 2002 to gather firm-level data from representative samples using a uniform 
data collection instrument in member countries of the World Bank. By 2014, the WBES had data 
on 130 000 firms in 135 countries. The survey instrument is comprehensive and discussed in detail 
by Kuntchev, Ramalho, Rodríguez-Meza and Yang (2013). The instrument includes personal 
characteristics of owners such as gender, ethnic origin, education and work experience. It includes 
firm characteristics such as number of employees, sector, target market (local or export), turnover, 
profitability, and composition of balance sheet. It provides insight into the plans of the firm by, for 
example, asking managers if their firms have or intend to undertake capital expenditure or 
expansion projects. Firms report on whether they applied for external finance and the outcome of 
the applications including reasons for rejection.  
Firms also provide feedback on how they rate the business environment obstacles such as access 
to finance, crime and disorder, macroeconomic and political stability and access to infrastructure, 
for example electricity and transport. Firms report on the challenges they encounter in trying to 
access finance, electricity, input materials and customers and how they addressed some of the 
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spending on security service providers to limit the effects of theft. The instrument also collects 
labour relations information such as workers’ level of education.  
Two WBES have been conducted in South Africa: the first in 2003 and the second in 2007. There 
was a survey in 2010 by the World Bank to assess the impact of the global financial crisis on firms. 
The 2010 survey covered a small sample of 234 firms. Unlike WBES, which gather data on a 
broader range of a firm’s business environment and operations, the 2010 survey focused on 
assessing the effects of the global financial crisis on firms’ access to finance. The 2010 survey is 
therefore useful in studying the finance constraint. All three surveys covered four locations: Cape 
Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth. The 2007 survey targeted establishments 
employing five or more full-time and paid permanent employees, but 120 microenterprises in 
Johannesburg with less than five employees were also covered by random sampling. WBES 
defines firms with between 5 and 20 employees as small, firms with 21 to 99 as medium-sized and 
firms with over 100 employees as large.  
In 2007, 1 057 establishments were surveyed. Of these, 706 were randomly sampled within a 
stratified list of 9 550 firms from the Department of Trade and Industry and the Intellectual Property 
Registration Office, while 231 firms were randomly drawn from the 2003 survey of 803 
establishments. Of the 231, only 191 could be matched in the 2007 survey data. There is thus a 
panel set of 191 firms between 2003 and 2007 which is utilised to overcome omitted variables 
problem in some of the analysis in the thesis, particularly on investigating the effects of the finance 
constraint over time. The balance of 120 firms to make up 1 057 firms in 2007 relates to 
microenterprises which were randomly sampled in Johannesburg. Table 2.2 summarises the data 
used by firm size.  
Table 2.2: Number of enterprises surveyed by size and year 
 2003 2007 only 2003 and 2007 (panel) 2010 
Micro enterprises 40 120 - - 
Small enterprises 217 375 12 122 
Medium enterprises 185 366 67 72 
Large enterprises 361 196 112 40 
Total 803 1057 191 234 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys in South Africa 
The 2007 survey is the main data used in the analyses of Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The 2007 survey 
covered 113 small and medium firms in Cape Town, 105 in Durban, 49 in Port Elizabeth and 474 in 
Johannesburg. In the three empirical chapters that follow, firms in Durban and Port Elizabeth are 
combined in a group called ‘Durban and Port Elizabeth’ because of the smaller sample sizes. 
Table 2.3 reports some descriptive statistics relating to age of the firms, years’ experience of 
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managers, annual turnover and level of exports in turnover for the 1 057 firms surveyed in the four 
locations, grouping them by size. 













ALL Age of firm (years) 1 056 15.94 17.77 1.00 141 
 Percentage help by largest owner 1 057 77.15 25.61 5.00 100 
 Experience of top manager (years) 1 055 13.75 10.69 1.00 61 
 Annual turnover (ZAR) 1 057 70 100 000 402 000 000 7 200 7 200 000 000 
 Percentage of exports in turnover 1 056 16 37 0.00 1 
Micro Age of firm (years) 119 5.20 5.87 1.00 39 
 Percentage help by largest owner 120 89.76 19.16 25.00 100 
 Experience of top manager (years) 120 6.89 6.18 1.00 34 
 Annual turnover (ZAR) 120 475 994 968 075 7 200 8 000 000 
 Percentage of exports in turnover 120 3 18 0.00 1 
Small Age of firm (years) 375 9.19 9.54 1.00 86 
 Percentage help by largest owner 375 83.99 22.91 10.00 100 
 Experience of top manager (years) 373 11.01 9.50 1.00 45 
 Annual turnover (ZAR) 375 3 155 483 4 150 913 100 000 30 000 000 
 Percentage of exports in turnover 375 7 25 0.00 1 
Medium Age of firm (years) 366 18.18 17.04 1.00 141 
 Percentage help by largest owner 366 73.76 25.11 5.00 100 
 Experience of top manager (years) 366 16.14 11.16 1.00 60 
 Annual turnover (ZAR) 366 20 900 000 36 600 000 90 000 328 000 000 
 Percentage of exports in turnover 365 18 38 0.00 1 
Large Age of firm (years) 196 31.18 23.84 1.00 116 
 Percentage help by largest owner 196 62.68 26.84 5.00 100 
 Experience of top manager (years) 196 18.70 10.50 1.00 61 
 Annual turnover (ZAR) 196 333 000 000 886 000 000 1 732 000 7 200 000 000 
 Percentage of exports in turnover 196 38 49 0.00 1 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007) 
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The level of education of business owners or managers is of particular interest to enterprise 
development policy makers and practitioners and is a key variable explored by empirical analyses 
(Gelb, Ramachandran, Shah and Turner, 2007; McGrath 2005). Figure 2.4 shows a positive 
association of higher levels of education with size of firms such that smaller firms have managers 
with low levels of education. The relationship between firm size and vocationally trained managers 
is mixed. 
 
Figure 2.4: Firm size and education level of top manager  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007)  
Grouping the firms by age in Figure 2.5 shows that 69 percent of microenterprises in the sample 
are less than 5 years old and 7 percent are more than 15 years old. Among small firms, there are 
more young firms than old ones but the distribution pattern changes for medium firms, where 44 
percent of the firms in the sample are old and 17 percent are less than 6 years old.  
 
Figure 2.5: Firm size and age group 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007) 
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WBES in South Africa list six ethnic groups for business owners: African, European, Indian, 
Lebanese or Middle Eastern, Other Asian and Other. In the three empirical chapters that follow, 
Indian, Lebanese or Middle Eastern, Other Asian and Other are aggregated in a group called 
‘Asian’. Figure 2.6 shows the proportion of firms by size in the sample where the main ownership is 
African (or black), Asian, and European (or white). 
 
Figure 2.6: Firm size and ethnic origin of owner 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007) 
Figure 2.6 shows that blacks own 78 percent of microenterprises and also that as firm size 
increases, the proportion of black-owned firms declines and Asian and white ownership increases. 
2.6 SUMMARY 
As a prelude to Chapters 3, 4, and 5, this chapter reviewed the enterprise development policy in 
South Africa and the socioeconomic environment underpinning the policy. The chapter also gave 
an overview of the public institutions set up to implement the policy and discussed the 
requirements of the BBBEE legislation. Finally, the WBES data on South Africa that will be used in 
the next chapters was presented. The use of the WBES, which gathers firm-level data using the 
same survey instrument globally, ensures that the analyses in the thesis can be replicated in other 
economies. 
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CHAPTER 3: WHAT IMPEDES THE GROWTH OF MICRO, SMALL AND 
MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN SOUTH AFRICA? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to identify, rank and determine the most binding obstacles to the growth 
of micro, small and medium enterprises in South Africa. As recognised by Ayyagari et al. (2008), 
the enterprise development literature has shown that many obstacles (e.g. access to finance, 
labour regulations, tax rates, access to land etc.) affect the growth of MSMEs but there is limited 
discussion on how the obstacles are to be prioritised so that policymakers can address them. An 
investigation that seeks to rank the obstacles based on their effects on growth is therefore 
important because it would inform policy about the types of interventions necessary to address the 
key obstacles and improve the growth of MSMEs. 
This chapter defines growth as the inter-period change in jobs created by a firm. The chapter 
builds on the Growth Diagnostics framework of Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005). Growth 
Diagnostics is based on the premise that not all obstacles to growth are equally binding and that by 
determining and eliminating the most binding obstacles, optimal growth is realised even though 
other obstacles are still in place. The WBES data have been used by Ayyagari et al. (2008) and 
Dihn et al. (2010) to identify top and binding constraints. WBES are suitable for such investigations 
because the Surveys have summarised the extensive list of obstacles to 15, thus making the data 
an important reference for investigating the top and binding constraints.  
In the WBES, firms report on whether each of the 15 obstacles is ‘not an obstacle’, a ‘minor’, 
‘moderate’, ‘major’ or a ‘very severe’ obstacle to their operations. Obstacles include employees’ 
skills adequacy, access to finance, electricity, crime, and efficacy of the legal system or courts 
among others. From the list, a pertinent question is which obstacles or, better still, which obstacle, 
must be prioritised given limited resources and the impracticality of tackling all obstacles at once.  
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON KEY OBSTACLES TO MSME DEVELOPMENT 
The question of the prioritisation of business environment obstacles to growth has been addressed 
by relatively few studies (e.g. Ayyagari et al., 2008; Dihn et al., 2010; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2005) and the studies based their investigations on the Growth Diagnostic framework. 
Beck et al. (2005) used World Business Environment Surveys of 1999 to 2000 to investigate if the 
effects of access to finance, legal obstacles and corruption on growth are determined by firm size, 
and found that these three constraints significantly affected firms employing 5 to 50 workers.  
Ayyagari et al. (2008) also used WBES. Unlike Beck et al. (2005), who began their analysis with an 
a priori list of three obstacles, Ayyagari et al. (2008) used an artificial intelligence-based Directed 
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Acyclic Graph methodology to determine three obstacles affecting growth the most. They found 
access to finance, crime and political instability to be the top obstacles. The authors then 
determined the most binding by multivariate regression analysis. The top three obstacles enter the 
regression all at once, along with firm and country-specific characteristics as control variables. 
Finance was found to have the largest effect on growth and was thus deemed binding.  
Dihn et al. (2010) used the WBES of 2007 to 2010, and they identified the top constraints by a 
count of responses of firms’ ratings of obstacles and found electricity, finance and tax rates as top 
obstacles. They determined the binding constraint through three sets of sequential multivariate 
regressions. The first set examined the independent effect of an obstacle on growth. In the second, 
all obstacles entered the regression at once for the effect of each obstacle in the presence of other 
obstacles to be determined. In the final set, only obstacles significant in the second set entered the 
regression. All regressions have intercept term, firm and country characteristics as control 
variables. Finance emerged as binding.  
The foregoing three studies are cross-country. Beck et al. (2005) used 54 countries from the 
developed and developing world, Ayyagari et al. (2008) used 80 from the same while Dihn et al. 
(2010) used 96 developing countries. Although all found finance binding, the top constraints varied. 
Two datasets from different periods made up of different countries can indeed be reasonably 
expected to yield different top constraints. But importantly, the difference suggests the 
distinctiveness of countries. Gelb et al. (2007) used WBES to explore how obstacles vary in 27 
African countries (including South Africa). They determined the top obstacles for each country in 
two ways: firstly by a count of firms’ own subjective ratings of the obstacles, which the authors 
found considerably different from country to country. Secondly, they estimated the effects of the 
obstacles using more objective indicators on growth, for example in the case of electricity, by 
substituting the rating of electricity with the actual number of power supply interruptions. They 
found that the effects of the objective measures of obstacles on growth varied with countries’ levels 
of per capita income. Specifically, low income countries were most affected by infrastructure-
related obstacles such as electricity, while countries with higher levels of income were most 
affected by the regulatory environment such as labour regulations.  
It may seem trivial to emphasise that obstacles differ by country. Yet, in the context of the cross-
country enterprise development literature, the emphasis is necessary because the peculiarities of 
countries are smoothed-off in cross-country studies such that resultant policy diagnoses are 
generic, best suiting the average country. Country-specific studies become necessary to identify 
specific issues that can credibly inform policy. This chapter demonstrates that policy 
recommendations drawn from a country-specific study can vary considerably from cross-country 
recommendations. For instance, whereas studies of MSMEs in developing countries find access to 
finance as the top and binding constraint, this chapter shows that the top constraint for all firms in 
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South Africa is crime, and the most binding for MSMEs is the efficacy of the legal system i.e. 
courts. After grouping firms by size, age, sector, location and owner’s gender and ethnic origin, the 
effects of the obstacles are found to vary across the groups. Medium-sized enterprises are mildly 
affected by all obstacles reviewed, while small firms are collectively constrained by ‘courts’ and 
electricity. There are limited effects of obstacles on firms in Durban and Port Elizabeth. Access to 
finance is only a significant constraint for small white-owned firms and small firms in Cape Town. 
The results suggest that a study of local circumstances may identify key obstacles with greater 
precision and perhaps engender more suitable policy recommendations.  
3.3 DETERMINING THE TOP CONSTRAINTS TO MSME DEVELOPMENT 
In investigating the key obstacles, researchers often present a list of possible obstacles for 
business owners to rate on a Likert scale. A simple count of responses determines the top 
constraints. Dihn et al. (2010), Gelb et al. (2007) and Ayyagari et al. (2007) adopted this approach 
on WBES data. The problem with this approach is that the firms will only be responding to a 
specific obstacle and rating only that obstacle but not ranking the obstacle against 14 others. To 
address this weakness, this chapter suggests using responses to the following question in the 
survey instrument: “among the issues numbered 1 to 15, please indicate which one constitutes: the 
most serious obstacle; the second most serious obstacle; the third most serious obstacle”. A 
weight score of 3 is assigned to the first most serious constraint, 2 to the second and 1 to the third 
most serious. Multiplying the score by the respectively observed frequencies and respectively 
summing the product of the first, second and third most serious obstacle for each firm, the relative 
importance of each of the 15 obstacles is determined by ranking based on the final weighted 
scores. This approach will be referred to as the weighted count approach throughout this chapter. 
The results for all firms are graphed in Figure 3.1 against results from a simple count of ratings 
above a ‘moderate’3 rating. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) and Coluzzi, Ferrando and 
Martinez-Carrascal (2012) also consider ratings above the moderate rating as a benchmark for an 
obstacle to be considered serious. In both the simple count of ratings and the ranking by the 
weighted count approach, crime is the top obstacle, followed by electricity. Access to finance is the 
fourth on the simple count method but fifth in the weighted count approach, while workers’ 
education becomes the fourth most important in the weighted count approach from being seventh 
in the simple count approach.  
                                               
3
 A ‘moderate’ rating of an obstacle is the mid-point in a  5 point Likert scale which, in increasing order of 
severity are: no obstacle, minor, moderate, major, very severe. Ratings above moderate therefore refer to 
‘major’ and ‘very severe’. 




Figure 3.1: Rating of constraints by firms in South Africa 
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
Table 3.1 reports the top five obstacles by firm size. Crime comes out as the top obstacle across 
all firm sizes. Access to finance only appears as a second top obstacle for micro enterprises. 
 
Table 3.1: Relative weights (%) of top 5 obstacles for MSMEs in South Africa 
Constraint Size of enterprise 
Rank  Name of constraint Micro Small Medium MSMEs 
1 Crime, theft and disorder 17.61 29.90 30.91 28.49 
2 Electricity 9.58 13.75 11.69 12.25 
3 Corruption  10.36 11.74 10.45 
4 Access to finance 14.93 10.11  9.44 
5 Practices of competitors in the informal sector 10.70 9.57  7.81 
- Inadequate education   11.05  
- Labour regulations   7.38  
- Transportation 10.00    
 Total weight of the 5 key constraints 62.82 73.69 72.76 68.44 
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
Figure 3.2 compares some of the top obstacles in South Africa reported in Figure 3.1 to the top 
obstacles of the 96 developing economies reported in Dihn et al. (2010).  
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Figure 3.2: Top constraints by enterprises – South Africa vs. the World 
Source: Dihn et al. (2010: 10); Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of 
South Africa (2007) 
The differences captured by Figure 3.2 suggest that the policy recommendations from cross-
country studies may not be appropriate for MSMEs in South Africa. In any case, for stakeholders 
set on promoting MSMEs, only the top domestic constraints matter, and particularly the binding 
constraints. Before determining the binding constraints, the next section reviews the Growth 
Diagnostic framework, which this chapter uses. 
3.4 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA SOURCES 
3.4.1 Analytical framework 
Hausmann et al. (2005) provide a theoretical framework, Growth Diagnostics, to determine a 
binding constraint. Two arguments are implicit in the framework. The first is that for developing 
countries to improve the socioeconomic circumstances of citizens, economic growth is what is 
required the most. The second is that economic growth is context-dependent, varying from setting 
to setting. The framework is based on the observation that in any setting, obstacles to growth will 
not equally constrain i.e. some obstacles will have a greater effect than others but one, the binding 
constraint, will have the largest effect on growth. That binding constraint keeps growth in check. 
Should the binding constraint be identified and eliminated, a welfare-improving equilibrium 
emerges in that setting. The challenge is then twofold: identifying the binding constraint, and 
designing policies to eliminate it. 
How then does one “sift through what may seem like a bewildering array of problems to hone in on 
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empirics”? (Rodrik, 2010: 35). The framework is not prescriptive. As discussed earlier in the 
chapter, Dihn et al. (2010) and Ayyagari et al. (2008) used different approaches to determine the 
top constraints: the former used a count of responses complemented by regression analysis, and 
the latter, Directed Acyclic Graph methodology. Once sifted, both used multivariate regression 
analysis to determine the constraint with the largest effect on growth.  
It is indeed expedient to identify the most binding problem in a setting because policies can be 
specific in design and execution. There are, however, many reasons to be cautious in adopting a 
framework that singles out just one impediment in a bewildering array of many. Three reasons 
need particular mention. Firstly, the underlying assertion of the framework that in any setting only 
one constraint matters most is very restrictive. It implicitly assumes homogeneity of subjects in that 
setting and that the effects of the binding constraint will be about the same across all subjects.  
Secondly, as Ayyagari et al. (2008) found, some effects of obstacles on growth can be indirect 
such that it is possible that a seemingly minor obstacle is responsible for what the framework 
diagnoses as binding. In such a situation, it is reasonable to posit that tackling the binding 
constraint as defined by the framework will not improve growth. Thirdly, it can be impractical for 
policy to attend to some binding constraint because of limited resources or because the constraint 
can only be eliminated over time. Crime, corruption, informality of the economy and political 
instability are examples.  
In all the three reasons for caution, a pragmatic approach is probably to take note of the 
constraints whose effects are most close to that of the binding. The problem is that once the 
binding constraint is determined, no attention appears to be given to what would have been 
discarded in the sifting process. This chapter attempts to retain the framework’s holistic analysis of 
constraints right through to the results by not quickly discarding obstacles in the sifting process. 
This ensures that the interpretation of the results of the frameworks is not focused solely on the 
most serious impediment but also on other serious challenges.  
As background to the analysis, it is important to refer a study by Rodrik (2008) which sought to 
understand why unemployment has remained high in South Africa. Reviewing the economy over 
three decades, Rodrik (2008) found that unemployment is largely explained by the increasing 
capital intensity of the manufacturing and mining sector along with a growing financial sector, all of 
which shored up demand for highly skilled workers, while job opportunities for the less skilled 
waned. Some studies focusing only on the post-apartheid era had similar findings (Altman, 2013; 
Bhorat and Mayet, 2013). Rodrik (2008) shows that it is less likely that large firms will create jobs 
as has been the case in the past. Instead, for job creation, policies must promote new sectors and 
entrepreneurship (Rodrik, 2008). This affirms the need to understand obstacles to the growth of 
emerging enterprises.  
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3.4.2 Application of analytical framework 
Studies have shown that MSME growth is considerably explained by firm age (Haltiwanger et al., 
2013), the sector in which it operates (Soderbom and Teal, 2003), ownership structure such as 
ethnic origins and gender of owners (Kantor, 2005; Raturi and Swamy, 1999) and location (Gelb et 
al., 2007; Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier, 2010). On the back of this literature, it is fair to expect 
that the effect of an obstacle on growth will likely vary across the categories of MSME such as age, 
sector, ownership, and location in South Africa. Accordingly, the analytical framework groups firms 
in the said categories. Categorising firms in this manner is also useful as policy makers often target 
support to specific groups.  
Following previous literature such as Dihn et al. (2010) and Ayyagari et al. (2008), the analysis 
defines growth as the log difference in the number of full-time employees in the period prior to the 





where 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the growth of firm i at time t, 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the number of its full-time employees in 2007 
and 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 in 2003, and 𝑁 is the number of years between the two periods.   
The chapter seeks to determine the binding constraints and constraints with notable effects and 
this is done using two approaches based on the Growth Diagnostic framework. The first approach 
is through four sequential stages while the second explores the effects of obstacles using a model 
with interaction terms. The multivariate regression models employed in the two stages enable the 
investigation to determine the effects of each of the 15 obstacles on growth defined in Equation 
3.1. Such effects are captured by the coefficient 𝛽 in each the models that are presented from 
Equations 3.2 to 3.5. 
The first approach: 
The effects of an individual obstacle on growth are first observed using the following model. 
Model 1:  
𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜀1 …(3.2) 
where Individual obstacle is each of the 15 obstacles given in Section 3.5 and ε1 is the error term. 
Firm characteristics include 2006 sales, number of full-time paid employees in 2003, the square of 
the number of full-time paid employees, firm age, the square of firm age, a dummy for whether the 
firm is a subsidiary, and a dummy variable for foreign ownership of the firm that is above 10 
percent. MSMEs are often young in age and by definition have few employees. The square of firm 
age (and number of employees) is used in empirical studies (e.g. Dihn et al., 2010) so as to be 
able to observe the potential effects of ‘older’ firms (and firms with more employees) on the 
dependent variable. Market characteristics include a dummy for direct exports above 10 percent of 
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sales and a dummy for the manufacturing sector. Overall, the control variables are such that the 
results can be compared to similar studies.  
The analysis proceeds to observe the impact of all constraints on growth at once in Model 2. 
Model 2: 
gremp = β0 + βall 15 obstacles + βfirm characteristics + βmarket characteristics + ε2 …(3.3) 
In the third stage, the significant constraints from Model 1 and 2 are used.  
Model 3: 
gremp = β0 + βonly significant obstacle in Model 1 and 2 + βfirm characteristics + βmarket characteristics + ε3…(3.4) 
The second approach: 
In the second approach, interactions between some of the groups are allowed and the top 
constraints are determined by estimating the following regression. 
Model 4: 
gremp = β0 + βinteraction term + β15 obstacles + βfirm characteristics + βmarket characteristics + ε4 …(3.5) 
where the interaction term is each of the 15 obstacles interacting with the small and with the 
medium firms in turn. Results from the four earlier models, discussed in Section 3.6, compel the 
analysis to drop microenterprises from the interactions because of the relatively small sample.  
3.4.3 Decision criteria  
Results are summarised in Tables 3.4 to 3.6. For the key question asked (i.e. what is the binding 
constraint for enterprise growth in South Africa?), three possible outcomes from the methodology 
outlined above are expected. One outcome is a binding constraint for each category of firms at 
Model 4. The binding constraint must have a significant negative effect on growth. An obstacle is 
binding in Model 4 subject to the criterion given in B. below. The two other likely outcomes occur in 
the absence of a binding constraint. One would be when there is evidence that the effect of an 
obstacle on growth is negative and significant in Models 1 and 2. Such an outcome will be referred 
to as a constraint with notable effects. Another will be when there is insufficient evidence that any 
of the constraints affects growth in a meaningful way. On such outcomes, there are no further 
investigations done in this chapter but the possible implications are discussed in Section 3.7. In 
sum, then, the analysis and decision making criteria on what is a binding constraint or a constraint 
with notable effect is as follows: 
First approach: 
i. With reference to Model 1, the outcome is a constraint with notable effects if, in the 
respective category of enterprises, it is the only constraint with a significant negative impact 
on growth given that no other(s) emerge as significant in Model 2. 
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ii. With reference to Model 2, the outcome is a binding constraint if it is significant and is the 
only constraint that is significant given that no other constraint was found significant in 
Model 1. If one or more constraints are significant in Model 2 or, in addition, at least one or 
more from Model 1, then the binding constraint is determined by proceeding with all such 
significant constraints from Models 1 and 2 to Model 3. 
iii. With reference to Model 3, the outcome is a binding constraint if significant. Should more 
than one emerge as significant then the constraint with the largest negative marginal effect 
on growth will be deemed the most binding and the other significant ones will be deemed 
constraints with notable effects. 
iv. There is no reporting on categories of firms where constraints have a less than notable 
effect on growth. 
Second Approach: 
With reference to Model 4, the constraint with the most effect is determined by counting the 
number of times a constraint has a significant negative effect on the interaction terms. The group 
or category of firms most affected by an obstacle is also determined by a count of obstacles 
negatively affecting the group significantly.  
All the models are estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. OLS estimates the 
parameter β such that the sum of the squared residuals of the model is minimised i.e. most close 
to zero. The method is used by many other similar studies including Dihn et al. (2010) and 
Ayyagari et al. (2008). 
3.5 DATA  
The WBES data of 2007 in South Africa were used for the analysis. The 861 MSMEs surveyed 
were subject to the analysis. The 196 large firms surveyed were however included in the analysis 
for comparative purposes. In the WBES, firms rated 15 obstacles on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is no 
obstacle, 1 is minor, 2 moderate, 3 major, and 4 very severe. The obstacles are access to finance, 
access to land, business licensing and permits, corruption, courts, crime, customs and trade 
regulations, electricity, inadequately educated workers, labour regulations, political instability, 
practices of informal sector competitors, tax administration, tax rates and transportation of goods 
and supplies.  
Since the measures of the 15 constraints are categorical, there are three alternative approaches of 
handling them in the analysis. One is to capture the categorical measures as they are, which would 
make interpretation and comprehension of results convolutedly confusing given the five categories. 
Another is to reduce the number of categories to for instance two, where one is ‘no obstacle’ and 
the other is ‘obstacle’. Interpreting results from the two categories would be straightforward but at 
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the loss of information in the ordered categorical ratings. The third alternative is to treat the 
categories as weak proxies of an otherwise continuous variable and use the resultant mean. The 
third alternative, used in this chapter, is adopted by Ayyagari et al. (2008) and Dihn et al. (2010).  
Table 3.2 gives descriptive statistics of the obstacles and shows that on average, a micro 
enterprise has two employees, a small enterprise has 10 employees while a medium-sized firm 
has 42. When grouped by age, the sample has 325 firms that are less than six years (i.e. young 
firms), 360 firms with ages from 6 and 15 (mature firms) and 370 firms that are more than 15 years 
(i.e. old firms). Only 23.6 percent of the firms surveyed had women owners. With regard to the 
obstacles encountered by the firms, the average ratings suggest that crime with a mean of 1.95 
would be the most serious obstacle to growth, as was indeed shown by the count-based results in 
Section 3.3. 
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Table 3.2: Variables descriptions and summary statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Min Max Mean SD 
Micro  Number of employees 120 1 4 2.2833 1.2243 
Small  Number of employees 375 5 20 10.0930 4.4950 
Medium Number of employees 366 21 99 41.9290 21.6650 
Large Number of employees 196 100 9600 426.4850 979.344 
Firm age 2007 minus the year firm begun operating in South Africa 1056 1 141 15.9290 17.7736 
Young Up to 5 years 325 1 5 2.8369 1.5359 
Mature Between 6 and 15 years 360 6 15 9.5278 2.8105 
Old Above 15 years 370 16 141 33.6092 19.6763 
Experience How many years of experience working in this sector does the top manager have? 1056 1 61 13.7311 10.7040 
Gender  Dummy for female ownership 847 0 1 0.2361 0.4250 
Access to finance How much of an obstacle access to and cost of finance is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.8826 1.2569 
Access to land How much of an obstacle access to land is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.5884 1.0877 
Licensing  How much of an obstacle issuing of business licencing/permits is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.4349 0.8814 
Corruption How much of an obstacle corruption is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.9570 1.2393 
Courts How much of an obstacle functioning of courts is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.1953 0.5921 
Crime How much of an obstacle crime, theft and disorder are the firm’s operations 860 0 4 1.9547 1.2817 
Customs & trade  How much of an obstacle customs and trade regulations are to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.2105 0.6281 
Electricity How much of an obstacle electricity is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 1.1395 1.3273 
Inadequately 
educated workers  
How much of an obstacle inadequately educated workers are to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.6349 1.0025 
Labour regulations How much of an obstacle labour regulations are to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.5058 0.9098 
Political instability How much of an obstacle political instability is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.2733 0.7180 
Informal sector How much of an obstacle are practices of informal competitors to the firm’s operations 859 0 4 0.8312 1.1356 
Tax administration How much of an obstacle tax administration is to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.2593 0.6868 
Tax rates How much of an obstacle tax rates are to the firm’s operations 859 0 4 0.4144 0.8518 
Transportation How much of an obstacle is transportation of goods and services  to the firm’s operations 860 0 4 0.5163 0.9399 
Sales (annual) Recent annual sales 859    7,200     328,000,000     10,300,000     25,700,000  
Employees in 2003 Number of employees in 2003 694 0 150 20.9798 21.7520 
Foreign ownership Dummy for ownership above 10 percent  859 0 1 0.0873 0.2825 
Export Dummy for direct exports above 10 percent  859 0 1 0.0477 0.2133 
 
Source: Author's estimations based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
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Table 3.3 summarises statistics of the 861 MSMEs by age, sector, ownership, and location. Like 
Dihn et al. (2010), an employment-based measure of growth is used rather than the sales-based 
measure as the latter is more volatile. Table 3.3 shows that young firms (up to 5 years old) have 
the highest growth rate of 9.6 percent, while old firms (more than 15 years) have the lowest at 6.4 
percent. Old firms however have the lowest standard deviation, indicating that the growth rates are 
more stable. The definition of firm age categories is rather arbitrary in the literature. Following 
Aterido et al. (2011), this study defines ‘young’ as being up to 5 years (OECD, (2013) similarly 
defines young firms), ‘mature’ as 6 to 15 years and ‘old’ as more than 15 years. Aterido et al. 
(2009) also show higher performance of young firms. 
Table 3.3: Employment growth rates by enterprise category 
Category  Obs. Mean   Std. Dev. Min Max 
 All 883 0.0761 0.1047 -0.7068 0.5973 
 Large firms 193 0.0611 0.1053 -0.7068 0.4176 
 MSMEs 690 0.0803 0.1042 -0.2310 0.5973 
Size Micro 68 0.0216 0.1104 -0.2310 0.4621 
Small 281 0.0936 0.1090 -0.1959 0.5973 
Medium 341 0.0811 0.0947 -0.2310 0.4851 
Age Young 147 0.0960 0.1076 -0.2310 0.3662 
Mature 304 0.0854 0.1093 -0.2310 0.5973 
Old 239 0.0642 0.0930 -0.2310 0.4176 
Sector Retail 171 0.0646 0.1053 -0.2310 0.5973 
Services 156 0.0759 0.1034 -0.1865 0.5365 
Manufacturing 361 0.0892 0.1032 -0.2310 0.4851 
Region Cape Town 96 0.0712 0.1057 -0.2310 0.3662 
Durban-Port Elizabeth 135 0.1107 0.0958 -0.0278 0.5365 
Johannesburg 391 0.0823 0.1013 -0.1959 0.5973 
Ownership African 234 0.0858 0.1128 -0.2310 0.4851 
Asian & other 188 0.0808 0.1048 -0.2310 0.5973 
European  268 0.0752 0.0957 -0.2310 0.5365 
Female 149 0.0756 0.1083 -0.1865 0.5365 
Male 530 0.0812 0.1034 -0.2310 0.5973 
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys, South Africa (2007)  
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3.6  EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON BINDING CONSTRAINTS AND GROWTH 
Section 3.4 outlined the stages of the analysis and the decision criteria in interpreting the results. 
The results of the first approach within the Growth Diagnostic framework are presented in full from 
Appendices 1 to 9 and summarised in Table 3.4. Table 3.5 summarises the marginal effects of the 
binding constraints. Section 3.6.1 discusses the results of the first approach and Section 3.6.2 
discusses the results from the second approach. 
3.6.1 The binding constraints: first approach 
Except for small firms of European ownership and firms in Cape Town, access to finance does not 
impact the growth of MSMEs significantly. These results on access to finance are rather 
unexpected given extensive empirical evidence globally finding this obstacle as the main 
impediment. The count-based ratings in Section 3.3 showed that access to finance is however one 
of the top four obstacles. Chapter 4 will thus explore access to finance in some detail to 
understand why or if indeed the problem is less important in South Africa.  
The analysis does not find a binding constraint in the full sample of firms that includes 196 large 
enterprises. When the large firms are dropped from the analysis, leaving the 861 MSMEs, some 
significant growth obstacles emerge. Excluding large firms also improves the quality of the results, 
with the adjusted R-squared improving from an average of 4 percent for all firms on the 15 
individual regressions of Model 1 to 78 percent for micro enterprises. Of the 17 enterprise 
subgroups studied in the five categories shown in Table 3.2, it is in the full sample of MSMEs, the 
medium, young and male-owned firms that the search for a binding constraint progressed to Model 
3. For the four categories, ‘courts’ is the binding constraint. For young firms, individual obstacles 
regressions of Model 1 found only courts significant. However when all obstacles entered the 
regression at once, the practices of competitors in the informal sector emerged as the only 
significant problem. With two constraints for young firms, the analysis proceeded to Model 3 
entering courts and practices of competitors in the informal sector in the regression. Courts 
emerged as significant. All else held constant, there is basis from this analysis to infer that the 
courts reduces the propensity of young firms to increase employment, on average, 2.83 percent as 
shown in the average marginal effects in Table 3.5.  
Black-owned firms have the highest growth rates and for these firms, tax administration is binding, 
reducing the likelihood of increasing employment by, on average, 3.13 percent with all else held 
constant. MSMEs in the retail sector have licensing and permits as a binding constraint. Practices 
of competitors in the informal sector are the binding constraint for Asian-owned firms. Electricity is 
the binding constraint for firms in Johannesburg. For MSMEs as a whole, the first approach shows 
that courts is the binding constraint and transport and electricity are constraints with notable 
effects.
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Table 3.4: Obstacles that constrain MSMEs' growth the most in South Africa 
          
Firms’ 
categories 
 Courts Electricity Business licensing 
and permits 
Practices of informal 
sector competitors 




ALL   -0.007      Electricity 
   (0.021)*       
MSMEs  -0.012 -0.006    -0.010 Electricity Courts 
  (0.037)* (0.036)*    (0.023)* Transport  
Size Medium -0.009 -0.006     Electricity Courts 
  (0.055) (0.033)*       
 Young -0.028   -0.023  -0.019 Informal competition Courts 
  (0.031)   (0.012)*  (0.052)   
Sector Retail   -0.022   -0.017 Transport Licensing 
    (0.039)*   (0.085)   
Region Jo’burg  -0.007      Electricity 
   (0.045)*       
Owner Male -0.011 -0.007    -0.009  Courts 
  (0.074) (0.039)*    (0.049)*   
 African     -0.031   Tax administration 
      (0.025)*    
 Asian    -0.018    Informal competitors 
     (0.012)*     
* Significant at the 5 percent level 
Note: Table 3.4 summarises the estimations which are reported in full in Appendices 1 to 9. Appendices 1 to 9 report the effects of obstacles on growth from 3 Models. The summary 
in the above Table 3.4 reports only obstacles found significant when estimated in Model 1 where a single obstacle along with firm and market characteristics are estimated, Model 2 
when all obstacles enter the regression at once along with firm and market characteristics and Model 3 when only significant obstacles from Model 1 and 2 are estimated along with 
firms and market. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
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Table 3.5: Marginal effects of the binding constraints 
Average marginal effects      
Model VCE: OLS      
Expression: Linear prediction, predict ()      
dy/dx w.r.t: binding constraint      
    Delta method    
Enterprise group Binding constraint dy/dx Std. Err. z P> ǀ z ǀ [95% Conf. Interval] 
ALL Electricity^ -0.0069 0.0030 -2.3100 0.0210 -0.0127 -0.0010 
Johannesburg MSMEs Electricity^ -0.0074 0.0037 -2.0100 0.0440 -0.0147 -0.0002 
All MSMEs Courts* -0.0118 0.0057 -2.0900 0.0360 -0.0229 -0.0008 
Medium  Courts* -0.0085 0.0044 -1.9300 0.0540 -0.0172 0.0001 
Young Courts* -0.0283 0.0130 -2.1900 0.0290 -0.0537 -0.0029 
Male-owned Courts* -0.0114 0.0064 -1.7900 0.0730 -0.0238 0.0011 
African-owned Tax administration^ -0.0313 0.0138 -2.2600 0.0240 -0.0585 -0.0042 
Asian-owned Practices of informal sector competitors^ -0.0183 0.0072 -2.5400 0.0110 -0.0324 -0.0042 
Retail Business licensing and permits^ -0.0216 0.0104 -2.0800 0.0370 -0.0419 -0.0013 
^
 Marginal effect estimated at Model 2 stage where all obstacles enter the regression at once 
*
 Marginal effect estimated post model 3 where only significant obstacles from Models 1 and 2 enter the regression 
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007)
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3.6.2 Top constraints: second approach 
The second approach studies the interaction terms. Ideally, interactions would include all five 
groups (size, age, sector, location, gender and ethnic origin) and subgroups. However, a sample of 
861 is too small to allow for all possible interactions. The analysis designates firm size as the key 
variable of interest. Interaction terms are thus firm size with each of the other categories’ 
subgroups. Micro enterprises are largely homogenous: all are from one locality, 80 percent are 
black-owned and three-quarters are retailers. Interacting micro enterprises with other groups would 
yield limited observations. The second approach excludes micro enterprises.  
Table 3.6 reports the effects of each obstacle as it interacts with small or with medium firms and 
one of the subgroups (i.e. young, old, services, etc.). Table 3.6 provides interesting reading in two 
main ways. Firstly, the effects of each obstacle can be observed across different categories of 
firms. For instance, the obstacle ‘courts’ is the only obstacle with a negative coefficient across all 
categories. However, the effect is not significant for medium firms. If results on access to finance 
are reviewed across the category of firms, it can be seen that the obstacle is significant in two of 
the 14 interaction terms (i.e. white-owned and Cape Town-based small firms). As previously 
stated, Chapter 4 conducts a detailed investigation of access to finance. It may therefore suffice for 
now to postulate that perhaps the fact that enterprise development policy in South Africa seeks to 
support mainly black- and Indian-owned firms has left white-owned small firms most vulnerable to 
the finance constraint (White Paper, 1995; DTI, 2005; NPC, 2011). Even then, the importance of a 
careful study of access to finance is further underscored by the fact that the effect of access to 
finance on growth is negative for all small firms except the black-owned.  
Secondly, the effects of all obstacles can be observed on each group. For example, the first 
column of Table 3.6 shows the effects of each obstacle on young small firms where only ‘practices 
of competitors in the informal sector’ is significant. For small firms in Durban and Port Elizabeth, 
the results show that all 15 obstacles have no significant effect on growth. One of the many 
plausible explanations is that the survey instrument did not pick up key issues affecting growth. On 
the other hand, 9 of the 15 obstacles affect the retail, Asian-owned and Johannesburg-based small 
firms. If interventions are to target the most affected firms, then this result suggests that the 
preceding three groups would deserve more attention. But this may be debatable. For instance, 
male-owned small firms are significantly affected by 8 out of the 15 obstacles, while only three are 
significant for female-owned small firms despite the fact that many studies have shown that 
female-owned firms face more obstacles. A possible explanation for this is that only 23.6 percent of 
firms in the sample were female-owned. That the proportion of female-owned firms was less than 
half the proportion of women in the national population suggests that there could be significant 
obstacles women face in starting their own businesses. Further research into such gender-related 
obstacles is therefore necessary so that suitable policies are designed and implemented.
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Table 3.6: Interactions for each obstacle 
 Young Mature Old Retail Manufacturing Services 
 Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium 
Access to finance -0.010 0.015 -0.005 0.015 -0.011 0.006 -0.012 0.024 -0.012 0.007 -0.006 0.012 
 0.154 0.106 0.408 0.007 0.154 0.371 0.226 0.043 0.153 0.343 0.191 0.014 
Access to land -0.011 0.011 -0.002 0.018 0.007 0.010 -0.011 0.012 -0.023 0.007 0.008 0.018 
 0.177 0.378 0.792 0.003 0.430 0.132 0.315 0.207 0.039* 0.330 0.242 0.002 
 Licensing & permits -0.002 0.023 -0.005 0.015 -0.009 0.003 -0.031 0.015 0.003 0.018 -0.001 0.009 
 0.892 0.070 0.585 0.079 0.426 0.809 0.023* 0.361 0.835 0.122 0.947 0.265 
Corruption -0.007 0.018 -0.003 0.010 -0.017 0.002 -0.012 0.011 -0.019 0.002 -0.002 0.010 
 0.266 0.037 0.530 0.034 0.012* 0.631 0.066 0.087 0.015* 0.730 0.661 0.024 
Courts -0.036 -0.026 -0.025 -0.002 -0.031 0.002 -0.056 0.001 -0.030 -0.011 -0.017 0.000 
 0.273 0.104 0.151 0.854 0.042* 0.850 0.017* 0.953 0.139 0.322 0.251 0.983 
Crime -0.006 0.013 -0.010 0.008 -0.012 0.002 -0.013 0.004 -0.017 0.002 -0.002 0.012 
 0.164 0.012 0.007* 0.022 0.008* 0.632 0.001* 0.359 0.000* 0.589 0.681 0.000 
Customs regulations -0.014 -0.023 -0.041 0.007 -0.030 0.013 -0.019 0.025 -0.051 0.009 -0.026 0.002 
 0.304 0.217 0.017* 0.579 0.092 0.103 0.277 0.099 0.073 0.527 0.026* 0.773 
Electricity -0.005 -0.001 -0.015 0.004 -0.015 0.003 -0.024 0.001 -0.018 0.002 -0.007 0.005 
 0.428 0.944 0.002* 0.422 0.011* 0.482 0.017* 0.878 0.001* 0.705 0.106 0.199 
Workers’ education -0.005 0.003 -0.011 0.013 -0.030 0.005 -0.036 0.007 -0.031 0.003 -0.005 0.012 
 0.580 0.793 0.176 0.020 0.004* 0.385 0.012* 0.330 0.011* 0.708 0.449 0.016 
Labour regulations -0.009 0.006 -0.005 0.017 -0.016 0.010 -0.024 0.003 -0.015 0.008 0.001 0.017 
 0.458 0.692 0.441 0.003 0.065 0.148 0.014* 0.781 0.106 0.262 0.850 0.001 
Political instability -0.019 0.007 0.002 0.029 -0.021 0.004 -0.045 0.019 0.004 0.006 -0.014 0.019 
 0.150 0.634 0.827 0.004 0.039* 0.629 0.145 0.207 0.833 0.522 0.056 0.038 
Informal sector -0.029 -0.003 -0.006 0.007 -0.013 0.011 -0.017 0.015 -0.021 0.003 -0.009 0.006 
 0.002* 0.747 0.308 0.215 0.079 0.083 0.046* 0.056 0.035* 0.731 0.077 0.276 
Tax administration -0.004 -0.005 -0.026 0.010 -0.024 0.013 -0.042 0.014 0.010 0.011 -0.017 0.008 
 0.805 0.777 0.211 0.245 0.093 0.151 0.035* 0.276 0.645 0.408 0.183 0.333 
Tax rates -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.009 -0.040 0.008 -0.031 0.014 -0.011 0.004 0.000 0.011 
 0.965 0.615 0.529 0.206 0.002* 0.265 0.046* 0.220 0.426 0.628 0.999 0.100 
Transport -0.021 0.019 -0.015 0.002 -0.025 0.006 -0.053 0.004 -0.028 0.005 -0.009 0.007 
 0.108 0.212 0.041* 0.768 0.023* 0.348 0.00* 0.688 0.020* 0.474 0.193 0.288 
P-values in italics 
Model: Employment Growth = β0 + β log of sales + number of employees +  number of employees squared + firm age + firm age squared + foreign ownership + export + size +
15 obstacles + one obstacle#size(small or medium) + selected firm  
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
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Table 3.6 continued: Interactions for each obstacle 
 Female Male African European Cape Town Durban and Port 
Elizabeth 
Johannesburg 
 Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium Small Medium 
Access to finance -0.011 0.005 -0.007 0.016 0.001 0.014 -0.012 0.008 -0.022 0.014 -0.024 0.007 -0.004 0.026 
 0.113 0.442 0.159 0.001 0.808 0.038 0.053 0.216 0.012* 0.036 0.015* 0.528 0.856 0.003 
Access to land -0.005 0.005 -0.002 0.019 -0.002 0.012 -0.016 0.011 0.020 0.019 -0.013 0.021 0.005 0.026 
 0.622 0.474 0.745 0.000 0.782 0.049 0.122 0.164 0.178 0.019 0.401 0.117 0.785 0.001 
 Licensing & permits -0.002 0.020 -0.008 0.008 0.008 0.016 -0.054 0.013 -0.007 0.009 -0.019 0.022 0.221 0.016 
 0.887 0.023 0.280 0.382 0.334 0.076 0.00* 0.243 0.626 0.458 0.286 0.388 0.000 0.315 
Corruption -0.019 0.003 -0.008 0.009 0.004 0.009 -0.015 0.005 -0.008 0.008 -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.014 
 0.043* 0.688 0.074 0.011 0.648 0.129 0.004* 0.252 0.208 0.086 0.758 0.513 0.649 0.008 
Courts -0.032 0.001 -0.029 -0.006 -0.093 -0.002 -0.046 -0.004 -0.023 -0.005 -0.051 0.001 -0.077 0.008 
 0.104 0.947 0.025* 0.436 0.047* 0.888 0.123 0.718 0.057 0.612 0.105 0.955 0.177 0.631 
Crime -0.010 0.003 -0.012 0.009 -0.007 0.008 -0.010 0.005 -0.012 0.006 -0.015 0.008 0.000 0.013 
 0.069 0.463 0.000* 0.003 0.112 0.043 0.006* 0.151 0.006* 0.065 0.011* 0.183 0.970 0.001 
Customs regulations -0.056 0.019 -0.024 0.004 -0.028 0.006 -0.030 0.002 -0.019 0.014 -0.014 0.034 -0.008 0.006 
 0.048* 0.147 0.015* 0.580 0.039* 0.796 0.075 0.805 0.297 0.146 0.278 0.041 0.732 0.581 
Electricity -0.006 0.001 -0.016 0.005 -0.011 0.000 -0.018 0.002 -0.008 0.006 -0.012 0.001 0.016 0.015 
 0.310 0.911 0.000* 0.214 0.022* 0.991 0.002* 0.655 0.217 0.178 0.088 0.781 0.119 0.025 
Workers’ education -0.015 0.006 -0.014 0.010 -0.010 0.010 -0.029 0.006 -0.010 0.008 -0.016 0.003 0.002 0.022 
 0.228 0.405 0.022* 0.023 0.301 0.177 0.007* 0.352 0.223 0.116 0.132 0.702 0.836 0.004 
Labour regulations 0.002 0.008 -0.013 0.015 -0.008 0.014 -0.025 0.005 0.004 0.015 -0.016 0.011 0.005 0.022 
 0.833 0.341 0.019* 0.002 0.594 0.158 0.001* 0.495 0.587 0.004 0.149 0.293 0.595 0.001 
Political instability -0.007 0.011 -0.014 0.017 -0.006 0.003 -0.035 0.012 0.019 0.019 -0.027 0.014 0.006 0.025 
 0.594 0.341 0.061 0.028 0.595 0.824 0.00* 0.265 0.157 0.025 0.019* 0.283 0.650 0.007 
Informal sector -0.001 0.003 -0.017 0.009 -0.001 0.007 -0.026 0.001 -0.011 0.011 -0.024 0.011 0.013 0.014 
 0.946 0.669 0.000* 0.063 0.893 0.315 0.000* 0.917 0.215 0.051 0.019* 0.422 0.203 0.061 
Tax administration -0.016 0.007 -0.023 0.011 -0.037 0.003 -0.002 0.012 -0.019 0.013 -0.014 0.014 -0.011 0.019 
 0.336 0.524 0.075 0.145 0.024* 0.761 0.884 0.185 0.340 0.237 0.395 0.199 0.653 0.087 
Tax rates -0.050 0.001 0.001 0.012 -0.008 0.013 -0.006 0.011 -0.012 0.001 -0.008 0.010 -0.015 0.019 
 0.002* 0.884 0.890 0.027 0.468 0.074 0.571 0.189 0.351 0.901 0.547 0.335 0.439 0.025 
Transport -0.019 -0.001 -0.020 0.009 0.003 0.008 -0.042 0.002 -0.025 0.007 -0.026 0.013 -0.009 0.014 
 0.088 0.918 0.003* 0.117 0.772 0.420 0.000* 0.835 0.010* 0.299 0.020* 0.282 0.526 0.125 
P-values in italics 
Model: Employment Growth = β0 + β log of sales + number of employees +  number of employees squared + firm age + firm age squared + foreign ownership + export + size +
15 obstacles + one obstacle#size(small or medium) + selected firm  
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 summarise Table 3.6 to expound on the results. Figure 3.3 reports the number 
of times each obstacle has a negative effect on growth and the number of times when the negative 
effect is significant. Crime, for instance, has negative effects 13 times and is significant in 9, while 
Access to land is only significant in 1 out of the 10 negative effects. Although access to land is a 
topical issue in South Africa, the results of this analysis suggest that it is not a critical problem. An 
explanation of this result could be that the enterprises surveyed were in urban centres where 
availability of rental offices and factories is more important than access to land.  
In essence, Figure 3.3 is a ranking of the importance of obstacles for the pooled 28 interaction 
terms reported in Table 3.6. Based on the count of significant negative effects, the top obstacles 
for the pooled 28 interaction terms are Crime, Transport and Electricity. Crime was the top obstacle 
in the simple count of ratings method and in the weighted count approach. Crime and Transport 
have 9 significantly negative effects from the 13 and 14 negative effects respectively.  
 
Figure 3.3: Ranking obstacles based on effects of interaction terms 
It is important to determine which groups as represented by the interaction terms are most 
impacted by the obstacles so that interventions can be appropriately targeted. Figure 3.4 reports 
the number of times each group is negatively affected by obstacles and the number of times when 
such effects are significant. It is quite clear from Figure 3.4 that medium-sized firms are mildly 
affected by the obstacles studied. However, small firms are seriously affected, particularly when in 
the Retail sector, Asian-owned, in Johannesburg, Old or in the Services sector. For small firms in 
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Similarly, for small Asian-owned and small firms in Johannesburg, all 15 obstacles negatively affect 
growth and 9 of such effects are significant. Interventions directed at these types of firms may 
unlock the job creation potential of small firms. Based on the summary in Figure 3.3, the previous 
analyses of Model 1 to 3 summarised in Table 3.5 and the simple and weighted count methods 
summarised in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 suggest that the most appropriate intervention must seek 
to mitigate crime, improve transportation of goods and the supply of electricity. These are the main 
impediments to the growth of MSMEs in South Africa. 
 
Figure 3.4: Ranking of obstacles by interaction terms 
The analyses of Models 1 to 3 found that Courts is the most binding constraint. It is probably 
important to note that Dihn et al. (2010) found the practices of informal competitors and access to 
finance as the most serious constraints but raised two arguments against the practices of 
competitors in the informal sector. The first pointed out that the survey instrument lacks objective 
indicators to validate the obstacle, and the second reasoned that competition, as the essence of 
enterprise, is not an obstacle. In that light, practices of informal sector competitors is a rather 
ambiguous constraint, as is ‘courts’. Courts relates to the legal system, its perceived and real 
efficiency4. This is too broad to relate to enterprise growth unless specific aspects of the law 
specified for evaluation by firms. Finding courts binding is of limited use to legal reform and design 
of support measures. It may therefore be useful for the WBES instrument and future studies to 
explore specific aspects of the broad ‘courts’ variable which affect growth negatively. 
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One way of dealing with an ambiguous binding constraint such as courts is to opt for the second 
most serious based on marginal effects on growth. This would certainly be justifiable in other 
contexts but for South Africa, it is more reasonable to associate courts with crime - and crime is the 
top constraint in all other analyses of this chapter. It is thus important to be cognisant of the 
possibility that the effects of crime on growth may also have an indirect effect through courts. 
However, the question of how constraints relate and influence each other is beyond the scope of 
this chapter but an important issue for further research. It suffices for this discussion to postulate 
that a lax legal system increases crime, limits entrepreneurship and keeps stakeholders such as 
insurance companies away. It also important to consider the firms’ interpretation of ‘crime, theft 
and disorder’ in the questionnaire as the interpretation informs where interventions are most 
required. Three further questions in the survey instrument offer some guidance on this as 
summarised in Table 3.7. The questions relate to goods-in-transit security and security of physical 
assets within the firm. 
Table 3.7: What could crime, and disorder mean? 
Percentage of firms reporting that: 
1 Shipments to customers were lost to theft 82% 
2 Firm paid for security for equipment, personnel, or professional security services 69% 
3 Firm experienced losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson 42% 
Source: World Bank Surveys in South Africa (2007) 
Table 3.7 suggests that the provision of secure transportation of products to the market could 
mitigate the effects of crime, further affirming transport as one of the main obstacles to growth.  
3.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
This chapter used two count-based methods that summarise the feedback of how business owners 
rated the severity of 15 obstacles on their enterprises and two approaches based on the Growth 
Diagnostic framework by Hausmann et al. (2005) to identify, rank and determine the most serious 
obstacles to the growth of MSMEs. Evidence in the chapter suggests that crime is the binding 
constraints for the MSMEs. However, the obstacles studied do not significantly affect medium-
sized enterprises but small firms. Although medium-sized firms are mildly affected, it is important to 
note that five obstacles (Courts, Customs and regulations, Electricity, Informal sector competitors 
and Tax administration) have a negative effect on young medium firms. All obstacles have 
negative effects on young small firms. This suggests that young firms are most vulnerable to 
business environment challenges. Interventions that seek to impart general business management 
skills to proprietors of new business ventures would be helpful to young firms.  
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There are some enterprises where the impact of all obstacles on growth was below constraints 
with notable effects. The affected categories prior to the second Growth Diagnostics approach 
were micro, small, old, female-owned and European-owned, services and manufacturing sector, 
Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth-based. There are two possible interpretations of this 
outcome. The first is that the firms have no significant obstacle constraining their growth, meaning 
that the business environment should be tenable for them. In this interpretation, firms are only 
exposed to the typical systemic challenges of being in enterprise, namely the ability to innovate 
and being competitive. The other interpretation is that it is possible that the hypothetical obstacles 
presented to business owners and managers in the survey instrument did not capture obstacles 
peculiar to such firms. However, considering additional characteristics of the firms as in the second 
approach within the Growth Diagnostics framework by creating interaction terms identifies 
impediments to growth. Considering interaction terms therefore provides incremental insight to 
policy when designing interventions to considering only a singular trait of a firm. 
This chapter used the 2007 World Bank Enterprise Survey data. In preparation for the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup in South Africa, substantial infrastructure projects to improve the transport system and 
electricity supply were undertaken nationwide. It is likely that the relative importance of some of the 
obstacles may well have changed because of these projects and other policies since. A survey and 
analysis of the 15 and perhaps more obstacles would be invaluable as it would not only show the 
evolving issues of MSME growth but further enrich the debate on whether there are economic 
benefit to hosting such events (Maennig and du Plessis, 2007; Rogerson, 2009). This chapter 
developed an analytical framework that can be utilised in such future surveys to identify, rank and 
determine the most important obstacles in a given context. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
The chapter identified key constraints to the growth of MSMEs and determined the most binding. 
The chapter presented a criterion for identifying top constraints as an alternative to the simple 
count of responses approach often used in the literature. Using this alternative weighted count 
approach, crime, electricity and corruption were found to be the top constraints. The chapter also 
used two Growth Diagnostics based methods to determine binding and top constraints and 
grouped firms by size, age, sector, ethnic and gender ownership and location to determine such 
constraints for each group. The binding constraint for MSMEs as a whole is crime, theft and 
disorder. Electricity and transportation of goods are constraints with notable effects on growth and 
quite important across all firm groups. Access to finance has limited effects on most MSMEs and is 
further investigated in the next chapter given the prominence of the problem in empirical literature 
in South Africa and in the developing world. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE FINANCE CONSTRAINT AND MICRO, SMALL AND 
MEDIUM ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Access to finance is regarded as one of the key determinants of whether a business idea is 
explored commercially in a start-up venture (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2008). Similarly, the 
availability of working capital and long-term finance determines the continued existence and growth 
of the venture. There is extensive empirical evidence globally that the main obstacle to the growth 
of MSMEs is access to finance (Ayyagari et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2008; G20, 2010). The evidence 
underscores the importance of studying the profile of financially constrained firms so that policy 
interventions can target such firms. 
A number of studies on MSMEs in South Africa have argued that finance is the main constraint to 
growth (DTI, 2005; Naidoo and Hilton, 2006; Rogerson, 2008). Others show through feedback from 
surveys that most business owners rate access to finance as a major obstacle (Garwe and Fatoki, 
2012; Fatoki and Garwe, 2010; Naudé et al., 2008; Gumede, 2004; Fatoki and Smit, 2011). Naudé 
et al. (2008) for instance used the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey data and found that 
access to finance is a major determinant of start-up rates in South Africa. Gumede (2004) used a 
national survey and found that along with access to information about international markets, 
access to finance plays a significant role in determining the propensity of SMEs to be exporters. 
Fatoki and Garwe (2010) surveyed MSMEs in the Eastern Cape province and employed factor 
analysis to identify key obstacles to starting a business and found access to finance to be the main 
obstacle.  
Although numerous other obstacles to the growth of MSMEs have been highlighted in South 
Africa5, the finance constraint features prominently (as it does globally) as the key obstacle to 
growth. The prominence of access to finance in the small enterprise development literature makes 
it reasonable to be cautious towards intimations as in Chapter 3 that finance may not be the most 
serious obstacle for MSMEs in South Africa.  
Through three systematic stages, this chapter seeks to understand the access to finance problem 
in South Africa using the WBES of 2003 and 2007 and the WBFCS of 2010. First, the chapter 
                                               
5
 For example Nieman, Visser and van Wyk (2008) found that for SMEs in the tourism sector, government 
policies and perceptions of the country internationally are more important. In investigating why some SMEs 
grow while others stagnate or fail, Unger, Keith, Hilling, Gielnik and Frese (2009) found that the cognitive 
ability of entrepreneurs and their level of education are the main determinants of success, a finding related to 
Visser et al. (2005) who showed that formal education enhances transformational leadership in SMEs. 
Ladzani and van Vuuren (2002) and Lotz and Marais (2007) underscored the importance of training before 
entrepreneurs set up their businesses. 
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determines the importance of the finance constraint over time by tracking opinions of business 
owners and managers on how they regarded access to finance issues as affecting enterprise 
operations. Second, the chapter assesses whether firms run by managers who regard access to 
finance as a serious obstacle significantly underperform firms run by managers who regard access 
to finance as not being a serious obstacle. The second stage is an important contribution in that 
the extant literature has largely not demonstrated the implied disadvantage of firms that rate 
access to finance as a problem.  
While the first two stages use a perceptions-based measure of the finance constraint, the third 
uses a framework by Kuntchev et al., (2013) to identify firms that actually encounter obstacles 
when seeking finance. Once identified, the third stage seeks to understand the profile of financially 
constrained firms by investigating their attributes, for example the sectors in which most are found, 
whether such firms are start-ups or mature, managed by very educated or less educated 
executives, owned by blacks or whites etc. Understanding the profile of financially constrained 
firms is important in that policies can target such firms rather than the generality of enterprises.  
The next section reviews theoretical explanations for why smaller firms encounter more obstacles 
than larger firms in accessing finance. It also reviews the empirical literature to assess how the 
finance constraint has been measured. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Information asymmetry (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Akerlof, 1970) and transaction costs economics 
(Williamson, 1981; 2007) provide useful theoretical rationalisations that, when applied to the small 
business sector (Honohan, 2010; Besley, 1994), explain why small firms find it difficult to access 
production inputs from factor markets. Finance, as Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) argue, is one 
such critical input. From the information asymmetry perspective, the explanation would be that 
small firms are less known to financiers. Unlike large firms that are for instance obliged to publish 
financial reports, particularly if listed, small firms are not. Financial information about small firms 
tends to be unreliable as most are not audited, hence the reluctance of financiers to fund them. In 
any case, transaction costs of screening and subsequent monitoring are higher for financiers when 
many widely spread small businesses make up the loan portfolio than when the portfolio has a few 
large firms. In addition, since owners of small firms often have executive roles in their firms, the risk 
that the owner will misallocate externally sourced finance is high due to weak or non-existent 
corporate governance structures. For these reasons, small businesses are credit-rationed by 
financial markets and regarded as difficult to deal with by potential counterparties, as is the case 
with the market for used cars analogy in Akerlof (1970). 
There are further explanations of why the finance constraint is more prevalent in MSMEs. Such 
issues can be categorised as being either macro or micro. Macro issues relate to the structure of 
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the economy while micro issues are specific to the firm seeking finance. Under macro issues, the 
level of financial markets development in a country is an important determinant of access to 
finance (Ayyagari et al., 2008; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2005; King and Levine, 1993). 
Firms in more developed financial markets and economies encounter fewer problems in accessing 
finance. Studies expounding on this hypothesis advocate for emergence of financial services 
providers such as microfinance institutions and venture capitalists to extend the reach of the 
financial markets (Banerjee and Duflo, 2010; Karlan and Morduch, 2009; Yunus, 2007).  
On macro issues and associated with financial market development, Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2006) showed that countries with an independent judiciary are less susceptible to the 
financing problem as financiers are confident that their rights will be protected in the event of 
disputes or liquidation. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (1999) showed that in such countries, small 
firms are more likely to grow into large firms than in countries with weak judicial systems. It is 
rather difficult to determine a priori in South Africa if the finance constraint is a serious problem for 
smaller firms. This stems from the fact that although the financial market is well developed, as the 
World Bank (2011) assessed, it is, along with other sectors of the economy, oligopolistic (Bhorat, 
Hirsch, Kanbur and Ncube, 2014), making it equally reasonable to suppose that MSMEs could be 
significantly credit-rationed.  
The literature on small business finance focuses largely on micro-level explanations of the 
financing constraint. The literature is quite extensive, with issues of ethnic origin of owner explored 
if the hypothesis is that there could be ethnic-influenced credit rationing by the financial market 
(Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman, 1998: Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo and Wolken, 2002; Kon and 
Storey, 2003; Raturi and Swamy, 1999). The role of social networks in influencing access to 
finance is also explored on the basis that social networks could mitigate information asymmetry 
through the peer reference mechanism in such networks (Biggs and Shah, 2006; Lehmann and 
Neuberger, 2001). On both ethnic origin and social networks, it is not clear in the South African 
context if for instance black-owned, Asian-owned or white-owned firms would face more 
challenges in accessing finance, particularly given significant measures government has put in 
place to support black-owned enterprises potentially increasing the likelihood of crowding-out other 
ethnic groups.  
The sector in which a firm belongs is also an important consideration as some industries may be 
regarded as being more likely to perform better than others (Parker, Storey and van Witteloostuijn, 
2010; Storey, 1994). Gender of owner has also been investigated, with the underlying hypothesis 
being that female-owned firms are more exposed to the finance problem than male-owned firms 
(Nichter and Goldmark, 2009; Kim, 2006) and a study by Naidoo and Hilton (2006) focusing on the 
finance constraint and female-owned small businesses in South Africa suggested that the 
hypothesis holds.  
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The level of human capital development usually proxied by the number of years the business 
owner spent in school, the business owner’s level of education or the years’ experience a manager 
has is another variable explored by researchers (Brown, Earl and Lup, 2005; McPherson, 1996). 
The underlying hypothesis is that the higher the level of human capital investment within the firm, 
the less likely that the firm is affected by access to finance. In developed economies, the extent to 
which a firm innovates, usually proxied by expenditure on research and development or number of 
patents lodged for registration, has been explored as possibly explaining access to finance (Mina, 
Lahr and Hughes, 2013). However, it is not clear a priori how the innovative disposition of a firm 
should affect access to finance (Mina et al., 2013).  
An important question in firm-level analyses is how to identify firms with the financing problem and 
the question dictates the need to measure the finance constraint. Once the financially constrained 
firms are identified, the characteristics discussed in the preceding paragraphs can be evaluated on 
how well they explain the finance constraint. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) used financial statements 
and annual reports information to identify a financially constrained firm but the approach is of 
limited use to small businesses as such information is often not available or unreliable.  
Perhaps because of the lack of reliable data from MSMEs, self-reported Likert scale-based 
assessments of access to finance are used where ratings above a specific rating in the rating scale 
are defined as presence of the finance problem (Beck et al., 2005). There is debate in the literature 
on whether perceptions on the finance constraint are a robust proxy of the actual problem 
encountered by firms (Canton, Grilo, Monteagudo and van der Zwan, 2013; Coluzzi et al., 2012; 
Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido, 2009; Gelb et al., 2007; Artola and Genre, 2011; Ferrando and 
Mulier, 2013; Ferrando and Griesshaber 2011). Gelb et al. (2007: 5) raised an interesting question 
to demonstrate concerns on the use of perceptions as indicators of the finance constraint, asking 
“but what is the benchmark against which firms in a given country are expected to rate the severity 
of a particular constraint?”: an important question given that multinational firms are probably the 
only set of enterprises with some international experiences to have such a benchmark.  
A review of studies in the preceding paragraph shows a mixed use of perception-based and the 
less subjective indicators, with the pattern growing toward the use of less subjective indicators. 
Canton et al. (2013: 702) used only the perception-based indicator as did Beck et al. (2005) and 
Beck et al. (2006), arguing that the indicator makes ‘large-scale analysis’ available to the 
researcher as most firms provide the rating and fewer typically provide information on the less 
subjective indicators such as how many of their loan applications were rejected and why.  
Beck et al. (2013) used access to a bank account as an indicator of access to finance. When a firm 
does not have a bank account, such a firm, according to Beck et al. (2013), has a problem in 
accessing finance. In South Africa, the Financial Services Charter of 2004 has been instrumental in 
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significantly increasing the reach of banking services (Kostov, Arun and Annim, 2014; Finscope, 
2010). As a result, using access to a bank account as an indicator of access to finance could 
understate the finance problem. This is indeed evident in Table 4.1 from the firms surveyed in 
2007. Micro enterprises have the highest number of firms without a bank account: 26.7 percent of 
micro enterprises did not have bank accounts. This drops to 3.5 percent for small firms and the 
proportion is negligible for medium enterprises.  
Table 4.1: Access to bank accounts 
Size Does firm have a chequing and/or a savings account? 
 Yes No Total 
Micro 88 (73.3%)ᵟ 32 (26.7%)  120 
Small 362 (96.5%) 13 (3.5%)  375 
Medium 364 (99.5%) 2 (0.5%)  366 
Large 196 (100%)  0 (0)  196 
Total  1 010  47  1 057 
ᵟ Percentage in parenthesis  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007) 
Given the summary in Table 4.1, defining access to finance based on holding a bank account 
seems unsuitable particularly when the objective of the analysis is to understand the small and 
medium firms. Alternatives to holding a bank account as a measure of access to finance could be 
access to specific financing products such as overdrafts, loans and lines of credit (Beck et al., 
2013). Of the 1 057 firms surveyed in 2007, 53 percent had overdraft facilities and 29 percent had 
loans or lines of credit. On a firm size basis, Table 4.2 shows that access to the two financial 
products improves by firm size with 13 percent of micro enterprises accessing overdrafts compared 
to 80 percent of large firms. Using access to overdrafts or loans and lines of credit therefore 
provides a fair alternative to the use of a bank account as an indicator of access to finance. Yet an 
indicator that captures not merely access to specific financial products but also the experiences of 
business owners when seeking access to financing products and the reasons why other business 
owners fail to access the products is perhaps a more integrated measure of the finance constraint. 
Importantly, such a measure implicitly analyses the lending technologies – (namely how loans are 
processed by financiers, Berger and Udell, 2006) - and could point out how such technologies 
could be improved. Kuntchev et al. (2013) constructed such an integrated measure of the finance 
constraint from the World Bank Enterprise Survey instrument.   
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Table 4.2: Access to overdrafts and loans by firm size 
Overdraft facilities by firm size: Micro Small Medium Large Total 
Proportion of firms with overdraft facility 13% 43% 60% 80% 53% 
Proportion of firms without overdraft facility 87% 57% 40% 20% 47% 
Total number of firms 120 375 366 196 1057 
Loans or lines of credit by firm size: 
Proportion of firms with loans or lines of credit 15% 18% 25% 23% 21% 
Proportion of firms without loans or lines of credit 85% 82% 75% 77% 79% 
Total number of firms 120 375 366 196 1057 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys in South Africa (2007) 
4.3 FRAMEWORK FOR IDENTIFYING FINANCIALLY CONSTRAINED FIRMS 
This section describes the integrated framework used by Kuntchev et al. (2013) to determine levels 
of financial constraint. The framework defines four levels of the finance constraint: Fully Credit 
Constrained (FCC), Maybe Credit Constrained (MCC), Partially Credit Constrained (PCC), and 
Non Credit Constrained (NCC). The chapter uses the framework to identify firms experiencing 
different levels of the finance constraint in South Africa and thereafter determines the profile of 
firms more likely to be financially constrained. 
The framework is constructed from the finance section of the questionnaire and focuses on 
questions about whether or not firms applied for loans, the reasons for not applying for loans, the 
outcome of applications, the reasons for the outcome from the financiers’ perspective and from the 
applicants’ perspective, and how the firm financed its working capital and fixed assets 
requirements. A firm is assigned to one of the four categorical outcomes of FCC, PCC, MCC and 
NCC depending on its responses to a set of questions and statements.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 50 
 
Table 4.3: Framework for determining levels of finance constraint 


















 External sources of finance for working capital and fixed assets:     
1 Working capital: proportion of financing borrowed from banks (private and state owned) 0  greater than 0  greater than 0 greater than 0 
2 Working capital: proportion of financing borrowed from non-bank financial institutions 0  greater than 0  greater than 0 greater than 0 
3 Working capital: proportion of purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers 0  greater than 0  greater than 0 greater than 0 
4 Working capital: proportion from other (moneylenders, friends, relatives etc.) 0  greater than 0  greater than 0 greater than 0 
5 Fixed assets: proportion of financing borrowed from banks (private and state owned) 0  greater than 0  greater than 0 greater than 0 
6 Fixed assets: proportion of financing borrowed from non-bank financial institutions 0  greater than 0  greater than 0 greater than 0 
7 Fixed assets: proportion of purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers 0  greater than 0  greater than 0 greater than 0 
8 Fixed assets: issued new debt (including commercial paper and debentures) 0  greater than 0  greater than 0 greater than 0 
9 Fixed assets: proportion from other (moneylenders, friends, relatives etc.) 0  greater than 0  greater than 0 greater than 0 
 Loans and lines of credit:     
10 Did firm apply for loans or lines of credit during the year? Yes No Yes No 
11 Reasons for not applying for loan: 
No need for a loan 
Application procedures complex 
Interest rates unfavourable 
Collateral requirements unattainable 
Size of loan insufficient 




















12 How many loan applications were rejected?   greater than 0  None 
13 Does firm currently have a line of credit or loan from a financial institution? No    
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys Instrument (2007); Kuntchev et al. (2013); Author 
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Table 4.3 details the questions and statements along with the answers expected for a firm to be in 
each of the outcomes. All expected responses for each category must be met for the firm to be 
assigned to it. For instance, with regard to Statement 1 on working capital which seeks to establish 
if the firm sourced some of its working capital from private or state-owned banks, a response by 
the firm that ‘0 percent’ was sourced sets the firm in the Fully Credit Constrained category subject 
to the following conditions. The firm must have applied for a loan or line of credit (Question 10), 
and if it did not apply, the reasons for not applying must be any one of those listed from 2 to 7 
(Statement 11). The firm must have no outstanding debt at the time of the survey (Question 13). 
When all these conditions are satisfied, the firm is classified as Fully Credit Constrained. A firm is 
in the Non Credit Constrained category if it did not apply for a loan (Question 10) because it ‘had 
no need for a loan’ (Statement 11). 
4.4  METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
This chapter uses three systematic stages to explore the finance constraint in South Africa. The 
discussion in the preceding section relates to the last stage. In the first stage the ratings (or 
perceptions) of access to finance are assessed over time, and in the second stage, firms rating 
finance as a serious problem are contrasted to firms rating it as not. In these two first stages, the 
analysis uses t-tests to determine the significance of patterns of change and differences in 
performance. The remainder of this section discusses how the profile of financially constrained 
firms is determined after being identified using the framework in Kuntchev et al. (2013). 
Ordered Logit Model 
The aim of the analysis here is to investigate the factors that determine the different categories of 
the finance constraint. For this analysis, the ordered logit method is most appropriate since the four 
categorical outcomes (FCC, PCC, MCC and NCC) are in order of intensity of the finance 
constraint. Ordered logit regression estimates how well a variable (or possible explanation) 
correctly assigns a firm to each of the four categorical outcomes of the finance constraint. 
Supposing 𝑋 denotes the vector of such possible explanations represented by attributes 
𝑥1, 𝑥2𝑥3 … 𝑥𝑛 and 𝑌𝑖
∗ represents the outcomes of interest from the first to the last category, the 
ordered logit model can be stated as follows: 
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝑖𝛽1 + 𝑥2𝑖𝛽2 … 𝑥𝑛𝑖𝛽𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖 …(4.1) 
𝑌𝑖
∗ 
is in fact unobserved but what is known about 𝑌𝑖
∗ 
is that each of its outcomes precludes the 
three other possible outcomes such that: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑     𝑖𝑓     𝑌𝑖
∗ ≤  𝜇0 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑏𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑     𝑖𝑓     𝜇0 <  𝑌𝑖
∗ ≤  𝜇1 
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𝑌𝑖 = 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑     𝑖𝑓     𝜇1 <  𝑌𝑖
∗  ≤  𝜇2 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑     𝑖𝑓   𝑌𝑖
∗  >  𝜇2           …(4.2) 
where 𝜇0, 𝜇1, and  𝜇2 are the cut-off points or thresholds between the four ratings to be estimated 
along with coefficient 𝛽 for each of the attributes. 
Using WBES data from 96 developing countries, Dihn et al. (2010) explored how well access to 
finance is predicted by the three categories of firm size, three categories of firm age, three 
categories of sectors, the extent to which a firm is an exporter, and whether a firm has foreign or 
government ownership, with all the variables estimated in one model. Similarly, Kuntchev et al. 
(2013) explored the association of firm size, firm age and gender to each of the four categories of 
the finance constraint. In addition to the variables explored by these studies, this study explores 
the association of ethnic origin of owner, level of education and experience of top manager with 
each of the four categories of the finance constraint and this can be presented in the general form 
as follows: 
𝐹𝐶1
4 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, … , 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛)             …(4.3) 
where 𝐹𝐶1
4 is each of the four independent outcomes (NCC, MCC, PCC and FCC). The general 
model specified in Equation 4.3 can be operationalised into an econometric model as follows: 
𝐹𝐶1
4 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀 …(4.4) 
where 𝛽0 is the intercept and 𝛽1 to 𝛽𝑛 are the coefficients of each firm variable with 𝑖 being each of 
the categories for variables that have more than one category. The variables investigated are firm 
size, sector, ethnic origin, gender, education level, experience group, age group, log of revenue 
per employee, exports and region. 
The ordered logit model is also run on the perception-based indicator of access to finance which 
also has four categories (No obstacle, Minor, Moderate and Major, where major combines two 
categories with few observations namely ‘major’ and ‘very severe’) which enables the study to 
present a comprehensive perspective on the finance constraint from both a subjective and an 
objective indicator. 
Binary Logit Model 
Next, the study employs a binary logit model to explore the characteristics of firms that are 
financially constrained and those that are not. As will be seen in the next section, most firms are in 
the NCC and the PCC categories. Following Kuntchev et al. (2013), the analysis combines some 
categories to distinguish characteristics of the financially constrained and those of the not 
constrained. Since it is difficult to assign MCC to a credit constrained category or one that is not 
constrained, this analysis excludes the category in the binary comparison such that the NCC firms 
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are contrasted with the aggregated PCC and FCC. Effectively, the dependent variable in the above 
ordered logit model is altered to two outcomes: NCC and CC such that Equation 4.3 is restated as  
𝐹𝐶1
2 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, … , 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛) …(4.5) 
where 𝐹𝐶1
2 represents the outcome of either NCC or CC. The general model specified in Equation 
4.5 can be operationalised into an econometric model as follows: 
𝐹𝐶1
2 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀 …(4.6) 
and as with Equation 4.4, the variables investigated are firm size, sector, ethnic origin, gender, 
education level, experience group, age group, log of revenue per employee, exports and region. 
The analysis then interacts some of the independent variables (ethnic, gender, age group and 
educations) given that the enterprise development policy (White Paper, 1995) emphasises 
attributes implied in these variables. In the interaction terms, only the variables with all its 
categories enter the model along with the interaction term as illustrated in Equation 4.7 below 
depicting ethic origin and education levels: 
𝐹𝐶1
2 =
 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 & 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
𝜀 …(4.7) 
where, for example, the specific ethnic group could be black and the specific level of education is, 
for instance, university graduate. All interaction terms are explored when the variables (ethnic, 
gender, age group, and education) enter a regression. The next section gives an overview of the 
data and some descriptive statistics. 
4.5 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In Chapter 2, Section 2.5 gave an overview of the WBES and reported that 803 firms were 
surveyed in 2003 and 1 057 in 2007. The first two stages of the analysis (tracking the importance 
of the finance constraint over time and whether firms reporting access to finance as a serious 
problem underperform) use both datasets. The 2007 surveys sampled 231 of the firms surveyed in 
2003 but only 191 matched, thus there was a matched panel set of 191 firms. The third stage of 
the analysis, which identifies financially constrained firms and determines their characteristics as 
described in Section 4.3 and 4.4, uses the 2007 survey only. Table 4.4 summarises the distribution 
of firms into the credit constraint categories. Panel A shows the distribution into the four credit 
constraint categories and Panel B shows the distribution onto the two categories of the finance 
constraint. Most firms are not financially constrained, with only 6 percent of the sample in FCC.  
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Table 4.4: Distribution of firms into the credit constraint categories  





Non-credit constrained 47 (39%) 165 (44%) 198 (54%) 130 (66%) 540 51.09 51.09 
Maybe credit constrained 5 (4%) 42 (11%) 67 (18%) 30 (15%) 144 13.62 64.71 
Partially credit constrained 36 (30%) 142 (38%) 97 (27%) 34 (18%) 309 29.23 93.95 
Fully credit constrained 32 (27%) 26 (7%) 4 (1%) 2 (1%) 64 6.05 100 
Total 120 375 366 196 1057 100  
Panel B:        
Non-credit constrained 47 (41%) 165 (50%) 198 (66%) 130 (78%) 540 59.15 59.15 
Credit constrained 68 (59%) 168 (50%) 104 (34%) 36 (22%) 373 40.85 100 
 115 333 302 166 913 100  
Note: the percentage of firms by size in each category of the finance constraint is italics in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys South Africa (2007) 
Figure 4.1 compares the results in Table 4.4 to a similar summary by Kuntchev et al. (2013) from a 
selection of geographical regions in the developing world. There are some striking differences 
between South Africa and the other regions. The proportion of FCC firms in South Africa is the 
lowest and the country has a high percentage of firms in the NCC category: 51 percent. This high 
proportion of NCC firms corroborates the subjective ratings of access to finance where most of the 
firms (63 percent) rated access to finance as not an obstacle. Kuntchev et al. (2013) found that 
28.3 percent of small firms in sub-Saharan Africa are fully credit constrained compared to 10 
percent of large firms. In South Africa, 7 percent of small firms are fully credit constrained 
compared to 1 percent of large firms. 
Figure 4.1 shows that the extent to which firms are credit constrained in South Africa is less than 
would be expected from the cross-country literature on developing countries. Rather than 
designing policies that seek to increase the supply of finance to the generality of firms, it could be 
more effective to identify the types of firms that are credit-constrained and design policies that 
could mitigate the obstacles such firms encounter when seeking finance. 
 




Figure 4.1: A comparison of credit constraint status of South Africa and other regions 
Notes:  On the Y-axis, FCC stands for Fully Credit Constrained, PCC for Partially Credit Constrained, 
MCC for Maybe Credit Constrained and NCC for Non Credit Constrained. On the X-axis, LAC stands for 
Latin America and Caribbean, ECA for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, SAR for South Asia, AFR for 
sub-Saharan Africa, EAP for East Asia and Pacific, MNA for Middle East and North Africa. 
Source: Kuntchev et al. (2013); Author’s estimations on World Bank Enterprise Surveys South 
Africa (2007) 
4.6  RESULTS 
Three subsections in this section present results. The first shows how the finance constraint has 
been considered by business owners and managers over time, the second shows whether firms 
reporting finance as a constraint show weaker performance, and the third shows the profile of firms 
that experience obstacles when seeking external finance. 
4.6.1 Importance of finance: a review of perceptions between 2003 and 2007 
The matched set of 191 enterprises surveyed in 2003 and 2007 makes it possible to track the 
importance of the finance constraint to the same firm over time. On comparing how the same firm 
rated access to finance in 2003 to how it rated the obstacle in 2007, a decline in the importance of 
the finance constraint is observed. Figure 4.2 shows the shift towards ‘none’ (which denotes ‘no 
obstacle’) for the matched panel set of 191 firms. An important question arising from Figure 4.2 is 
whether the shift is a significant improvement in the perception of finance accessibility. Comparing 
the mean ratings in the radar chart confirms that the improvement is significant, with the null 
hypothesis of equal mean ratings in the two periods not being accepted as shown by the mean-
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comparison tests in Table 4.5. It can be seen in Table 4.5 that the mean rating is 1.23 in 2003 
against 0.45 in 2007.  
 
Figure 4.2: Access to finance 2003 vs. 2007 
Source: Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2003; 2007) 
Table 4.5: Mean-comparison test (paired) for access to finance, 2003 vs. 2007 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Access to finance 2003 191 1.2251 0.0955 1.3205 1.0367 1.4136 
Access to finance 2007 191 0.4450 0.0650 0.8979 0.3169 0.5732 
diff 191 0.7801 0.1151 1.5907 0.5531 1.0071 
mean(diff) = mean (Access to finance 2003 – Access to finance 2007)  t = 6.7777 
Ho: mean (diff) = 0    degrees of freedom = 190 
Ha: mean (diff) < 0  Ha: mean(diff) ≠ 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000    Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
Source: Author’s estimations based on Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2003; 2007) 
The 191 firms of course remained in business between 2003 and 2007. But many studies have 
shown a high failure rate of small businesses, as is indeed indicated by the high job losses 
attributable to SMEs in a study by Kerr et al. (2014) in South Africa. This suggests that the panel 
set comparison could be inherently biased in favour of resilient firms that may have survived in the 
presence of constraints such as challenges in accessing finance. To offset the bias, a comparison 
is made in Table 4.6 of the mean rating of access to finance of firms surveyed in ‘2003 only’ to 
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Table 4.6: The importance of access to finance (2003 vs. 2007) 






Access to finance 2003 412 1.1384 0.0600 1.2174 1.0205 1.2562 
Access to finance 2007 866 0.8661 0.0428 1.2587 0.7821 0.9500 
combined 1278 0.9538 0.0350 1.2516 0.8852 1.0225 
diff  0.2723 0.0737  0.1277 0.4169 
 diff = mean(2003) - mean(2007)   t =   3.6964 
Ho: diff = 0  Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom =  832.999 
Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff ≠ 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9999    Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0002 Pr(T > t) = 0.0001 
Source: Author’s estimations based on Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2003; 2007) 
Table 4.6 shows that 2007 ratings are better as the 95 percent confidence interval is well within the 
2003 range. The difference is statistically significant at 1 percent, confirming that there was an 
improvement in the perceptions of access to finance in the period between 2003 and 2007. The 
mean-comparison test therefore affirms a marked improvement in access to finance in South Africa 
in the period 2003 to 2007 as captured in Figure 4.2. This suggests that the BBBEE policy 
measures have perhaps been effective in addressing the finance constraint except with regard to 
white-owned firms, as Chapter 3 revealed. 
4.6.2 Do firms reporting finance to be a serious obstacle underperform? 
It would be expected that firms reporting access to finance as a problem would experience slower 
growth than those reporting it as not. However, this hypothesis has been largely unexplored by 
empirical investigations and this sub-section contributes to filling this gap in the empirical literature. 
Defining growth first in terms of percentage change in the number of jobs created between 2003 
and 2007 and then as the percentage change in sales between 2003 and 2007, a comparison of 
whether firms rating access to finance as a major problem had growth rates significantly lower than 
firms rating access to finance as not a problem was done. The comparison is on both employment 
and sales growth, with two sample t-tests conducted to determine if the difference is significant. 
Table 4.7 presents the results of the comparison, with Panel A reporting on employment growth 
and Panel B on sales growth. There is no evidence that firms reporting access to finance as an 
obstacle grow at a rate significantly different to those that rate access to finance as not an 
obstacle. In fact, the mean growth rates for the ‘no obstacle’ firms in both Panel A and B are less 
than the firms reporting access to finance as an obstacle. It must be noted however that the 
standard deviations of the growth rates of firms reporting finance as an obstacle is higher in both 
Panels suggesting that such returns are unstable. It is therefore not surprising that such high-risk 
firms would face problems in accessing finance. 
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Table 4.7: Performance of firms reporting finance as obstacle vs. those not 
Panel A: Employment growth (two-sample t test with unequal variances) 




[95% Confidence  
Interval] 
No obstacle 443 0.0763 0.0046 0.0971 0.0672 0.0853 
Obstacle 247 0.0876 0.0072 0.1156 0.0731 0.1021 
Combined 690 0.0803 0.0040 0.1042 0.0725 0.0881 
diff  -0.0114 0.0087  -0.0284 0.0057 
mean(diff) = mean (no obstacle - obstacle)   t = -1.3102 
Ho: mean (diff) = 0  Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom  = 439.987 
Ha: mean (diff) < 0  Ha: mean(diff) ≠ 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0954     Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1908 Pr(T > t) = 0.9046 
Panel B: Sales growth (two-sample t test with unequal variances) 




[95% Confidence  
Interval] 
No obstacle 410 0.1127 0.0063 0.1275 0.1003 0.1251 
Obstacle 211 0.1350   0.0110 0.1602 0.1133 0.1568 
Combined   621   0.1203 0.0056 0.1398 0.1093 0.1313 
diff  -0.0223 0.0127    -0.0473 0.0027 
mean(diff) = mean (no obstacle - obstacle)   t = -1.7581  
Ho: mean (diff) = 0  Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom  = 350.118  
Ha: mean (diff) < 0  Ha: mean(diff) ≠ 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0398    Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0796 Pr(T > t) = 0.9602 
Source: Author’s estimations based on Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) 
There are two important inferential conclusions from this and the preceding subsection reviewing 
access to finance from 2003 to 2007. The first is that the perception of access and cost of finance 
improved between 2003 and 2007, and the second is that even though some firms reported access 
to finance to be a problem in 2007, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that their performance 
was affected by the problem as proxied by the rating assigned in the Likert scale.  
It would be informative to determine whether access to finance improved further using the WBFCS 
2010 data. The limitation with the WBFCS, however, is that it has a smaller sample of 234 firms 
compared to 1 057 firms by WBES of 2007. Of the 234 firms, 122 are small and 72 medium. 
Microenterprises were not covered by the WBFCS. Although the WBFCS are less representative of 
the MSMEs, a comparison of how the firms surveyed in 2010 rated the finance constraint is useful 
to enhance the understanding of the finance constraint in South Africa even with the limitations of 
the data.  
As was done in Table 4.6 in comparing the 2003 and 2007 mean ratings, Table 4.8 presents the t-
test results determining whether the ratings of access to finance in 2007 improved further in 2010. 
Table 4.8 shows that there was a significant deterioration in the ratings of access to finance, with 
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the mean rating of 0.866 in 2007 declining to 1.701 in 2010. This result would indeed be expected 
given the financial strain that firms and financiers were facing during the global financial crisis.  
Table 4.8: The importance of access to finance (2007 vs. 2010) 






Access to finance 2007 866 0.8661 0.0428 1.2587 0.7821 0.9500 
Access to finance 2010 221 1.7014 0.0939 1.3953 1.5164 1.8863 
combined 1087 1.0359 0.0403 1.3302 0.9567 1.1150 
diff  -0.8353 0.1031  -1.0382 -0.6324 
 diff = mean(2007) - mean(2010)   t =   -8.0986 
Ho: diff = 0  Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom =  317.39 
Ha: diff < 0  Ha: diff ≠ 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000    Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys of South Africa (2007) and 
World Bank Financial Crisis Survey (2010) 
Although studies on the impact of the global financial crisis on MSMEs in developing economies 
are limited, studies in more developed economies, especially in Europe (Ferrando and 
Griesshaber, 2011; Popov and Udell, 2012; Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2010), show 
increased effects of the finance constraint in the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 on banks and firms. 
The studies show that the effects were greater on the small and medium enterprises. A survey of 
1 050 firms in Asia, Europe and the USA by Campello et al. (2010) for instance finds that 82 
percent of small firms (compared to 18 percent of large firms) reported being ‘very affected’ by the 
financial crisis-induced difficulties in accessing finance. 
It therefore does not suffice to confirm only that accessing finance was difficult for firms in South 
Africa in 2010, as the observation would likely be the same for firms in globally integrated 
economies. Thus, a comparison of South African firms’ ratings of the finance constraints to the 
ratings by firms in peer economies surveyed at about the same time is useful to explore how better 
or worse off firms in South Africa were in accessing finance during the crisis years. Unfortunately, 
most of the peer nations used in Chapter 2, namely the BRICS plus Nigeria and Ghana, were not 
surveyed in the period of interest. Therefore, the current analysis defines peer nations as upper 
middle-income countries surveyed by the WBES in the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Since some of 
the peers have small populations (e.g. Saint Lucia has a population of 174 000), an arbitrary 
minimum population of 5 million was used to make the sample comparable to South Africa. The 
result is 11 peer economies.  
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The WBES reports the proportion of firms per country that rated access to finance as a major 
problem6. Figure 4.3 compares the rating of access to finance in 2010 by firms in South Africa to 
ratings by firms in the 11 peer economies. Figure 4.3 shows that 18.8 percent of firms in South 
Africa rated finance as a major problem compared to 45 percent of firms in Brazil. Compared to the 
peer economies, finance in 2010 was a relatively less serious problem in South Africa. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Percentage of firms identifying access to finance as a major constraint 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys; World Bank Financial Crisis Survey South Africa (2010) 
 
Although access to finance is often found to be a top constraint and a binding constraint for 
MSMEs elsewhere, the sample of MSMEs used in this research shows that the firms have other 
more pressing problems. The inference from this review of the finance constraint in South Africa is 
that availability of finance has been improving (except for an expected deterioration during the 
global financial crisis). Yet to draw such inferences is not to say that there are no firms 
encountering serious problems in trying to access finance. It is thus necessary to determine if there 
could be such firms in South Africa using the framework in Section 4.3 and investigate their profile.  
4.6.4 The profile of financially constrained firms: ordered logit results 
Section 4.4 presented the ordered logit model the chapter uses to explore characteristics that 
could be peculiar to each of the four categories of the finance constraint. This subsection 
discusses the results of the ordered logit model presented in Table 4.9. In Table 4.9, Column 1 
reports the results when the perceptions-based measure of the finance constraint (in which 
outcomes are None, Minor, Moderate  or Major) is used, and Column 2 reports results when the 
more objective measure based on the framework by Kuntchev et al. (2013) (in which outcomes are 
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NCC, MCC, PCC and FCC) is used. In discussing the results, ‘perceptions-based’ will be used to 
refer to Column 1 and ‘objective’ will be used to refer to the results in Column 2.  








Column 2   
dependent is 
based on actual 
experiences 
Size: Micro 2.312  (0.014) 4.543  (0.000) 
 Small 2.076  (0.004) 2.218  (0.000) 
 Medium 1.789  (0.010) 1.430  (0.069) 
 Large (base)    (base)    
Sector: Retail (base)    (base)    
 Services 1.106  (0.646) 1.362  (0.145) 
 Manufacturing 1.789  (0.003) 2.233  (0.000) 
Ethnic origin: Black 2.818  (0.000) 3.399  (0.000) 
 Asian 1.863  (0.000) 2.254  (0.000) 
 White (base)    (base)    
Gender: Male (base)    (base)    
 Female 1.141  (0.391) 0.819  (0.179) 
Education level of manager: Up to secondary school 0.927  (0.687) 1.319  (0.115) 
 Vocational training 0.977  (0.889) 1.152  (0.365) 
 University graduate (base)    (base)    
Experience group: Less than 5 years 0.656  (0.035) 0.891 (0.534) 
 6 to 10 years 0.836  (0.289) 0.940 (0.696) 
 More than 10 years (base)    (base)    
Age group of firm⃰: Young 1.637  (0.027) 1.198  (0.379) 
 Mature 1.103  (0.856) 0.970  (0.858) 
 Old (base)    (base)    
Exports percentage in sales:  0.487  (0.001) 0.939  (0.729) 
Region: Johannesburg (base)    (base)    
 Durban and Port 
Elizabeth 
0.674  (0.059) 0.633  (0.015) 
 Cape Town 0.343  (0.000) 0.785  (0.163) 
/cut1  1.646 1.697 
/cut2  2.323 2.361 
/cut3  3.020 4.740 
R-squared  0.076 0.077 
Number of firms  1037 1037 
 
Note: Column 1 dependent variable is how business owners or managers rated access to finance as affecting 
their operations on a scale of 0 to 4 where 0 is ‘No obstacle’, 1 is ‘Minor’, 2 is Moderate and 3 is ‘Major’ and ‘Very 
severe’. Column 2 dependent variable is how firm responded to a number of questions as detailed in Table 4.3 
and such responses determined classification of a firm into one of four categories, namely NCC, MCC, PCC and 
FCC.  
*On Firm age, Young firms are up to 5 years, Mature is between 6 and 15 years, and Old is above 15 years.  
Source: Author’s estimations based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in South Africa (2007) 
The first block of rows in Table 4.9 reports on firm size, with large firms being the reference 
category. On the perceptions-based analysis, micro, small and medium-sized firms are more likely 
to assign a rating towards ‘major’ for access to finance than large firms. There are similar results 
when the objective measure is used. In relation to large firms, for instance, the odds are 2.4 times 
that a micro enterprise will regard finance as a serious obstacle and, when the actual experiences 
of micro and large enterprises in seeking finance are considered, the odds increase to 5 times.  
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For small firms employing between 5 and 20 employees with large firms being the reference 
category, the odds are the same on both measures, being 2.2 times. For medium firms, however, 
while the odds are 1.9 times (and significant) that the firm will regard finance as a serious obstacle, 
the study found insufficient evidence to show that medium-sized firms will be classified more 
towards the FCC category, which suggests that medium-sized firms are less likely to be credit 
constrained than large firms. Thus with regard to firm size, the likelihood that micro and small firms 
are credit constrained is significant but this is not the case for medium-sized firms. It will be seen in 
the binary logit results that when the MCC firms are excluded from the analysis that the odds of 
micro and small firms being credit constrained increase. 
In both the perceptions-based and objective measure of the finance constraint, when the retail 
sector is the reference category, the manufacturing sector is more likely to face challenges in 
accessing finance, and the likelihood increases on the objective measure, suggesting the 
importance of the problem to the sector. Results on ethnic origin are also significant on both 
indicators and show that in relation to white-owned firms, firms owned by previously disadvantaged 
groups (blacks and Asians) are more likely to regard access to finance as a serious problem and 
more likely to be in the financially constrained categories of PCC and FCC. With white-owned firms 
as the reference category, the odds are 3.4 times and 2.2 times that a black-owned firm and an 
Asian-owned firm respectively will encounter challenges in seeking finance. 
There is insufficient evidence from the ordered logit analysis, the subsequent binary logit model, 
and the models with interactions to associate gender with the finance constraint. There is also 
insufficient evidence in Table 4.9 to associate exports with the finance constraint in the sample of 
firms studied. The ordered logit analysis does not find sufficient evidence to associate the three 
categories of manager’s experience with actual levels of the finance constraint. However, on the 
perceptions-based measure, firms run by managers with less than 5 years’ experience are less 
likely to regard access to finance as being a major obstacle.  Compared with old firms, the odds 
are 1.8 times that young firms will regard finance to be a serious obstacle but the effects are 
insignificant when an objective measure is used. 
While results show that the odds are higher that the less formally educated managers are likely to 
be in the worst categories of the finance constraint (e.g. when university graduates are the base 
category, the odds are 1.3 and 1.5 times that managers with up to secondary school education and 
managers with vocational training will be towards the worst categories of the finance constraint), 
these results are not significant. In relation to Johannesburg-based firms, firms in other cities are 
less likely to regard finance as a major obstacle and are less likely to be financially constrained. It 
could be that the costs of doing business in Johannesburg, such as rent, labour etc. are higher, 
thus increasing the need for external finance by firms. Furthermore, Chapter 3 showed that firms in 
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Johannesburg are significantly affected by electricity, a problem that would increase costs through, 
for example, use of generators, and make it more challenging for such firms to access finance. 
The predicted probabilities for the two ordered logit models are reported in Table 4.10.  
Table 4.10: Predicted probabilities from ordered logit models 
 Perception-based Actual experiences 
  None Minor Moderate Major NCC MCC PCC FCC 
Size: Micro 0.5852 0.1504 0.1123 0.1521 0.2855 0.1517 0.4562 0.1066 
 Small 0.6111 0.1449 0.1053 0.1387 0.4500 0.1640 0.3309 0.0551 
 Medium 0.6458 0.1366 0.0957 0.1219 0.5594 0.1523 0.2521 0.0362 
 Large 0.7653 0.1001 0.0626 0.0720 0.6448 0.1344 0.1952 0.0256 
Sector: Retail 0.7269 0.1131 0.0732 0.0868 0.6324 0.1374 0.2032 0.0270 
 Services 0.7063 0.1195 0.0789 0.0952 0.5580 0.1525 0.2531 0.0364 
 Manufacturing 0.5992 0.1475 0.1085 0.1448 0.4352 0.1645 0.3421 0.0583 
Ethnic 
origin: 
Black 0.5269 0.1602 0.1277 0.1851 0.3602 0.1623 0.3994 0.0781 
 Asian 0.6276 0.1411 0.1008 0.1306 0.4592 0.1635 0.3241 0.0532 
 White 0.7584 0.1025 0.0645 0.0746 0.6567 0.1314 0.1876 0.0243 
Gender: Female 0.6591 0.1331 0.0921 0.1157 0.4937 0.1609 0.2987 0.0466 
 Male 0.6289 0.1408 0.1004 0.1299 0.5435 0.1548 0.2632 0.0385 
Education:  Up to secondary 0.6628 0.1321 0.0910 0.1141 0.4680 0.1630 0.3176 0.0514 
 Vocational 0.6508 0.1353 0.0944 0.1196 0.5020 0.1601 0.2927 0.0452 
 University 0.6455 0.1366 0.0958 0.1220 0.5372 0.1557 0.2676 0.0395 
Experience 
group: 
Up to 5 years 0.7099 0.1184 0.0779 0.0937 0.5225 0.1577 0.2780 0.0418 
 6 to 10 years 0.6576 0.1335 0.0925 0.1164 0.5091 0.1593 0.2876 0.0440 
 Above 10 years 0.6163 0.1437 0.1039 0.1361 0.4935 0.1610 0.2988 0.0466 
Firm age 
group:* 
Young 0.5741 0.1525 0.1153 0.1581 0.4711 0.1628 0.3153 0.0508 
 Mature 0.6808 0.1271 0.0860 0.1061 0.5239 0.1575 0.2770 0.0415 
 Old 0.6882 0.1250 0.0840 0.1029 0.5163 0.1585 0.2824 0.0428 
Region: Johannesburg 0.5929 0.1488 0.1102 0.1480 0.4779 0.1623 0.3102 0.0495 
 Cape Town 0.6836 0.1263 0.0853 0.1049 0.5912 0.1464 0.2305 0.0319 
 Durban-PE 0.8092 0.0840 0.0505 0.0563 0.5383 0.1556 0.2669 0.0393 
 
Note: The perception-based indicator of the finance constraint is based on how business owners or managers 
rated access to finance as affecting their operations on a scale of 0 to 4, where 0 is ‘No obstacle’, 1 is ‘Minor’, 2 is 
Moderate and 3 is ‘Major’ and ‘Very severe’. The actual experiences measure of the finance constraint is 
determined by how firms responded to a number of questions as detailed in Table 4.3 and such responses 
determine the classification of a firm into one of four categories: namely Not Credit Constrained, Maybe Credit 
Constrained, Partially Credit Constrained and Fully Credit Constrained.  
*On Firm age, Young firms are up to 5 years, Mature is between 6 and 15 years, and Old is above 15 years. 
Source: Author’s estimations from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in South Africa (2007) 
The predictions assume that all other variables in the model other than the variable being predicted 
are held at their means. Thus, with reference to the results based on the actual experiences and in 
relation to micro enterprises, the predicted probability of being in the NCC category is 28.55 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 64 
 
percent. Micro enterprises have the highest predicted probability of being partially credit 
constrained and being fully credit constrained followed by black-owned firms, the manufacturing 
sector and small firms for the same categories of the finance constraint. On the other hand, the 
predicted probability of white-owned firms being in the NCC category is 65.67 percent and the 
highest for that category, followed by the retail sector and medium enterprises. 
4.6.4  The profile of financially constrained firms: binary logit results 
The results of the goodness-of-fit test of the logit model are summarised in Table 4.11. In essence, 
the ordered logit model discussed in the preceding subsection folds into the binary logit model 
reported in this subsection. Table 4.1 shows that the binary logit model correctly classifies 70 
percent of the 893 firms analysed. Specifically, the model correctly classifies 78 percent of NCC 
firms and 58 percent of the Credit Constrained (CC) firms are correctly classified.  
Table 4.11: Goodness-of-fit test for logit model 
 --------TRUE--------  
Classified D ~D Total 
+ 208 116 324 
- 152 417 569 
Total 360 533 893 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as finance constraint ≠0 
 
 
Sensitivity measure  Pr( + D) 57.78%  
Specificity measure  Pr( - ~ D) 78.24%  
Positive predictive value Pr( D +) 64.20%  
Negative predictive value Pr(~ D -) 73.29%  
False + rate for true ~D Pr( + ~D) 21.76%  
False - rate for true D Pr( - D) 42.22%  
False + rate for classified + Pr(~ D +) 35.80%  
False - rate for classified - Pr( D -) 26.71%  
Correctly classified   69.99% 
Note: The sensitivity measure (208/360) reports the proportion of firms in the Credit Constrained 
category that are correctly classified by the model. The specificity measure (417/533) reports the 
proportion of firms in the Non Credit Constrained category that are correctly classified by the model. 
The false positive and false negative classification error rates are 116/533 and 152/360 respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007) 
Table 4.12 reports the logit regression results where FCC and PCC are combined to form CC and 
compared to NCC. As would perhaps be expected from the ordered logit results, micro and small 
enterprises are more likely to be credit constrained than large firms. The odds that the 
manufacturing sector firms are credit constrained increase from 1.8 times in the ordered logit 
estimations to 2.3 times in the binary logit analysis. The odds are also higher that the firms owned 
by the previously disadvantaged groups will be credit constrained, being 4 times and 2.7 times for 
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black- and Asian-owned firms respectively compared to white-owned firms. Firms in Cape Town 
are less likely to be credit constrained than firms in other cities.  
Table 4.12: Logit regression results: Not Credit Constrained and Credit Constrained 
 Coefficient Odds 
ratio 
P-value 95% Confidence 
Interval (Odds 
ratio) 
Size Micro 1.076 2.932 0.005 1.379 6.238 
 Small 0.920 2.509 0.001 1.441 4.369 
 Medium 0.344 1.411 0.188 0.846 2.354 
 Large (base)    (base)       
Sector Retail base base    
 Services 0.333 1.396 0.179 0.858 2.270 
 Manufacturing 0.845 2.328 0.000 1.506 3.599 
Ethnic Black 1.406 4.081 0.000 2.771 6.010 
 Asian 0.980 2.665 0.000 1.808 3.926 
 White (base)    (base)       
Gender Female -0.237 0.789 0.201 0.549 1.135 
Education Up to secondary school 0.304 1.356 0.156 0.890 2.065 
 Vocational 0.312 1.366 0.107 0.934 1.997 
 University (base)    (base)       
Experience Up to 5 years -0.126 0.882 0.576 0.567 1.370 
 6 to 10 years -0.092 0.912 0.640 0.620 1.342 
 Above 10 years (base)    (base)       
Firm age Young 0.303 1.354 0.237 0.820 2.237 
 Mature -0.037 0.964 0.866 0.626 1.482 
 Old (base)    (base)       
Exports percentage in sales -0.048 0.953 0.842 0.593 1.531 
Region Johannesburg (base)    (base)       
 Cape Town -0.897 0.408 0.001 0.239 0.696 
 Durban-Port Elizabeth -0.276 0.759 0.180 0.507 1.136 
_constant  -2.321     
R-squared 14.42     
Number of observations  893     
Source: Author’s estimations based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007) 
Table 4.13 presents the interaction results where only the interacting variables enter the binary 
logit regression. Interacting age group and education levels of managers shows that for young 
firms, the financial constraint is more likely to be experienced when the firm is run by managers 
with vocational level education but that the prevalence of the constraint is perhaps more likely to 
diminish with university level education. This affirms some of the existing evidence in South Africa 
that higher levels of education and training improves enterprise performance (Unger, Keith, Hilling, 
Gielnik and Frese, 2009; Lotz and Marais, 2007; Visser et al., 2005). However, young firms run by 
managers with up to secondary school education are significantly less likely to be credit 
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constrained. On the other hand, mature and old firms run by managers with up to secondary 
school education are more likely to be constrained. Thus over time, or as the firm ages, higher 
levels of education mitigate the finance constraint, further affirming the importance of training as an 
essential intervention for small businesses in South Africa. 









Age group and education Young & Secondary school 0.421 0.006 0.227 0.780 
 Young & Vocational 1.978 0.025 1.091 3.583 
 Young & University 1.230 0.549 0.625 2.420 
 Mature & Secondary 
school 
1.404 0.280 0.759 2.598 
 Mature & Vocational 0.805 0.472 0.447 1.452 
 Mature & University 0.890 0.728 0.463 1.713 
 Old & Secondary 1.842 0.073 0.945 3.591 
 Old & Vocational 0.636 0.163 0.337 1.201 
 Old & University 0.900 0.741 0.482 1.680 
Age group and ethnic origin Young & Black 0.864 0.644 0.464 1.608 
 Young & Asian 1.555 0.209 0.781 3.095 
 Young & White 0.771 0.487 0.371 1.604 
 Mature & Black 1.596 0.149 0.846 3.010 
 Mature & Asian 1.235 0.537 0.631 2.419 
 Mature & White 0.504 0.042 0.261 0.977 
 Old & Black 0.684 0.282 0.342 1.367 
 Old & Asian 0.546 0.073 0.283 1.057 
 Old & White 2.558 0.004 1.338 4.890 
Ethnic origin and education Black & Secondary School 1.157 0.651 0.615 2.174 
 Black & Vocational 1.314 0.364 0.729 2.369 
 Black & University 0.540 0.074 0.275 1.061 
 Asian & Secondary school 1.208 0.603 0.593 2.459 
 Asian & Vocational 1.675 0.115 0.882 3.181 
 Asian & University 0.487 0.036 0.249 0.953 
 White & Secondary school 0.699 0.319 0.346 1.414 
 White & Vocational 0.418 0.008 0.219 0.800 
 White & University 3.604 0.000 1.892 6.863 
Ethnic origin and gender Black & Female 0.788 0.493 0.400 1.555 
 Black & Male 1.275 0.483 0.646 2.517 
 Asian & Female 0.912 0.811 0.429 1.939 
 Asian & Male 1.097 0.811 0.516 2.332 
 White & Female 1.579 0.264 0.708 3.521 
 White & Male 0.796 0.580 0.355 1.783 
 
Note: On Age group, Young is less up to 5 years old, Mature is 6 to 15 years old and Old is above 15 years. 
Source: Author’s estimations from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007)  
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With regard to ethnic origin and education there seems to  be a pattern, albeit not significant, that 
higher levels of education for black-owned firms reduces the likelihood of a firm being in the credit 
constrained category. For the other ethnic groups, the results are mixed. For instance university 
educated managers in Asian-owned firms are significantly associated with the NCC category, while 
university educated managers in white-owned firms are more likely (and significantly so) to be in 
the CC category. The finding that white-owned firms with university-educated managers are more 
likely to be financially constrained perhaps needs to be investigated further by researchers 
because high levels of human capital in the firm should improve its access to finance. However, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that in the BBBEE policy environment, white-owned firms are at a 
disadvantage because they cannot access BBBEE-related support.  
4.7  IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH 
The finance constraint is prominent in the small enterprise development literature and practice. 
Evidence from this chapter suggests that the seriousness of access to finance on MSMEs in South 
Africa could perhaps be less prevalent. While results broadly affirm that smaller firms are most 
vulnerable to the problem, it emerged from this chapter that black-owned and Asian-owned firms 
experience challenges in accessing finance. Given the policy emphasis of supporting these 
previously disadvantaged groups, especially through the BBBEE legislation, a result showing that 
black- and Asian-owned firms are more affected would seem less likely. It perhaps suggests the 
enormity of the finance constraint that the previously disadvantaged groups could be facing. 
It is probably necessary to reflect more on the ethnic results with consideration of the results on 
how levels of education associate with the finance constraint. While the association between 
education and the finance constraint is not significant in the sample of firms studied, there was a 
minor relationship between education and the finance constraint at higher levels of education in 
black-owned firms. Table 4.14 shows that in the sample used, the number of blacks with a 
university education was the lowest, accounting for 21 percent of the 359 black business owners in 
the sample, while 42 percent of whites and Asians were university graduates, which is double the 
proportion of the black sub-sample.  
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Table 4.14: Education and ethnic origin 
Level of education African Asian European Total 
Up to secondary school 38% 21% 23% 296 
Vocationally trained 40% 37% 34% 391 
University graduate 21% 42% 42% 370 
Total number of managers 359 284 414 1,057 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys in South Africa (2007) 
In the sample used in this chapter, 38 percent of the blacks had up to secondary education against 
21 percent and 23 percent for Asians and whites respectively. If the goals of BBBEE and 
enterprise development are to be realised, it is imperative that policy motivates educated blacks to 
set up their own businesses as they are less likely to encounter as many obstacles as the less 
educated business owners. The interacting term of levels of education and black-owned firms 
showing a pattern of a declining likelihood of being financially constrained at higher levels of 
education affirms the importance of encouraging blacks with higher levels of formal education to 
become entrepreneurs. It is important however to recognise the potentially high opportunity costs 
for educated blacks to start businesses given the employment opportunities available to them, 
especially through the affirmative action provisions of the Employment Equity Amendment Act of 
2013 which applies to employers with 50 or more workers or firms with turnovers above thresholds 
set by Schedule 4 of the Act. The provisions of the Act require that ‘designated groups’ (i.e. black 
people, women and people with disabilities) “have equal employment opportunities and are 
equitably represented in all occupational levels of the workforce” (Employment Equity Amendment 
Act, 2013: 24). 
In Chapter 3, the interaction term of small and white-owned firms and small firms in Cape Town 
were significantly affected by access to finance. The analysis in Chapter 3 is based on perceptions 
of access to finance. Exploring the interaction effects using the objective indicator of access to 
finance, white-owned small firms are significantly less likely to be credit constrained. Similarly, 
while the odds ratio that small firms in Cape Town will be constrained is 1.5 times that of small 
firms in Johannesburg, Durban and Port Elizabeth, the ratio is not significant. Thus firms found to 
be credit constrained in the interactions of Chapter 3, when the perception-based measure of 
access to finance was used, are, from the evidence in this chapter, where an objective measure is 
used, not likely to be credit constrained. However, old white-owned firms and white-owned firms 
run by university-educated managers are more likely to be credit constrained, indicating that the 
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explanation suggested in Chapter 3 that white-owned firms could be more vulnerable to the finance 
problems of the adverse effect of BBBEE support could be plausible.  
Firms in the manufacturing sector are more likely to be financially constrained. This is important for 
policy formulation. It motivates financing interventions that suit the manufacturing sector better than 
other sectors that are less impacted. Such financial interventions could include lease financing 
manufacturing technologies and working capital facilities such as invoice discounting. It is however 
necessary that further research be done to determine financing products suitable for the SMEs and 
microenterprises in the manufacturing sector which, unlike the services sector, have other costs 
(e.g. production costs) which are difficult to be financed by credit terms from suppliers.  
4.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated the importance of the finance constraint in South Africa. It showed that 
the seriousness of the problem as proxied by feedback from firms has declined over time. The 
chapter showed that the performance of firms that rated access to finance as serious did not 
underperform those that rated access to finance as not a problem. The chapter then identified firms 
that actually experience challenges in accessing finance to determine their characteristics. Black- 
and Asian-owned firms, young firms, and firms in the manufacturing sector are more likely to be 
financially constrained. It is such firms that policy can target with financial support. 
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CHAPTER 5: WHAT CHARACTERISES HIGH-GROWTH FIRMS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA? 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Empirical studies provide mixed evidence that small businesses reduce unemployment (Biggs, 
2000). Considerable resources are nonetheless spent promoting small and emergent firms (Beck 
et al., 2005; Hallberg, 2000). A perspective that perhaps needs consideration in the small-firms job-
creation discussions, especially in developing countries, is the growing body of evidence showing 
that a small segment of enterprises in an economy accounts for 50 to 70 percent of net new jobs 
(Henrekson and Johansson, 2010; Audretsch, 2012; Nightingale and Coad, 2013). This chapter 
uses the WBES and employs logit and quantile regression to determine the characteristics of what 
could be such high-growth firms in South Africa.  
In the three decades since Birch (1981) showed small businesses contributing more to 
employment than larger firms, many studies as reviewed by Storey (1994) and van Praag and 
Versloot (2007) have affirmed the role of small businesses in job creation. Globally, the studies 
have bolstered public policy support for MSMEs. Davis et al. (1994) however revealed that 
although smaller firms create jobs they often fail to retain the new employees as most of the firms 
fold. In South Africa, for instance, Kerr et al. (2014) found that between 2005 and 2011, firms with 
up to 20 employees created 75 000 jobs quarterly but lost 110 000. Most of the unemployed 
engage in informal survivalist activities, hopeful for formal jobs. Whether MSMEs reduce 
unemployment is therefore a highly contested assertion (Mason and Brown, 2013; Shane, 2009; 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2005).  
What perhaps offers an interesting perspective to discussions on enterprise development and job 
creation is the growing body of evidence showing that a small segment of firms in an economy 
accounts for 50 to 70 percent of net new jobs (Haltiwanger et al., 2013; Acs and Mueller, 2008). 
There is debate on whether these high-growth firms are start-ups, small, medium or large. In fact, 
Audretsch (2012) and Walburn (2012) submit that little seems to be known about the 
characteristics of high-growth firms. Henrekson and Johansson (2010: 230) identified only 20 
studies on high-growth firms in the period 1990 to 2008, confirming the nascent state of the 
literature.  
Nonetheless, directing developmental assistance to this small segment of firms if they could be 
identified in advance or, alternatively, facilitating that other firms emulate their characteristics or 
practices, could accelerate job creation and reduce the unemployment rate. Some authors, for 
example Coad, Daunfeldt, Hölzl, Johansson and Nightingale (2014) and Derbyshire (2012), are 
cautious about the contribution of studies on high-growth firm for policy because a high-growth firm 
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at time 𝑡 may not be such at 𝑡 + 1, making it difficult for policies to target them. Daunfeldt and 
Halvarsson (2014) and Hölzl (2014) empirically show this ‘one-hit wonder’ characteristic of high-
growth firms in Sweden and Austria respectively, thus confirming the reservations of the cautious 
authors. But the reservations are misplaced if the motivating curiosity of the studies is not the 
identity of a high-growth firm per se but its characteristics and practices which, when discerned 
successfully, could inform policy to target firms with similar traits in 𝑡 + 1 and thereafter, thus 
contributing to policy. 
Although the empirical literature is still emerging, high-growth firms are drawing increasing interest 
from policy makers in developed economies. In developing countries where unemployment rates 
are perennially high, enterprise development policies tend to regard MSMEs as homogenous such 
that policy interventions are generic. High-growth firms do not feature in policy discussions in 
developing countries and, except for the cross-country study of 11 African countries by Goedhuys 
and Sleuwaegen (2010), there is a dearth of related analyses in Africa. In line with Goedhuys and 
Sleuwaegen (2010), this chapter seeks to stimulate discussions on high-growth firms in Africa. It 
focuses on South Africa, which Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2010) did not include in their study. 
In South Africa, enterprise development is an important policy to address unemployment and 
integrate society (NPC, 2011). One of the key policy frameworks supporting these goals is the 
BBBEE legislation, which requires established organisations to spend proportions of their net 
revenues on enterprise development and procure some of their inputs from black-owned firms. A 
study into the characteristics of firms creating most jobs is thus important to inform policy on 
whether interventions have been useful and on how they can be improved. 
In order to determine the characteristics of firms creating most jobs, enterprise data from at least 
two periods is necessary. However, reliable data in such form is difficult to gather from small firms. 
A review of empirical studies on small businesses in South Africa reveals that studies are mostly 
qualitative, typically reviewing changes in legislation and policies on enterprise development 
(Daniel, 2004; Rogerson, 2004; 2008; McGrath, 2005), describing characteristics of small business 
owners (Rwigema and Karungu, 1999), and obstacles faced by small business owners (Ladzani 
and Netswera, 2009; Lotz and Marais, 2007). When quantitative, studies identify common 
attributes of obstacles faced by the business owners (Unger et al., 2009; Fatoki and Garwe, 2010; 
Nieman, Visser, and van Wyk, 2008).  
Given the state of the small businesses literature in South Africa, the relationship between 
enterprise characteristics (for example level of education of the business woner, firm size and age, 
access to finance etc.) and enterprise performance are underexplored. Relatedly, Nichter and 
Goldmark (2009: 1459) observed that in developing countries, little is known about the 
characteristics’ “relative importance or how they interact with each other” to influence growth. In 
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light of the growing body of evidence on high-growth firms, it is perhaps more beneficial to relate 
certain characteristics to such firms and explore the interaction effects of the characteristics than to 
the generality of enterprises. 
To investigate the characteristics of firms that create more jobs in South Africa, a sample of 749 
firms from the WBES of 2007 was used. The sample has firms with 5 to 250 employees, and the 
analysis has two stages. Given the exploratory nature of the theme of this chapter, the first stage 
determines growth characteristics of firms that create more jobs than an average firm. In this stage, 
firms are outperformers if they generated more jobs than the sample average or underperformers if 
otherwise. A logit regression model is then employed to determine the characteristics that most 
likely result in outperformers and how the outperformers differ from underperformers. The first 
stage also investigates the interaction effects of some of the characteristics on growth. The 
characteristics interacted are age group of the firm, size of the firm, ethnic origin of main owner, 
gender of main owner and level of education of the manager or owner.  
The second stage of the analysis determines characteristics of high-growth firms. High-growth 
firms are a subset of outperformers but there is no consensus in the literature on when growth is 
high-growth. Definitions of high-growth are therefore arbitrary, hence the second stage of the 
analysis uses quantile regression. Quantile regression accommodates the numerous definitions of 
high-growth in that the importance of each characteristic for firms in different levels of growth rates 
can be observed.  
5.2   GROWTH DETERMINANTS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Studies that seek to explain the growth of firms can be classified into two theoretical perspectives: 
the Law of Proportionate Effect (or Gibrat’s law) and the knowledge spillover theory of 
entrepreneurship (Lotti, Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2008; Acs, Braunerhjelm, Audretsch and Carlsson, 
2009). Gibrat’s law posits that growth rates are normally distributed such that no discernible 
characteristics can explain growth. Empirical analyses offer limited support for Gibrat’s law, with 
smaller and younger firms frequently found to outperform larger and older firms (Wagner, 1992; 
Bigsten and Gebreeyesus, 2007). Were Gibrat’s law to hold perfectly, then interventions to support 
MSMEs would be difficult to justify. Indeed many authors argue that the most effective way of 
promoting enterprise growth is by ensuring that an enabling business environment exists and that 
such an enabling environment is realised if the regulatory burden on start-ups and smaller firms in, 
for example, registrations, taxes, and property rights, is reduced (de Soto, 2000; Beck Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005). While proponents of this view do not raise Gibrat’s law as the basis 
for their policy recommendations, there is mutual preference for letting firms attend to growth 
challenges unaided once the regulatory obstacles are removed.  
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The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship suggests that growth can be explained by 
entrepreneur- and firm-specific characteristics (Acs et al., 2009). The theory is consistent with 
Jovanovich’s (1982) passive learning model where each firm at start-up is presumed to have  
unique, random and unknown cost structures (and knowledge gaps) that the firm can only come to 
understand as it conducts its business. The cost structures determine the firm’s scale of operations 
(i.e. size) as some knowledge is internally exploited or externalised when other employees leave 
with some of the knowledge to set up new firms. The aim of studies stemming from the knowledge 
spillover theory is to identify firm-specific factors that explain growth. Thus, studies proceeding 
from the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship shy away from assessing the effects of 
macro-level factors such as business regulations on growth. Instead, they look at the actual 
operations of the firm: who owns the firm, how the firm is managed and how it interacts with 
suppliers and customers (Brown et al., 2005; Bigsten and Gebreeyesus, 2007; Bradford, 2007; 
McPherson, 1996).  
Some empirical evidence on firm- and entrepreneur-specific attributes is from field experiment 
studies such as Banerjee and Duflo (2010) and de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008). Field 
experiment studies identify factors explaining growth by tracking the behaviour and transactions of 
small business owners post-treatment where the treatment involves being granted microloans, 
receiving training or both. But since the field experiment studies focus more on microenterprises 
and draw almost exclusively from microfinance activities in very specific locations, generalising the 
results to SMEs is problematic.  
Empirical evidence on determinants of enterprise growth is extensive. In a review of early studies, 
Storey (1994) lists firm age, firm size, sector, legal form of enterprise, location, and ownership as 
key growth determinants. A review of studies since Storey (1994) shows an increasing number of 
variables explored. It is however interesting to note that ‘legal form of organisation’ has over time 
been infrequently explored except in studies covering micro enterprises. On the other hand, some 
determinants have gained importance in the literature and are being explored with increasing 
frequency. For instance, McPherson (1996) investigated if education, gender and age of small 
business owners explain growth. Brown et al. (2005) explored the growth effects of training and 
factors such as trade finance, loans accessed, previous work experience, and business 
association membership. Bigsten and Gebreeyesus (2007) examined the effects of operational 
efficiency measures such as output per employee on growth. These factors were found to 
significantly explain growth.  
Most of the studies have however focused on access to finance as a determinant of growth. It 
would be interesting to explore if there are types of financing preferred by high-growth firms. In 
addition, while many studies find access to finance to be the most serious obstacle to growth, 
corporate governance within emerging enterprises is overlooked. Yet governance issues are quite 
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important when the firm solicits transactions with external stakeholders such as banks, suppliers 
and customers (Abor and Adjasi, 2007). 
With regard to some findings on high-growth firms in the literature, Henrekson and Johansson 
(2010) concluded after a review of the literature that it is age rather than size that defines high-
growth firms, and that if there is sector over-representation of such firms then the 
overrepresentation is more in the services sector than the technology sector. On the experience of 
the business owner, Siegel, Siegel and MacMillan (1993) showed that it is experience within the 
enterprise’s sector which is important. Studies on high-growth firms have focused on developed 
economies. This study extends the discussion to South Africa building on the analysis of high-
growth firms in Africa by Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2010). 
5.3 DEFINITIONS OF HIGH-GROWTH FIRMS 
Growth can be based on variables such as sales, profits, value added, net assets or number of 
employees. The choice of the growth indicator depends on the policy question and presents limited 
debates. The main issue is in defining high-growth: when is growth high-growth? Answers are 
many and arbitrary. In Siegel et al. (1993), a high-growth firm must double sales in its most recent 
three years. Siegel et al. (1993: 172) however excluded companies with “exceptionally high growth 
rates” so as not to skew the results.  
Birch, Haggerty and Parsons (1997) set revenues of US$100 000 in the base year for the firm and 
stated that subsequent sales growth must be at least 20 percent per annum for three years. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a high-
growth firm must increase its revenue by more than 20 percent per year for three consecutive 
years given that the firm is less than five years old and has at least ten employees (OECD, 2011). 
Barringer, Jones and Neubaum (2005: 664) used three year compound annual growth in sales of 
at least 80 percent to define high-growth.  
Henrekson and Johansson (2010: 228) proposed that high-growth firms be defined as a proportion 
of the fastest growing firms, thus circumventing the arbitrary benchmarks. In spite of the different 
definitions, there seems to be consensus in the literature that high-growth firms account for 3 to 9 
percent of firms in an economy. A global survey by the GEM in 2011 found that “high-growth 
entrepreneurs represent only 4 percent of the total entrepreneurs … yet the businesses they have 
founded or co-own created close to 40 percent of the total jobs generated by all entrepreneurs who 
responded to the survey” (GEM, 2011: 1). Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2010: 38) explored how 
comparable the prevalence rate of high-growth firms in Africa is to developed economies and 
found the prevalence rate comparable at 5 to 9 percent of total firm distribution. This chapter 
contributes to this emerging discussion of high-growth firms in Africa by focusing on South Africa, 
where job creation is a subject of significant policy interest.  
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5.4 METHODOLOGY 5.4.1  Determining growth 
Since the policy problem is job creation, the study uses employment growth. Typically, studies that 
use employment growth (e.g. Dihn et al., 2010; Ayyagari et al., 2008) estimate growth as the log 





where gr_empit is the growth of firm i at time t,  Empit is the number of its full-time employees at the 
end of the later period, Empi,t−1 at the end of the earlier and 𝑁 is the number of years between the 
two periods.  
The relative growth in Equation 5.1 will show higher growth rates for smaller firms because of their 
lower base. A smaller firm is in fact expected to experience rapid growth according to the minimum 
efficient size hypothesis, which posits that the smaller firm or start-up business must quickly reach 
a set operational scale to maintain presence in a given sector (Acs and Audretsch, 1989). When on 
the other hand an absolute measure of growth, such as the actual number of jobs created, is used,  
a larger firm expectedly recruits more workers and perhaps plays a more important role in reducing 
the absolute number of the unemployed. While the sheer numbers of smaller enterprises are 
presumed to result in more jobs by smaller firms, the demonstrated higher job-churning rate of 
smaller firms (Kerr et al., 2014) make the choice of using relative or absolute measures of growth 
important. 
To mitigate overstating the growth propensity of small firms in relative growth measures and large 
firms in absolute growth measures, the Birch Index combines both measures as follows 




This study follows Hölzl (2014; 2009) and Almus (2002) in employing the Birch index in all 
estimations. The study uses the natural log of the index defined as:  
Birch Index = (lnEmpt − lnEmpt−1) 
lnEmpt
lnEmpt−1
  …(5.3) 
5.4.2 Determining high-growth 
Before studying high-growth firms, it is perhaps important to appreciate characteristics of firms that 
create more jobs than an average firm. This chapter refers to such firms as outperformers. To 
identify outperformers, the average growth rate is determined and firms with above average 
growth, the outperformers, are coded 1 and 0 for underperformers when below average.  
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5.4.3 Outperformers and underperformers: logit regression  
Given a set of hypothetical characteristics informed by empirical literature, what are the odds that a 
firm will be an outperformer rather than an underperformer? Since it has already been determined 
which firms belong to either group based on their observed growth, what in essence is sought by 
the question is whether the conditional factors will be useful in correctly assigning firms to the 
outperformers or underperformers category even when the actual growth is unknown. If for 
brevity’s sake all the conditional factors are referred to as X, and the goal is to predict an outcome 
termed Y and coded 1 for outperformers and 0 for underperformers, then the problem can be 
defined as  
P = E[Y = 1 ǀ X] = Xβ …(5.4) 
The dichotomous outcome motivates the use of a binary logit regression model which this chapter 
uses. The chapter also examines the extent to which interactions of conditional factors (or 
characteristics) are useful in classifying firms into the two categories. The interaction term is a pair 
of variables from the list of firm and market characteristics presented in Section 5.5.  
5.4.4 High-growth firms: quantile regression  
OLS regression is the commonly used method to estimate the effects of the factors on growth. The 
weakness of a basic OLS model is that it estimates “the mean effects of the explanatory variables” 
on growth (Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2010: 40) such that when the subjects of the analysis have 
highly heterogeneous characteristics, the reported results have weak explanatory power. Evidence 
of this problem is indeed the very low R-squared statistics in most of the OLS-based studies. A 
review of a dozen studies by Coad (2009) for instance shows half with R-squared less than 5 
percent which, according to Parker et al. (2010: 208), suggests that “the hypothesis that growth is 
a random walk cannot easily be dismissed”.  
An alternative to basic OLS regression is quantile regression. Quantile regression is a special case 
of OLS in that it splits the dependent variable into percentiles which are arguably more 
homogenous than the full sample. Thus, the expectation is that a quantile model would be more 
robust as measured by R-squared than a basic OLS model. Essentially, a standard linear 











+  𝜀 …(5.5) 
where 𝑔𝑖
𝑞
 is the Birch Index for each firm in a group that is specified by q, q is a percentile between 
1 and 99 percent, β is the coefficient for each of the covariates and ε is the error term. Since the 
focus is on firms that grow much faster than the generality of others, deciles starting at the 50 
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percentile will be analysed and attention in the interpretation of results will be on the upper two 
deciles where high-growth firms reside. 
5.5  DATA  
Data used are from the 2007 WBES in South Africa. The study focuses on firms with 5 to 250 
employees so that the study results can be related to others in the emerging literature on high-
growth firms (Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2010; Nightingale and Coad, 2013; Hölzl, 2009). Table 
5.1 gives definitions and mean statistics of the characteristics to be evaluated. The characteristics 
are listed under three categories: firm, market and business environment.  
Table 5.1 shows that outperformers are on average younger and smaller than underperformers. 
On average, outperformers start operation with fewer employees (i.e. ten employees) than 
underperformers (23 employees). From other studies such as Almus (2002) and Goedhuys and 
Sleuwaegen (2010), there is a basis to suppose that outperformers would be innovative, subscribe 
to quality standards such as ISO 9002 etc. and use more modern technology proxied by a firm 
having its own website. This appears not to be the case for outperforming enterprises in South 
Africa, with fewer outperformers using modern technology and holding lesser quality certifications 
such as ISO 9000, 9002 etc. for their products.  
The work experience of managers does not seem to distinguish outperformers and 
underperformers in Table 5.1. However the managers of outperformers have comparatively lower 
levels of formal education. A comparatively larger proportion of Asian- and African-owned firms are 
outperformers than underperformers. It is difficult to draw conclusions on the market characteristics 
in Table 5.1. However, it is evident that outperformers suffer less regulatory intrusion proxied by 
lower percentage visits by tax officials and management time spent on regulatory issues. In 
particular, only 40 percent of outperformers were visited by tax officials compared to 48 percent of 
underperformers.  
This section gave an overview of characteristics of outperformers. The limitation of the discussion 
thus far is that it is not possible to infer the degree to which these characteristics differ between 
outperformers and underperformers. The logit and quantile regression results address this 
limitation. 
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Table 5.1: Outperformers vs. underperformers – comparing means of characteristics 
  Variable Outperformers Underperformers 
 Total number of firms in the samples 249 500 
Firm: Number of jobs created from 2003 to 2006 15.55 4.94 
 Firm age in years 14.63 19.55 
 Number of employees at start-up 10.67 23.10 
 Percentage of firm held by main shareholder 78.56 72.98 
 Firms size with 1 being small and 2 medium 1.55 1.67 
 Sector: 1 is retail; 2 is services; 3 is manufacturing 2.51 2.42 
 Quality: % of firms with ISO 9000, 9002, etc. 24.50 35.40 
 Audit: % of firms with annual audit of accounts 73.90 78.60 
 Website: percentage of firms with own website 40.96 47.20 
 Education level (4 levels: 4th is university) 1.98 2.17 
 Training – percentage of firms that train workers 34.54 45.80 
 Experience of top manager in years 14.75 15.65 
 Gender: % of firms with female as shareholder 18.78 22.52 
 African-owned 31.73 23.60 
 Asian-owned 31.33 28.40 
 European-owned 36.95 48.00 
Market: Average sales (ZAR)  20,400,000   34,600,000  
 Management time per week spent on regulations (%) 6.79 7.14 
 Exports: % of direct exports in sales 10.84 18.64 
 Percentage of firms that applied for loan 22.89 22.40 
 Overdraft: % of firms with overdraft 50.60 60.60 
 Percentage creditors’ financing in working capital 58.52 63.67 
 Percentage of total trade credit in working capital 22.01 23.03 
 Percentage of firms visited by tax official 38.96 48.40 
 Number of years firm has known main supplier  10.20 13.04 
Business 
environment:  
Crime as obstacle on 1 to 4 scale; 4 is most serious 2.15 1.94 
 Percentage of firms paying for security 69.88 81.80 
 Electricity as obstacle on 1 to 4 scale; 4 most serious 1.06 1.21 
 % of firms reporting having a generator 13.51 21.91 
 Transport as obstacle on 1 to 4 scale; 4 most serious 0.46 0.44 
 Percentage of firms with own transport 70.81 70.79 
Source: Author’s estimations from Enterprise Survey South Africa (2007) 
5.6 RESULTS 
The goodness-of-fit-test for the logit model is presented in Table 5.2. The model correctly classifies 
73 percent of the 700 firms analysed. Specifically, 89.63 percent of underperforming firms are 
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correctly classified by the model while 40 percent of the outperforming firms are correctly 
classified. While the model is quite robust in identifying underperforming firms, the comparatively 
lower Sensitivity measure in the goodness-of-fit test shows that there is scope for more variables to 
be explored to understand outperforming firms better. It must be noted also that the sample for 
outperformers is comparatively small, with 249 firms against 500 underperformers, which to some 
extent explains why the model is more robust in correctly classifying underperformers than 
outperformers.  
Table 5.2: Goodness-of-fit test for logit model 
 --------TRUE--------  
Classified D ~D Total 
+ 95 48 143 
- 142 415 557 
Total 237 463 700 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as growth != 0 
 
 
Sensitivity measure  Pr( + D) 40.08%  
Specificity measure  Pr( - ~ D) 89.63%  
Positive predictive value Pr( D +) 64.43%  
Negative predictive value Pr(~ D -) 74.51%  
False + rate for true ~D Pr( + ~D) 10.37%  
False - rate for true D Pr( - D) 59.92%  
False + rate for classified + Pr(~ D +) 33.57%  
False - rate for classified - Pr( D -) 25.49%  
Correctly classified   72.86% 
Note: the sensitivity measure (95/237) reports the proportion of firms in the outperformers’ category 
that are correctly classified by the model. The specificity measure (415/463) reports the proportion of 
firms in the underperformers’ category that are correctly classified by the model. The false positive 
and false negative classification error rates are 48/463 and 142/237 respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2007) 
The logit model results contrasting outperformers and underperformers are discussed in Section 
5.6.1 and the results on high-growth firms from the quantile regression model follow in Section 
5.6.2.  
5.6.1 Characteristics of outperforming firms 
Table 5.3 reports the logit regression results. Four key observations emerge for discussion: the 
number of employees a firm had at start-up, ethnic origin of main owner, managers’ experience, 
and business environment constraints. As noted in the previous section, outperformers have fewer 
employees at start-up than underperformers. Firms owned by previously disadvantaged South 
Africans are more likely to be outperformers and this likelihood is higher for black-owned firms. All 
else being constant, a black-owned and an Indian-owned firm are respectively 1.7 times and 1.6 
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times more likely to create a job than a white-owned firm. Relative to firms with managers who 
have more than 10 years’ experience, enterprises with managers who have less experience are 
more likely to be outperformers. This likelihood is higher for the least experienced managers, who 
are 1.8 times more likely to turn their firms into outperformers than managers with over 10 years of 
experience.  








interval for odds ratio 
log of firm age -0.449 0.638 0.102 0.373 1.093 
log of no. of workers at start-up -0.604 0.547 0.000 0.446 0.669 
experience 0.021 1.021 0.109 0.995 1.047 
dummy: exports -0.201 0.818 0.453 0.484 1.383 
dummy: training -0.206 0.814 0.285 0.558 1.187 
trade credit -0.002 0.998 0.722 0.989 1.008 
dummy: up to secondary education 0.151 1.163 0.545 0.714 1.894 
dummy: vocational education 0.080 1.083 0.717 0.703 1.669 
dummy: university education (base) (base)    
dummy: owner ethnic origin African  0.529 1.697 0.022 1.080 2.668 
dummy: owner ethnic origin Asian 0.477 1.612 0.028 1.053 2.469 
dummy: owner ethnic origin European (base) (base)    
dummy: up to 5 years’ experience 0.589 1.801 0.097 0.899 3.610 
dummy: 6 to 10 years’ experience 0.335 1.398 0.224 0.814 2.401 
dummy: over 10 years’ experience (base) (base)    
dummy: young firms (1 to 5 years) -0.043 0.958 0.937 0.332 2.762 
dummy: mature firms (6 to 15 years) -0.082 0.921 0.808 0.477 1.780 
dummy: old firms (above 15 years) (base) (base)    
working capital to debt 0.001 1.001 0.890 0.991 1.010 
% held by largest owner 0.005 1.005 0.217 0.997 1.012 
dummy: firm has website  -0.383 0.682 0.064 0.455 1.023 
dummy: firm has overdraft -0.179 0.836 0.337 0.579 1.205 
dummy: firm was audited 0.002 1.002 0.994 0.646 1.553 
dummy: female -0.157 0.855 0.484 0.551 1.326 
log of 2003 sales 0.158 1.171 0.042 1.006 1.364 
transport as an obstacle 0.102 1.108 0.345 0.896 1.369 
crime and theft as an obstacle 0.112 1.119 0.129 0.968 1.293 
electricity as an obstacle -0.086 0.918 0.252 0.793 1.063 
constant -1.300  0.428   
R-squared 0.104     
Number of outperformers (p=1)  249     
Number of underperformers (p=0)  500     
Source: Author’s estimations from Enterprise Survey South Africa (2007) 
It is also informative to assess the interaction effects of some independent variables and the extent 
to which such interaction terms determine whether a firm will be an outperformer or an 
underperformer. The study observed 39 interaction terms listed along with respective results in 
Table 5.4. 
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With regard to interactions effects on Young firms and starting with levels of education presented in 
the first set of rows of Table 5.4, firms run by managers with up to secondary school education are 
more likely to be outperformers. Young Asian-owned firms and young white-owned firms are more 
likely to be outperformers, with the odds being 1.3 times for Asian-owned firms and 2.7 times (and 
significant) for white-owned firms. Mature firms run by vocationally trained and by university 
graduates have a higher likelihood of being outperformers. However, it is old firms run by 
managers with secondary education that are significantly more likely to be outperformers, the odds 
ratio being 2.5 times. 
On gender, although there is insufficient evidence to be conclusive, firms owned by white females 
have the highest likelihood of outperforming over other gender and ethnic origin interactions. From 
the results in Table 5.4, it seems that medium-sized firms are more likely to be outperformers than 
small firms except when the small firms are white-owned. Interaction results of ethnic origin and 
levels of education, though all statistically not significant, exhibit consistent patterns that must be 
noted. For Asian-owned and black-owned firms, the odds of being an outperformer decrease with 
higher levels of education but increase with higher levels of education for white-owned firms, from 
0.7 times at secondary school to 1.6 times at university.  
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Firm age group and education Young & Secondary school 1.715 0.261 0.669 4.397 
 Young & Vocational 0.617 0.239 0.276 1.379 
 Young & University 1.116 0.818 0.44 2.828 
 Mature & Secondary school 0.323 0.002 0.16 0.654 
 Mature & Vocational 1.853 0.062 0.97 3.541 
 Mature & University 1.477 0.263 0.747 2.924 
 Old & Secondary 2.459 0.015 1.191 5.074 
 Old & Vocational 0.727 0.357 0.37 1.431 
 Old & University 0.701 0.306 0.356 1.383 
Firm age group and ethnic origin Young & Black 0.356 0.016 0.154 0.823 
 Young & Asian 1.274 0.582 0.538 3.015 
 Young & White 2.666 0.032 1.086 6.547 
 Mature & Black 1.684 0.146 0.834 3.403 
 Mature & Asian 0.922 0.821 0.458 1.857 
 Mature & White 0.696 0.271 0.365 1.327 
 Old & Black 1.280 0.522 0.601 2.728 
 Old & Asian 0.926 0.827 0.464 1.848 
 Old & White 0.898 0.75 0.464 1.739 
Ethnic origin and education Black & Secondary School 1.071 0.855 0.51 2.25 
 Black & Vocational 1.026 0.94 0.521 2.021 
 Black & University 0.968 0.934 0.446 2.101 
 Asian & Secondary school 1.424 0.364 0.664 3.055 
 Asian & Vocational 1.186 0.625 0.598 2.353 
 Asian & University 0.613 0.181 0.3 1.255 
 White & Secondary school 0.692 0.313 0.339 1.414 
 White & Vocational 0.897 0.738 0.475 1.694 
 White & University 1.624 0.155 0.832 3.169 
Ethnic origin and gender Black & Female 0.925 0.85 0.414 2.068 
 Black & Male 1.095 0.825 0.49 2.448 
 Asian & Female 0.649 0.336 0.269 1.567 
 Asian & Male 1.541 0.336 0.638 3.723 
 White & Female 1.677 0.219 0.736 3.821 
 White & Male 0.65 0.294 0.291 1.452 
Ethnic and size Black & Small 0.855 0.686 0.399 1.832 
 Black & Medium 1.134 0.743 0.535 2.405 
 Asian & Small 0.835 0.642 0.389 1.789 
 Asian & Medium 1.318 0.475 0.618 2.808 
 White & Small 1.357 0.408 0.658 2.798 
 White & Medium 0.752 0.429 0.371 1.523 
Source: Author’s estimations from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in South Africa (2007) 
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5.6.2  Characteristics of high-growth firms  
The results of the quantile regression model are in Table 5.5. The second column in Table 5.5 
reports the basic OLS regression often used to investigate growth characteristics of firms (Naudé 
et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2005; McPherson, 1996). The next column reports effects of the 
characteristics on firms in the fifth decile or Q50 per the Table 5.5 notation. Given that high-growth 
firms are at the right hand tail of the distribution of growth rates, the discussion on results focuses 
on the Q80 and Q90 results, which in essence incorporate the numerous definitions of high-growth 
firms in the literature (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010: 228). 
There is a negative and significant relationship between size at start-up (i.e. log of number of 
workers at start-up) and growth. The effect increases with higher growth rates. This means that the 
higher the number of employees a firm has at formation, the less likely it is to be a high-growth 
firm. Firm age exhibits a similar pattern. In relation to young firms (which are not listed in Table 4 
as it is the reference category for age groups), mature firms perform poorly across all deciles 
reported but when related to old firms, younger firms outperform in the lower deciles but 
underperform in Q70, Q80 and Q90, albeit insignificantly. Therefore, from the sample of firms 
assessed, there is inadequate evidence to associate high-growth firms with a particular age group. 
In the previous section, young firms were more likely to be outperformers. Results in this section 
show that the contribution of young firms to job creation does not meet the high-growth firm criteria 
on the upper two deciles. Thus, all things being equal, while young firms create more jobs than the 
average firm in the sample, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that they reside in the top 
deciles of high-growth. It is therefore important to address the binding and top constraints for 
young firms to propel the firms into the high-growth zone. 
With regard to experience, the results provide evidence that high-growth firms can be associated 
more with managers with up to 10 years’ experience than over 10 years. The association is 
stronger with moderately experienced managers (i.e. managers with between 6 and 10 years’ 
experience). The results provide evidence that African-owned firms are more likely to be high 
growth-firms. In relation to Asian-owned firms, African-owned firms in Q80 and Q90 associate 
positively with growth. On the other hand European-owned firms underperform Asian-owned firms 
and the underperformance is significant at the top quantile, while the outperformance by African-
owned firms is significant. A plausible explanation for the underperformance of white-owned firms 
could be that the set of further regulatory requirements they must comply as they increase the 
number of employees. Employment Equity requirements compel firms to meet set quotas for black 
employees. Such employees may lack the necessary skills and experience or be too expensive for 
the firm. It is likely that some white-owned firms may prefer to remain small to avoid such additional 
regulatory burden. Future research is necessary to explore this and other explanations of the 
underperformance. What would also be useful to explore in such studies are the cultural incentives 
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and value systems of business owners – some of which could be ethnic-driven – where, for 
example, some business owners may regard financial capital growth as more important than 
having many employees and vice versa. 
Table 5.5: Results of quantile regression on growth 
 OLS  Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90 
log of firm age -0.111 -0.034 -0.039 -0.095 -0.136 -0.181 
 0.027 0.428 0.232 0.164 0.061 0.140 
dummy: mature -0.031 -0.072 -0.059 -0.007 -0.032 -0.051 
 0.633 0.199 0.165 0.938 0.754 0.769 
dummy: old 0.011 -0.055 -0.051 0.050 0.030 0.037 
 0.916 0.537 0.444 0.721 0.857 0.894 
log of no. of workers at start-up -0.123 -0.063 -0.087 -0.116 -0.150 -0.171 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
experience 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.012 
 0.071 0.632 0.009 0.117 0.044 0.022 
dummy: 6 to 10 years’ experience 0.021 -0.004 -0.036 -0.077 -0.075 0.074 
 0.702 0.932 0.317 0.304 0.386 0.605 
dummy: over 10 years’ experience 0.002 -0.002 -0.064 -0.104 -0.162 -0.086 
 0.977 0.968 0.153 0.254 0.117 0.614 
dummy: training -0.006 -0.035 -0.037 -0.013 0.025 0.019 
 0.861 0.276 0.115 0.786 0.639 0.826 
dummy: up to secondary school 0.023 0.030 0.011 0.029 -0.011 0.183 
 0.630 0.471 0.718 0.632 0.870 0.119 
dummy: vocational education 0.035 0.038 0.055 0.067 0.024 0.169 
 0.409 0.296 0.045 0.223 0.702 0.123 
dummy: Asian -0.100 -0.018 -0.001 0.009 -0.060 -0.327 
 0.035 0.656 0.968 0.884 0.396 0.003 
dummy: European -0.120 -0.052 -0.045 -0.031 -0.091 -0.343 
 0.009 0.185 0.127 0.604 0.175 0.001 
dummy: gender -0.009 -0.006 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.061 
 0.827 0.870 0.937 0.954 0.980 0.567 
dummy: exports -0.005 0.007 -0.026 -0.061 -0.008 0.056 
 0.914 0.870 0.405 0.336 0.910 0.640 
trade credit -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 0.309 0.055 0.920 0.768 0.344 0.385 
working capital to debt -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 0.456 0.990 0.927 0.964 0.500 0.516 
% held by largest owner 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.781 0.534 0.585 0.871 0.705 0.836 
dummy: audit -0.017 -0.015 -0.001 0.008 -0.016 -0.120 
 0.694 0.685 0.984 0.879 0.800 0.191 
log of 2003 sales 0.013 0.023 0.029 0.011 0.019 0.016 
 0.370 0.082 0.004 0.573 0.402 0.671 
overdraft -0.070 -0.027 -0.025 -0.016 -0.004 -0.095 
 0.059 0.396 0.299 0.736 0.946 0.306 
website -0.074 -0.036 -0.014 -0.082 -0.043 -0.018 
 0.065 0.297 0.576 0.110 0.459 0.847 
Quality certification  -0.022 -0.014 -0.026 -0.025 0.098 
  0.312 0.653 0.702 0.639 0.223 
transport severity as a constraint 0.021 0.000 0.003 0.019 0.048 0.143 
 0.316 0.991 0.803 0.482 0.130 0.002 
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crime severity as a constraint 0.007 0.016 0.010 -0.003 -0.017 -0.045 
 0.632 0.206 0.262 0.886 0.434 0.251 
electricity as a constraint 0.011 -0.022 -0.025 -0.005 0.003 0.052 
 0.467 0.079 0.009 0.777 0.881 0.168 
constant 0.732 0.308 0.214 0.832 1.081 1.686 
 0.018 0.188 0.229 0.022 0.013 0.020 
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 0.057 0.072 0.087 0.119 0.192 
Number of firms 700 700 700 700 700 700 
Source: Author’s estimation from Enterprise Survey South Africa (2007) 
With regard to education, the results show that in relation to low levels of formal education (i.e. up 
to secondary school) vocationally trained managers influence growth. Overall, university graduates 
underperform the less formally educated managers but all education levels effects are not 
statistically significant. However, results show that enterprise performance is improved by in-house 
training programmes for workers. This is shown by the effects of training which turn positive at Q80 
and Q90. There are no discernible patterns that emerge on working capital related characteristics. 
However, firms with overdraft facilities have a consistently negative relationship with growth.  
Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2010) proxied innovation by whether a firm has a website or holds 
quality certifications such as ISO 9000, and found positive associations with high-growth firms. The 
explanation for a positive association by Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2010) is that websites 
mitigate transport and communication obstacles. The results of this study however show a 
persistently negative association of own-website with growth as with quality certification, although 
the latter is positive at Q90. There is thus insufficient evidence in this study to associate these 
proxies of innovation with high growth. Interestingly, transport as an obstacle has positive effects 
on growth and this effect is significant at Q90. It could be, as Denrell and Liu (2012) cautioned, that 
high-growth firms may not necessarily reflect the ability of entrepreneurs but structural faults in an 
economy which encourage opportunistic behaviour rather than innovation. Importantly, crime 
negatively affects high-growth firms, affirming the earlier finding (see Chapter 3) of crime as the 
overall binding constraint for firms. 
5.7  IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH  
Four findings need further discussion for policy and research. Firstly, the typical high-growth firm is 
likely to be black-owned. This may seem rather intuitive since 80 percent of the population is black. 
However, this is an important finding given that African-owned firms accounted for 26 percent of 
the 749 firms analysed against 29 percent and 44 percent for Asians and Europeans respectively. 
Secondly, it appears that young firms create more jobs than mature firms but that the 
outperformance slides as firms get to be over 15 years. A possible explanation for this is that the 
formal African-owned enterprises are largely post-1994 (Rogerson, 2004). Government support, 
especially the BBBEEE requirements, may have helped the emerging black entrepreneur. 
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However, interaction terms results show that black-owned firms which are five years or younger 
are less likely to outperform, suggesting the need for further research to determine obstacles that 
are perhaps peculiar to this category of firms.  
Thirdly, the chapter did not find sufficient evidence to associate exports with outperformance but 
this should not be taken to mean that exports do not influence growth. The problem, as shown by 
Soderbom and Teal (2003), is that few SMEs in Africa are exporters. There is therefore need for 
further research into barriers faced by the few exporting SMEs and firms that attempt to export. 
Finally, this chapter used variables gathered in the WBES instrument to explore the extent to which 
the variables explain firms creating most jobs. Other studies not based on WBES extensively 
explore the variables used in this chapter. As discussed in Section 5.4.4, there is an established 
concern in the literature that the variables used in empirical studies poorly explain the performance 
as demonstrated by low R-squared statistics in OLS-based studies.  
The quantile regression results in this chapter showed the R-squared statistic increasing with 
higher deciles, from 6 percent in the OLS results to 7 percent in the fifth decile (Q50) and 19 
percent in Q90. The goodness-of-fit test of the logit regression model used in this chapter predicted 
89 percent of underperformers correctly but only 40 percent of outperformers correctly. Could it be 
that these well-established or default variables such as firm age, ethnic origin, gender sector, 
education, experience etc. are inherently weak in explaining high-levels of firm performance? 
Perhaps there should be more emphasis in innovation-related variables in the literature than is 
presently the state of MSME literature in developing countries. Determining what such variables 
could be is beyond the scope of this study but would be an important subject for future research.     
5.8  CONCLUSION 
This chapter is a modest effort to stimulate discussions on high-growth firms in South Africa. The 
chapter determined characteristics of firms that create more jobs than an average firm does. The 
chapter referred to such firms as outperformers. High-growth firms are an upper subset of 
outperformers. The results suggest that young firms are more likely to be outperformers but the 
typical high-growth firm is more likely to be black-owned and perhaps more than five years old. The 
limitation of the analysis is that only characteristics in the WBES instrument could be explored. It is 
evident from the chapter that the variables gathered by the WBES are relatively weak in explaining 
outperforming firms and high-growth firms. This suggests that there are perhaps better variables 
characterising high-growth firms than are presently explored in the literature. Alternatively, the 
weaknesses of the variables in explaining high-growth firms may be confirming their relatively 
small size of 3 to 9 percent of firms in an economy. Further research could perhaps use larger 
samples and more in-depth survey instruments to pick characteristics that explain high-growth 
firms better.  
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
The thesis set out to identify the factors in the WBES (2003, 2007) and WBFCS (2010) data that 
play a most important role in constraining the growth of MSMEs in South Africa. It also set out to 
determine characteristics of firms creating most jobs. The goal was to explore through these 
investigations, interventions in the MSME sector that may perhaps improve the socioeconomic 
circumstances of many South Africans who are unemployed or running the six million or so small 
businesses in the country.  
The motivation of the research was firstly in the debate on whether small businesses reduce 
unemployment. The argument for promoting MSMEs is that their sheer numbers make it plausible 
that their growth will lead to job creation, social cohesion and equity. Secondly, the socioeconomic 
context of high unemployment and high levels of social and income inequality in South Africa and 
the fact that the government emphasises the importance of MSMEs in addressing the challenges 
motivated the focus on South Africa. Thirdly, the theoretical rationalisations within the market 
failure hypothesis which posits that it is essential for policymakers to intervene in markets in order 
to improve allocation and productivity of available resources affirm the need for empirical analyses 
to identify and inform such interventions. Accordingly, the thesis systematically studied challenges 
of MSMEs and characteristics of high-growth firms to explore approaches for promoting small 
businesses to foster socioeconomic development. 
Chapter 2 presented the contextual background to the subsequent empirical analyses in the thesis. 
The chapter reviewed the small enterprise development policy highlighting key institutions involved 
in implementing the policy and discussed the importance of BBBEE legislation in enterprise 
development. The chapter demonstrated the unfavourable socioeconomic environment in South 
Africa by comparing the country to peer economies. These comparisons also demonstrated 
significant differences between South Africa and other countries to show that recommendations 
from the cross-country literature may not be appropriate for the peculiarities of a country of interest. 
The subsequent chapters used the WBES data of 2003 and 2007 and the WBFCS of 2010 to 
understand MSMEs and their operating environment in South Africa. 
Chapter 3 investigated the main obstacles to growth of MSMEs, basing the analysis on how 
business owners and managers rated the 15 business environment obstacles in the WBES 
instrument. The relative importance of each obstacle was determined by evaluating how it affected 
employment growth. The chapter used two count-based approaches and two further approaches 
based on the Growth Diagnostic framework by Hausmann et al. (2005) to determine the key 
obstacles and the extent to which the obstacles constrained job creation. The count-based 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 88 
 
approaches and the first approach based on the Growth Diagnostic framework found that crime, 
theft and disorder is the binding constraint for MSMEs, which, if addressed, result in optimal growth 
even when all other obstacles remain unchanged. Infrastructure-related obstacles, particularly 
electricity supply and transport, emerged as the next set of obstacles with significant effects on 
growth. The second Growth Diagnostic approach showed that medium-sized enterprises were 
least affected by the businesses environment obstacles, suggesting that support would be more 
useful to micro and small firms. Chapter 3 showed that access to finance is a relatively less 
important obstacle for MSMEs in South Africa.  
Access to finance is an important issue in the small business literature with many studies showing 
finance as the most binding constraint to growth. Chapter 4 conducted an in-depth study of the 
financing constraint using two approaches. The first approach continued the analysis from Chapter 
3 which was based on the feedback from business owners on how they assessed access to 
finance as affecting their operations. The feedback from the 2003 and 2007 WBES showed that 
the importance of access to finance as an obstacle declined significantly. The chapter found that 
firms reporting finance to be a major obstacle did not underperform firms that rated finance as not 
a problem. The second approach identified firms that encountered challenges as they sought to 
raise external finance. The objective in the second approach was to determine first, if such firms 
existed and second, their profile. The chapter identified four levels of finance constraint: Fully 
Credit Constrained, Partially Credit Constrained, Maybe Credit Constrained and Non Credit 
Constrained. The investigation found, using an ordered logit model, that black-owned firms, firms 
less than five years old and firms in the manufacturing sector have high likelihoods of encountering 
problems in accessing finance. 
Chapter 5 explored the characteristics of high-growth firms in South Africa. Given the arbitrary 
definition of high-growth in the literature, Chapter 5 adopted two approaches. The first approach 
investigated the characteristics of firms creating more jobs than the average firm in the sample 
does using a binary logit regression model, while the other used quantile regression so as to 
observe the characteristics of firms at different levels of growth rates. The chapter found that young 
firms (i.e. less than six years old) created more jobs than the average firm in the sample 
particularly young white-owned firms and old firms with more experienced managers. There was 
however, insufficient evidence for such young firms to qualify as high-growth firms, which by 
definition, must reside in upper end of the distribution of growth rates. Evidence suggested that the 
typical high-growth firms were more likely to be black-owned firms which are perhaps more than 
six years old. 
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6.2 IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR MSME DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Young firms emerge consistently across the analyses of the thesis as warranting some attention. 
Chapter 2 showed that in the random WBES sample of firms used, young firms accounted for 69 
percent of micro enterprises, 45 percent were small firms and 17 percent were medium-sized firms. 
Young firms therefore are mainly micro and small enterprises. In investigating the binding 
constraints, young firms were significantly affected by more obstacles than other categories of 
enterprises, with the main obstacles being crime, informal sector competitors and transport. In 
examining the finance constraint, young firms were more likely to be towards the worst categories 
of the Fully Credit Constrained category. Yet it emerged in Chapter 5 on high-growth firms that 
young firms are more likely to be outperformers if they are white-owned, while young black-owned 
firms are significantly less likely to outperform the generality of MSMEs. Before relating these 
findings on young firms to policy, it is necessary to run through the key findings on black-owned 
firms. 
Whereas crime was the binding constraint for most categories of firms and for MSMEs as a group, 
the binding constraint for black-owned firms using the first approach of the Growth Diagnostic 
framework was tax administration. In the second approach of the Growth Diagnostic framework, 
four constraints affected small black-owned firms significantly: courts, customs and regulations, 
electricity, and tax administration. With regard to the finance constraint, black-owned firms as 
mentioned above are more likely to experience significant challenges in accessing external finance 
as was found for young firms. While black-owned young firms are significantly less likely to be 
outperformers, black-owned firms that are more than six years old are significantly likely to be in 
the top two deciles of job creators defined as high-growth firms.  
In suggesting policy recommendations, it is also important to be cognisant of the fact that support 
to MSMEs seeks not only job creation. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, most micro and small firms 
are owned by individuals with lower levels of formal education who ventured into business because 
they could not find jobs or had just lost their formal jobs. Support to such business owners must 
seek to ensure that the citizens so determined to be self-reliant are encouraged to persevere – the 
creation of additional jobs by such business owners being perhaps a bonus. Enterprise 
development policy must therefore address two goals: job creation and individual business owner 
empowerment. The remainder of this section suggests policy recommendations for job creation. 
Section 6.3 discusses the empowerment of individual business owners. 
With regard to job creation, it is important to acknowledge that empirical evidence globally and in 
South Africa shows that the generality of MSMEs do not retain the jobs they create. Thus, the 
focus on promoting firms that create jobs more than the generality of other firms, or at least 
nurturing such characteristics in the generality of firms, is important. Evidence from this study 
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suggests prioritisation of support to young firms. Young firms have a high likelihood of being 
financially constrained, which suggests that interventions for young firms must have a financing 
emphasis. Furthermore, the binding constraints for young and black-owned firms are tax-related, 
which suggests the need for the financial interventions to include training programmes to improve 
the appreciation of tax issues by entrepreneurs. The research showed that black-owned firms 
encounter significant challenges in accessing finance in spite of support such as the BBBEE. As 
observed in Chapter 4, an explanation for this was that this was perhaps suggestive of the 
enormity of the finance constraint: more still needs to be done to address the problem of access to 
finance.  
The thesis showed that black-owned firms had fewer managers with high levels of education, 
particularly university education. Given evidence that higher levels of education mitigate the 
finance constraint, it could be useful for policy to accelerate vocational training programmes for 
business owners. It is also important that policy encourage blacks with high levels of formal 
education to set-up entrepreneurial ventures, as such start-ups could be less vulnerable to 
obstacles such as the finance constraint.  
The limitation of the research is that it could only use variables in the WBES. This limitation was 
particularly evident in investigating the characteristics of high-growth firms where the predictive 
power of the variables used was 40 percent. Further research exploring a wider set of 
characteristics would enrich the literature and policy discussion on firms that create most jobs. It is 
particularly important, given that the typical high-growth firm may be black-owned, that future 
research explores how BBBEE-driven support can further address the finance constraint.  
6.3  IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL ECONOMY ACTORS IN PROMOTING SMALL FIRMS 
The BBBEE legislation has ensured that government and the private sector undertake the 
promotion of small businesses jointly. The role of NGOs and local and international development 
agencies (hereafter referred to as social economy actors) must however not be overlooked. The 
goal of social economy actors is to support small business owners in a financially sustainable way. 
Social economy actors seek to address the underlying market failures in an economy by working 
with the most affected individuals and engaging other stakeholders (e.g. banks) in their activities. It 
is fitting to discuss how the social economy actors can contribute to addressing the main 
challenges encountered by MSMEs in South Africa as found by this study. It must also be 
acknowledged that the New Growth Path government policy of 2010 envisaged the social economy 
sector creating 260 000 jobs by 2020, thus underscoring the important role that the sector must 
play in addressing pressing social problems while creating jobs in its own right (NGP, 2011).  
This thesis showed that if MSMEs are to create and retain jobs, crime, electricity and transport are 
the critical problems that must be addressed. A study by Alda and Cuesta (2010) estimated that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 91 
 
total crime costs for South Africa in 2007 were US$22 billion or 7.8 percent of GDP, making it a 
critical challenge. Since social economy actors engage the communities, they can organise 
community-driven initiatives to mitigate a social problem such as crime (K’nIfe and Haughton, 
2013).  
Initiatives by social economy actors could follow the ‘social business’ institutional framework 
proposed by Yunus (2007) or the social entrepreneurship proposition (Mair and Marti, 2006; Dees, 
1998). Yunus (2007) described a social business as a non-dividend paying venture from which 
investors can only get back their initial investment. Social businesses seek to deliver social good in 
a financially sustainable manner. The social business model is a conceptually useful institutional 
framework because of the potentially poor financial returns that for-profit only ventures may earn 
by providing security and transport services to micro and small firms that may be unwilling or 
unable to pay a fair market price for commercially-priced services. This makes the social business 
model, which emphasises social impact, more useful to complementing government efforts to 
address the socioeconomic challenges. 
In addition to the social business model, social entrepreneurs must be encouraged to address the 
critical challenges that micro and small firms encounter. Unlike social businesses that do not pay 
dividends to their investors, social entrepreneurs can pay dividends such that investors seeking 
both a financial return and delivering social good would be attracted to invest in social 
entrepreneurial ventures. Social entrepreneurs, unlike private sector entities that may attempt to 
address the socioeconomic problems for profit purposes, are at an advantage because they can 
raise some of their capital at lower cost from NGOs, Not-for-Profit Organisations (NPOs) and 
development agencies (Greater Capital, 2011). The resultant lower weighted average cost of 
capital for social entrepreneurs improves their margins such that they are more likely to perform 
well financially and pay dividends to investors while delivering social good.  
There are indeed some initiatives to address crime by social economy actors in South Africa. One 
such example is Khulisa Social Solutions, which aims to foster enterprise development by 
preventing crime through collaborating with multiple stakeholders (Khulisa, 2012). It is necessary 
that such initiatives are supported and scaled-up by government, the private sector and the local 
communities.  
Initiatives by social businesses and social entrepreneurs along with the traditional NGOs and 
development agencies are essential in promoting micro and small enterprises in South Africa. 
While government policy has ensured that large firms invest in MSME development through the 
BBBEE legislation, the role of social economy actors is important. Social economy actors’ 
understanding of communities suggests that they are perhaps well positioned to tackle social 
problems such as crime. It is therefore necessary that there is appropriate legislation recognising 
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the emerging social economy actors such as social enterprises (ILO, 2011; Fury, 2010). Legislation 
recognising social enterprises would improve their operations ability to engage stakeholders such 
as government, NGOs, investors and the MSMEs for socioeconomic development initiatives. 
6.4  CONCLUSION 
The thesis used the World Bank Enterprise Surveys data to determine key obstacles to growth and 
the profile of firms that could expedite job creation. The results show that policies to mitigate crime 
must be the top priority. It is also necessary that MSMEs have access to efficient infrastructure 
facilities, particularly an efficient transport system for their inputs and produce and a consistent 
supply of electricity.  
Young firms encounter more obstacles than other categories. If the goal of the policy was solely to 
create more jobs, firms that create more jobs seem more likely to be black-owned. Interventions 
that would perhaps expedite job creation must encourage educated blacks to become 
entrepreneurs given that firms run by entrepreneurs with higher levels of formal education reduce 
the effects of business environment constraints such as access to finance.  Encouraging educated 
blacks to become business owners is however a long-term strategy. What is more urgent is 
training start-ups so that they are better able to secure finance, which may perhaps explain why 
young black-owned firms underperform the average MSME sector growth.  
Further research drawing from a larger and more in-depth survey instrument would contribute to 
improving the understanding of MSMEs and the extent to which they contribute to creating jobs 
and promoting social cohesion and equity. 
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Appendix 1: Estimating the binding constraint for all enterprises including large firms 
Obstacle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
finance 0.008                             0.005 
  0.014                             0.149 
land   0.010                           0.010 
    0.009                           0.021 
Licensing     0.007                         -0.001 
      0.147                         0.853 
Corruption       0.006                       0.002 
        0.029                       0.546 
Courts         0.000                     -0.004 
          0.985                     0.559 
Crime           0.006                   0.003 
            0.036                   0.277 
Customs             0.008                 0.005 
              0.144                 0.360 
Electricity               -0.003               -0.007 
                0.269               0.021 
Workers’ educ.                 0.003             -0.002 
                  0.405             0.637 
Labour                   0.004           0.002 
                    0.259           0.630 
Politic                     0.012         0.010 
                      0.016         0.084 
Practices                       0.003       -0.001 
                        0.316       0.729 
Tax admin                         0.010     0.001 
                          0.064     0.881 
Tax rates                           0.011   0.008 
                            0.013   0.163 
Transport                             -0.001 -0.007 
                              0.755 0.111 
Std. Error 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004   
R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.060 0.063 0.058 0.063 0.060 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.064 0.059 0.062 0.065 0.058 0.090 
Adj. R-sqd 0.055 0.056 0.051 0.054 0.048 0.053 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.055 0.049 0.052 0.055 0.048 0.065 
No. of obs. 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 879 880 879 880 878 
Columns 1 to 15: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (one obstacle at a time)    
Column 16: Growth = β0 + β
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Appendix 2: Estimating the binding constraint for MSMEs 
Obstacle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
finance 0.006                             0.003   
  0.064                             0.321   
land   0.011                           0.014   
    0.001                           0.000   
Licensing     0.005                         -0.001   
      0.268                         0.873   
Corruption       0.003                       0.001   
        0.330                       0.806   
Courts         -0.013                     -0.014 -0.012 
          0.026                     0.015 0.037 
Crime           0.003                   0.002   
            0.272                   0.559   
Customs             -0.004                 -0.005   
              0.415                 0.428   
Electricity               -0.004               -0.006 -0.003 
                0.166               0.036 0.297 
Workers’ educ.                 0.003             0.000   
                  0.460             0.959   
Labour                   0.005           0.007   
                    0.184           0.094   
Politic                     0.006         0.005   
                      0.250         0.350   
Practices                       0.000       -0.003   
                        0.935       0.381   
Tax admin                         0.005     0.000   
                          0.314     0.977   
Tax rates                           0.007   0.008   
                            0.078   0.140   
Transport                             -0.004 -0.010 -0.002 
                              0.280 0.023 0.656 
Std. Error 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004     
R-squared 0.306 0.314 0.304 0.303 0.307 0.304 0.303 0.304 0.303 0.304 0.304 0.302 0.303 0.306 0.304 0.339 0.309 
Adj. R-sqd 0.297 0.305 0.294 0.294 0.298 0.294 0.294 0.295 0.294 0.295 0.294 0.292 0.294 0.296 0.294 0.316 0.298 
No. of obs. 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 686 687 686 687 685 687 
Columns 1 to 15: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (one obstacle at a time)    
Column 16: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (all obstacles at once)    
Column 17: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β no. of employees + β No. of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (only significant from Column 2 to 16)
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Appendix 3: Estimating the binding constraint for medium enterprises 
Obstacle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
finance 0.006                             0.003   
  0.064                             0.321   
land   0.011                           0.014   
    0.001                           0.000   
Licensing     0.005                         -0.001   
      0.268                         0.873   
Corruption       0.003                       0.001   
        0.330                       0.806   
Courts         -0.013                     -0.014 -0.012 
          0.026                     0.015 0.037 
Crime           0.003                   0.002   
            0.272                   0.559   
Customs             -0.004                 -0.005   
              0.415                 0.428   
Electricity               -0.004               -0.006 -0.003 
                0.166               0.036 0.297 
Workers’ educ.                 0.003             0.000   
                  0.460             0.959   
Labour                   0.005           0.007   
                    0.184           0.094   
Politic                     0.006         0.005   
                      0.250         0.350   
Practices                       0.000       -0.003   
                        0.935       0.381   
Tax admin                         0.005     0.000   
                          0.314     0.977   
Tax rates                           0.007   0.008   
                            0.078   0.140   
Transport                             -0.004 -0.010 -0.002 
                              0.280 0.023 0.656 
Std. Error 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004     
R-squared 0.306 0.314 0.304 0.303 0.307 0.304 0.303 0.304 0.303 0.304 0.304 0.302 0.303 0.306 0.304 0.339 0.309 
Adj. R-sqd 0.297 0.305 0.294 0.294 0.298 0.294 0.294 0.295 0.294 0.295 0.294 0.292 0.294 0.296 0.294 0.316 0.298 
No. of obs. 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 686 687 686 687 685 687 
Columns 1 to 15: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (one obstacle at a time)    
Column 16: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (all obstacles at once)    
Column 17: 
Growth =
β0 + β log of sales + β no. of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (only significant from Column 2 to 16)
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Appendix 4: Estimating the binding constraint for young enterprises 
Obstacle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
finance 0.008                             0.009   
  0.202                             0.255   
land   0.003                           0.013   
    0.623                           0.120   
Licensing     0.009                         0.007   
      0.244                         0.429   
Corruption       0.007                       0.011   
        0.281                       0.164   
Courts         -0.031                     -0.024 -0.028 
          0.018                     0.107 0.031 
Crime           0.006                   0.002   
            0.364                   0.809   
Customs             -0.007                 -0.003   
              0.574                 0.783   
Electricity               -0.006               -0.005   
                0.354               0.456   
Workers’ educ.                 -0.002             -0.009   
                  0.849             0.403   
Labour                   0.004           0.008   
                    0.712           0.472   
Politic                     -0.002         -0.007   
                      0.897         0.618   
Practices                       -0.013       -0.023 -0.011 
                        0.088       0.012 0.151 
Tax admin                         -0.002     -0.021   
                          0.910     0.328   
Tax rates                           0.014   0.027   
                            0.157   0.083   
Transport                             -0.016 -0.019   
                              0.059 0.052   
Std. Error 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.008 0.014 0.010 0.009     
R-squared 0.318 0.311 0.317 0.316 0.338 0.314 0.312 0.314 0.310 0.311 0.310 0.322 0.310 0.319 0.328 0.432 0.323 
Adj. R-sqd 0.273 0.266 0.272 0.271 0.294 0.269 0.266 0.269 0.265 0.266 0.265 0.277 0.265 0.274 0.284 0.324 0.273 
No. of obs. 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 146 147 146 147 145 146 
Columns 1 to 15: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (one obstacle at a time)    
Column 16: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (all obstacles at once)    
Column 17: 
Growth =
β0 + β log of sales + β no. of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (only significant from Column 2 to 16)
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Appendix 5: Estimating the binding constraint for African-owned MSMEs 
Obstacle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
finance 0.007                             0.004 
  0.155                             0.574 
land   0.012                           0.010 
    0.030                           0.086 
Licensing     0.010                         0.004 
      0.114                         0.569 
Corruption       0.007                       0.001 
        0.245                       0.942 
Courts         -0.012                     -0.012 
          0.363                     0.375 
Crime           0.007                   0.004 
            0.201                   0.471 
Customs             -0.010                 -0.017 
              0.436                 0.203 
Electricity               -0.006               -0.007 
                0.210               0.167 
Workers’ educ.                 0.004             0.007 
                  0.627             0.432 
Labour                   0.008           0.006 
                    0.432           0.585 
Politic                     0.006         -0.005 
                      0.586         0.694 
Practices                       0.010       0.002 
                        0.112       0.724 
Tax admin                         -0.007     -0.031 
                          0.501     0.025 
Tax rates                           0.013   0.026 
                            0.096   0.016 
Transport                             -0.001 -0.008 
                              0.849 0.309 
Std. Error 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.013 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.007   
R-squared 0.259 0.268 0.261 0.257 0.255 0.258 0.255 0.258 0.253 0.255 0.254 0.261 0.254 0.262 0.253 0.321 
Adj. R-sqd 0.230 0.239 0.231 0.227 0.225 0.228 0.225 0.228 0.223 0.225 0.224 0.231 0.224 0.232 0.223 0.246 
No. of obs. 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 233 234 233 
Columns 1 to 15: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (one obstacle at a time)    
Column 16: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (all obstacles at once)
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Appendix 6: Estimating the binding constraint for Asian-owned MSMEs 
Obstacle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
finance 0.005                             0.007 
  0.401                             0.294 
land   0.008                           0.011 
    0.298                           0.211 
Licensing     -0.004                         -0.008 
      0.659                         0.536 
Corruption       0.000                       -0.001 
        0.975                       0.914 
Courts         -0.009                     -0.012 
          0.444                     0.413 
Crime           0.002                   0.002 
            0.731                   0.723 
Customs             -0.004                 0.001 
              0.678                 0.920 
Electricity               -0.005               -0.006 
                0.315               0.348 
Workers’ educ.                 0.002             0.006 
                  0.793             0.557 
Labour                   -0.007           -0.008 
                    0.332           0.333 
Politic                     -0.006         -0.005 
                      0.525         0.696 
Practices                       -0.018       -0.018 
                        0.006       0.012 
Tax admin                         0.013     0.010 
                          0.138     0.507 
Tax rates                           0.011   0.014 
                            0.158   0.263 
Transport                             -0.007 -0.002 
                              0.325 0.879 
Std. Error 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.007   
R-squared 0.286 0.288 0.284 0.283 0.286 0.284 0.284 0.287 0.284 0.287 0.285 0.314 0.292 0.291 0.287 0.359 
Adj. R-sqd 0.250 0.252 0.248 0.247 0.250 0.248 0.248 0.251 0.247 0.251 0.249 0.279 0.256 0.256 0.251 0.269 
No. of obs. 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Columns 1 to 15: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (one obstacle at a time)    
Column 16: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (all obstacles at once)
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Appendix 7: Estimating the binding constraint for Johannesburg-based MSMEs 
Obstacle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
finance 0.008                             0.005 
  0.031                             0.224 
land   0.007                           0.005 
    0.116                           0.289 
Licensing     0.013                         0.008 
      0.014                         0.211 
Corruption       0.001                       0.001 
        0.843                       0.879 
Courts         -0.008                     -0.006 
          0.224                     0.401 
Crime           -0.002                   -0.003 
            0.576                   0.480 
Customs             -0.013                 -0.009 
              0.126                 0.345 
Electricity               -0.008               -0.007 
                0.018               0.045 
Workers’ educ.                 0.004             0.005 
                  0.346             0.352 
Labour                   0.002           0.001 
                    0.735           0.825 
Politic                     0.004         -0.002 
                      0.581         0.760 
Practices                       -0.002       -0.004 
                        0.698       0.405 
Tax admin                         0.004     -0.001 
                          0.606     0.953 
Tax rates                           0.004   0.006 
                            0.488   0.316 
Transport                             0.000 -0.004 
                              0.976 0.520 
Std. Error 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.005   
R-squared 0.363 0.359 0.365 0.355 0.358 0.356 0.359 0.365 0.357 0.355 0.356 0.354 0.355 0.356 0.355 0.387 
Adj. R-sqd 0.348 0.344 0.350 0.340 0.342 0.340 0.344 0.349 0.341 0.340 0.340 0.339 0.340 0.341 0.340 0.348 
No. of obs. 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 388 389 389 389 388 
Columns 1 to 15: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (one obstacle at a time)    
Column 16: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (all obstacles at once)
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Appendix 8: Estimating the binding constraint for retail sector MSMEs 
Obstacle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
finance 0.010                             0.012 
  0.161                             0.133 
land   0.012                           0.018 
    0.071                           0.020 
Licensing     -0.005                         -0.022 
      0.545                         0.039 
Corruption       0.013                       0.006 
        0.023                       0.420 
Courts         -0.010                     -0.009 
          0.440                     0.532 
Crime           0.009                   0.006 
            0.131                   0.397 
Customs             0.012                 0.016 
              0.290                 0.247 
Electricity               -0.008               -0.011 
                0.223               0.138 
Workers’ educ.                 0.004             -0.001 
                  0.612             0.930 
Labour                   -0.001           0.000 
                    0.952           0.969 
Politic                     0.006         0.001 
                      0.685         0.960 
Practices                       0.004       0.001 
                        0.592       0.894 
Tax admin                         0.008     -0.002 
                          0.499     0.899 
Tax rates                           0.011   0.020 
                            0.261   0.269 
Transport                             -0.008 -0.017 
                              0.286 0.085 
Std. Error 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.013 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.016 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.008   
R-squared 0.230 0.236 0.222 0.245 0.223 0.232 0.226 0.228 0.222 0.220 0.221 0.221 0.223 0.227 0.226 0.322 
Adj. R-sqd 0.186 0.193 0.178 0.202 0.179 0.188 0.182 0.184 0.177 0.176 0.177 0.176 0.178 0.182 0.182 0.213 
No. of obs. 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 167 168 168 168 167 
Columns 1 to 15: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (one obstacle at a time)    
Column 16: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (all obstacles at once)
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Appendix 9: Estimating the binding constraint for male-owned enterprises 
Obstacle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
finance 0.008                             0.007   
  0.034                             0.096   
land   0.014                           0.017   
    0.000                           0.000   
Licensing     -0.001                         -0.009   
      0.872                         0.106   
Corruption       0.003                       0.002   
        0.320                       0.540   
Courts         -0.013                     -0.013 -0.011 
          0.043                     0.052 0.074 
Crime           0.002                   0.000   
            0.441                   0.925   
Customs             -0.005                 -0.005   
              0.371                 0.445   
Electricity               -0.005               -0.007 -0.004 
                0.114               0.039 0.250 
Workers’ educ.                 0.002             0.000   
                  0.596             0.967   
Labour                   0.003           0.005   
                    0.386           0.289   
Politic                     0.007         0.006   
                      0.230         0.397   
Practices                       -0.001       -0.004   
                        0.813       0.292   
Tax admin                         0.005     -0.003   
                          0.398     0.662   
Tax rates                           0.011   0.013   
                            0.017   0.024   
Transport                             -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 
                              0.178 0.049 0.512 
Std. Error 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004     
R-squared 0.309 0.321 0.303 0.305 0.309 0.304 0.304 0.307 0.304 0.304 0.305 0.303 0.304 0.311 0.306 0.359 0.312 
Adj. R-sqd 0.297 0.309 0.291 0.292 0.297 0.292 0.292 0.294 0.291 0.292 0.293 0.290 0.292 0.299 0.294 0.329 0.297 
No. of obs. 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 526 527 526 527 525 527 
Columns 1 to 15: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (one obstacle at a time)    
Column 16: 
Growth = β0 + β log of sales + β number of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (all obstacles at once)    
Column 17: 
Growth =
β0 + β log of sales + β no. of employees + β number of employees squared + β firm age + β firm age squared + β foreign ownership + β export + β (only significant from Column 2 to 16) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
